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DEDICATION 
To my great-great-grandparents and great-grandparents who left 
Germany and Norway to become family farmers in a new land, to my 
grandparents who passed on the family farming tradition, and to my 
parents who fought to maintain that tradition. 
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MARXIST PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY FARMING 
Introduction 
Family farming usually has been considered a form of simple 
commodity production (SCP) left untouched by capitalist development. 
Under this perspective, the family farmer is considered an independent 
producer owning both the means of production and the product of his 
labor. However, all SCP forms are transitional according to Marx's 
theory of capitalist development, which sees them as organizational 
residues of a former stage. Eventually, the family farm will be replaced 
by capitalist forms of production based upon the hired employment of 
landless laborers, Marx's theory argues. Therefore, the persistence of 
family farming within advanced capitalism has presented a problem for a 
Marxian analysis of agricultural development. 
Capitalist forms of production dominate almost all sectors of the 
U.S. economy; however, agricultural production is still predominantly 
based upon the family farm.^ Consequently, American agriculture has been 
considered an aberration, "a production system that is capitalist 
society without being of it -- a productive sector that has somehow 
resisted the intrusion of capitalist relations" (Davis, 1980:135). The 
persistence of family farming is used as evidence for the lack of 
capitalist development and has called Marx's theory of the transitional 
nature of SCP and the universality of capitalism into question. It also 
has been offered as evidence of the inapplicability of Marx's theory of 
capitalist development to agriculture (Soth, 1957:24). 
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In general, Marxist theories assume that the analysis of capitalism 
is relevant to agricultural development. Therefore, the persistence of 
the family farm does not invalidate Marx's theory (Davis, 1980:136). 
From this, one may posit two possible outcomes; the orthodox 
perspective, which predicts the imminent demise of family farming; and 
the revisionist perspective, which predicts the persistence of family 
farming. 
The "imminent demise" perspective finds support for Marx's theory of 
capitalist development in the changing structure of American agriculture. 
Under this perspective, the survival of the family farm is only 
temporary; i.e., its institutional extermination by capitalism has been 
2 
retarded but not prevented. 
The "persistence" perspective finds its support in two theoretical 
approaches. One explains the persistence of family farming by the 
3 barriers to capitalist development of agriculture; the other explains it 
through family farming's integration into the larger capitalist sphere of 
exploitation and control. 
Under the first perspective, one assumes a lack of capitalist 
development in agriculture ; this idea is common to both the orthodox 
Marxist and barriers to capitalist development perspectives. The second 
perspective assumes universal capitalist development but does not assume 
that family farming and capitalist development are incompatible. 
Instead, this perspective holds that family farming persists because it 
4 has been the basis of capitalist agricultural development, serves the 
primary objectives of capitalist production,^ or is otherwise necessary 
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to the accumulation of urban capital. 
These perspectives are representative of the diversity of Marxist 
theory in explaining family farming. Denis (1982) suggested clarifying 
the issue by regrouping the literature on the basis of its theoretical 
approach. This classification consists of three broad categories, each 
reflecting a somewhat different perspective. The first (orthodox 
Marxism) is based on Marx's law of value and his analysis of ground rent. 
The second (specificity of dominated forms) corresponds to the more 
recent literature on the articulation of modes of production. The third 
(integration and exploitation) focuses on exploitation of agriculture. 
This introduction reviews the three perspectives and comments' upon their 
limitations. From this examination, theoretical questions are examined 
and a revised perspective posed. 
Three Perspectives 
Orthodox Marxism 
Orthodox Marxism predicts the eventual differentiation and ultimate 
demise of SCP. Marx's theory of capitalist development argues that all 
SCP forms, including the family farm, are transitional. Simple commodity 
producers eventually will be differentiated into two classes, a 
bourgeoisie and a landless proletariat, through the forces of 
concentration and centralization of capital. 
While the unique characteristics of agriculture tend to modify the 
general laws of capitalist development, they do not transcend them, Marx 
argued. Land is a unique factor in the capitalist development of 
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agriculture: the existence of ground rent, a surplus-product of 
agricultural development, is acquired by a landowning class. Therefore, 
land is both a property and a natural monopoly, he asserts (Marx, 
1967:614-618). 
Marx based his analysis of ground rent on four crucial working 
assumptions (Marx, 1967:515-539): (1) both agriculture and industry are 
capitalist; (2) the organic composition of capital is lower in 
agriculture than in industry: (3) the supply of agricultural products is 
less than their demand; and (4) the landowning class is different from 
the farm-operating class. 
Under these assumptions, surplus-value arises in both sectors from 
the same relations of production. In proportion to the capital invested, 
agriculture produces a higher surplus-value than industry. Thus, free 
labor and capital mobility between sectors tend to equalize the rate of 
profit in the whole economy. However, one should note that Marx 
developed his theory to describe a system under which landlords rented 
land to capitalist farmers who, in turn, repeated the process by hiring 
laborers who performed the direct tasks of production. 
Marx (1967:616-520) asserted that capitalist development of 
agriculture lagged behind that of industry because of the property 
monopoly in land and ground rent, which is composed of differential and 
absolute rents (Marx, 1967:640-648). Variations in the natural fertility 
of the land, its geographical location, and the capital invested in it 
determine differential rents. Absolute rents, in contrast, are produced 
by all farms, regardless of their fertility or location (Marx, 
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1967:748-772). 
The gist of Marx's assumption, and the argument which followed from 
it (Marx, 1967:748-772) was this: Ground rent can only be taken out of 
profit, given that less productive farms receive a price for production 
that includes both the cost of production and the average profit. 
However, agricultural production does not share in the social 
equalization of rate of profit (because land is a property monopoly) and 
so agricultural commodities are sold at a value which exceeds their 
social price of production. Therefore, even the less-productive farm 
produces a surplus which can be used to pay rent. Surplus-value produced 
by human labor therefore is the source of profits, ground rent, and 
interest. 
Under this perspective, ground rent represents a dual loss of 
capital accumulation in agriculture. First, ground rent removes a 
portion of surplus-value which cannot be immediately reinvested in land, 
resulting in a lower organic composition of capital. Most ground rent, 
therefore, accrues to absentee landlords. Second, interest for 
improvements accrues to the capitalist tenant farmer. However, the more 
permanent improvements revert to the landowner (with the expiration of 
the lease) and become an inseparable feature of the land, with the result 
that the landowner expropriates interest as increased differential rent. 
This feature discourages capital improvements by tenants. Therefore, 
both the property monopoly and the capitalist tenant system hinder 
capitalist agricultural development. 
Kautsky's analysis of the capitalist development of agriculture 
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(1980) extends the Marxian analysis and attributes the uniqueness of 
capitalist agricultural development to the peculiar characteristics of 
land as a factor of production. These characteristics include both its 
fixed quantity (natural monopoly) and its variation in quality 
(differential rents). Both the development of private property in land 
and absolute ground rent dictate the form of capitalist development. 
Thus, Kautsky maintains there is no unique form of the capitalist 
agricultural development. 
Kautsky states that the peculiar characteristics of land 
differentiate capitalist agricultural development from industrial 
development (1980:64-58). In general, the means of industrial production 
are multiplied on an extended scale, whereas land is not; land is the 
main factor in agricultural production. This distinction indicates why 
capitalist industrial development is different from capitalist 
agricultural development: the process of concentration of industrial 
capital is independent of its centralization, while the concentration of 
agricultural capital requires its centralization. 
Land is more readily centralized in areas where renting 
predominates. Centralization in rental areas proceeds by the acquisition 
of new properties in relatively close proximity. Centralization may 
occur by rental or purchase, depending on the unique patterns of land 
ownership. The land needed for centralization, however, may not be 
available for purchase, especially if it is owner operated; therefore 
owner-operation impedes centralization. 
Kautsky believed that the characteristic dynamics of advanced 
7 
capitalism must inevitably differentiate SCP into an agricultural class 
structure composed of absentee landlords and capitalist farmers, on one 
side, and an agricultural proletariat on the other. The latter is 
composed of landless agricultural laborers along with 
semi-proletarianized tenant farmers ; these are the remnants of the 
family-labor farms. Lenin (1934, 1958), like Marx, concluded that 
increasing differentiation within SCP would result in a landless 
proletariat and a landowning bourgeoisie through the concentration and 
centralization of land. 
Criticisms of the orthodox perspective Marx's theory of the 
capitalist development of agriculture contains seven problems relating to 
his six assumptions. Briefly, these are: (1) Surplus profit is not 
necessary for reproduction in all cases, particularly in the United 
States; (2) The British tripartite class structure on which Marx based 
his theory did not develop in the U.S.; (3) The feudal relationship of 
tenant to landlord historically does not apply in the U.S.; (4) Ground 
rent has disappeared through capital accumulation on most U.S farms; (5) 
Agricultural production exceeds demand; (6) The role of the state is not 
included in the orthodox perspective; (7) Orthodox Marxism has become 
dogma. These problems are discussed in more detail below. 
Marx first assumed that capitalist ground rent was the amount in 
excess of average profit; this form of ground rent was associated with 
surplus-profit, which was required for capitalist farmers who rented land 
from landowners and hired wage laborers to produce commodities. Tenants, 
such as those in the Midwest, however, are often engaged in direct 
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production. In this case surplus-profit is not necessary to reproduce 
such production (Mooney, 1983:567-568). 
Second, Marx developed his theory in reference to the British 
tripartite class structure. This class structure did not develop in the 
U.S. for two reasons. First, land was in ample supply and readily 
obtained by subsistence and simple commodity producers from the State at 
little or no cost (Newby, 1980:8-12). Second, a previously entrenched 
feudal agrarian society did not exist. Consequently, a landed monopoly, 
the essential condition for absolute ground rent, was not present (Goss 
et al., 1980:93). This suggests that the persistence of SCP may instead 
be the result of the initial land settlement by small family farmers and 
the lag in capital penetration of agriculture (Goss et al., 1980:93). 
Third, a major problem exists with the theory of ground rent. Marx 
did not consider land as product of human labor, and so, did not conceive 
of land as a commodity. Therefore, his appeal to feudal relations to 
explain the economic necessity of landlords does not suffice in the 
United States, where land became a commodity with the onset of European 
colonization (Tribe, 1977). 
Fourth, in many of the large capitalist agricultural enterprises, 
the organic composition of capital is near, or equal to, that of the 
average industry. Such capital accumulation has resulted in the 
disappearance of ground rent on the majority of U.S. farms (Mande1, 
1980:382-383). 
Fifth, the great increase in agricultural productivity has resulted 
in the supply of agricultural products rapidly outdistancing demand. The 
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tendency toward overproduction has been stimulated by technological 
revolution (Goss et al., 1980:101). 
Sixth, Marx's analysis does not include the role of the state in 
maintaining the appearance of family farming (Goss et al., 1980; Kautsky, 
1980). The state's conscious political support may take the form of 
assisting in two contradictory roles: the accumulation of capital and 
the legitimation of the social order (O'Connor, 1973). Policies and 
programs promoting the accumulation of capital do so at the expense of 
laborers, whereas policies and programs promoting legitimation do so at 
the expense of capital. Legitimation policies and programs (e.g., 
commodity support programs) designed to aid family farming may actually 
assist in the accumulation of capital by capitalist farmers, thereby 
contributing to the differentiation process. While the two roles may 
appear contradictory, state policy may serve both simultaneously. 
The major weakness of the orthodox perspective, however, lies in its 
transformation into dogma (Denis, 1982:132). Marx claimed that his 
analysis of ground rent operated at a voluntary, abstract level and 
predicted only the necessary outcome of the capitalist evolution of 
agriculture. One must understand that while the orthodox perspective may 
have reflected the social reality of capitalist agriculture eighty years 
ago, no capitalist country today has a predominantly capitalist 
agriculture. 
While some differentiation occurs within SCP, to predict the 
eventual differentiation of SCP on that basis alone is critically unsound 
and displays only an eagerness to transfer Marx's abstract analyses and 
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political writings to specific social formations. Such a prediction 
demonstrates an incomplete analysis of the various forms of production 
and distribution of surplus-value in SCP and ignores the manner in which 
the capitalist mode of production (CMP) is articulated to SCP. Thus, the 
prediction recognizes neither the specificity of simple commodity 
producers, nor their potential for resistance and adaptation. It further 
fails to recognize the interaction of economic factors affecting both SCP 
and the CMP, generally (Denis, 1982:132). 
Articulation of modes of production 
The orthodox perspective was rejected in favor of one based on 
articulation after the predictions specified by it failed to occur and 
capitalist social formations did not become uniformly capitalistic. The 
articulation perspective emphasizes the specific nature of precapitalist 
production and the idea of a "multiform" capitalist development, together 
with the linkages (or articulations) between the different modes of 
production (Denis, 1982:133). 
Rey provides the most systematic formulation of this approach 
(Foster-Carter, 1978; Bradby, 1975). The transition from one mode of 
production to another involves both the co-existence and articulation of 
their relations of production rather than the simple succession of one by 
another. Transition is often gradual and characterized by the inversion 
of dominance (Denis, 1982:135). Articulation, in contrast, refers to the 
process by which the inversion of dominance takes place; i.e., that by 
which primary or dominant relationships become secondary or dominated, 
and secondary relationships become primary. Thus, the CMP must reinforce 
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the precapitalist modes in order to secure raw materials or labor-power 
to survive. Capitalism, in consequence, can never immediately and 
totally eliminate the modes of production which preceded it, nor the 
resulting production relationships which characterized those modes 
(Foster-Carter, 1978:59). 
Rey believes that it is necessary to study the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism if one hopes to understand the articulation of 
the CMP with other modes. He argues that landed property is essentially 
outside the CMP, being instead founded upon precapitalist or feudal 
relations of production between peasants and landowners. The effects of 
these older relations may intervene in the process of capital 
distribution within the CMP (Chevalier, 1983:167), with the result that 
ground rent is gradually transformed from a dominant relation of 
production into a secondary role (as a distributive mechanism) through 
the expansion of capitalism. 
Thus, in Rey's perspective, ground rent is the principal feudal, 
rather than capitalist, relation of production. Rey then generalizes the 
transition period from feudalism to capitalism (Bradby, 1975:59-60) to 
show that the precapitalist mode remains primary during the first stage. 
At this time, the CMP secures only raw materials from the precapitalist 
mode. This reinforces the precapitalist mode but does not promote 
capitalist relations of production. Therefore, capitalism can dissolve 
the precapitalist relations of production only by implanting transitional 
modes which will eventually yield to capitalism. 
After the CMP is established and dominant (second phase), it 
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requires the precapitalist mode to meet its increasing labor demand. 
During this transition from feudalism to capitalism, peasant agriculture 
and handicrafts are first partially, then totally, transformed or 
eliminated. A labor-force is created thereby. However, the break with 
the land may be only partial, resulting in the slower penetration of 
agriculture by capital. Thus, those precapitalist modes which still 
exist now do so on the basis of the capitalist mode and are transformed 
by its laws. Therefore, the second stage becomes transitional when 
capitalism dominates, but remains more heterogeneous in nature than the 
first. 
The full conversion of agriculture to capitalism is accomplished 
only during the third stage, when capitalism is able to provide its own 
labor supply. This third stage, Rey states, has been reached only in the 
U.S., where capital penetrates the agricultural sector. Peasant forms 
of production have been destroyed through market competition, and the 
dominance of capital asserted in the exploitation of agricultural workers 
(Chevalier, 1983:167). 
Criticisms of the articulation perspective key's articulation of 
the modes of production perspective has been criticized on four points: 
(1) The capitalist/precapitalist linkage is ambiguous. (2) The 
evolutionary transition to capitalism is questionable. (3) The relations 
of production are inadequately defined. (4) The perspective is built 
upon a rigid conception of capital. These problems are discussed in more 
detail below. 
The first criticism concerns capitalism's reason for articulating 
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with precapitalist modes. Does it do so because it needs raw materials, 
or a labor-force? If the principal motive is the production of raw 
materials, and if securing labor to produce raw material is but a 
secondary motive, there is no permanent reason for capitalism to 
articulate with other modes (Bradby, 1975:148-152). 
This suggests that articulation will occur in response to the needs 
of particular capitals, and may, under particular conditions, disappear 
again. The disappearance would be as much a response as the appearance, 
because capital continually seeks cheaper sources of substitute raw 
materials (Bradby, 1975:149). 
The problem is that at a particular stage of historical development, 
capital produces its own raw materials. If the securing of raw materials 
provides the motive for articulation, then articulation will end when 
capitalism secures all sources of raw materials. 
This motive does not necessarily imply assimilation of the 
precapitalist mode (Bradby, 1975:149). 
A second problem with Rey's approach is in its evolutionary model of 
capitalist transition (Chevalier, 1983:167-158). Although Rey rejects 
the earlier crude evolutionary models of orthodox Marxism, he reaffirms 
the predictions of Marx, Kautsky, and Lenin regarding the development of 
capitalism in agriculture. Some of the same criticisms which apply to 
the orthodox Marxist perspective therefore apply to the articulation 
perspective, e.g., the appeal to feudal relations of production in 
explanation of ground rent does not apply in the U.S., nor does the 
articulation between precapitalist and capitalist modes. The necessary 
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landed monopoly was absent (Goss et al., 1980). Also, Rey shares the 
orthodox prediction of eventual uniform capitalist agricultural 
development, and states that it has been achieved in the U.S.; however, 
American agriculture is not uniformily capitalist. Thus, the theory 
appears to deny "inconvenient" facts. 
A third problem is arguably more important. Rey does not adequately 
define the relations of production (Denis, 1982:137). His distinction 
instead treats the relations of production between noncapitalist 
producers and capital as relations of unequal exchange, conceived in an 
entirely voluntaristic fashion. Under these conditions, prices are 
determined by differential power relations rather than economic laws. 
This conception reflects a naturalistic definition of surplus, i.e., any 
natural excess over the amount needed to reproduce the producer's labor 
and means of production. However, a Marxist definition of surplus refers 
to the relationship between a producer and a nonproducer, in which the 
nonproducer appropriates part of the value of the commodity produced. 
Such a surplus may (or may not) be a natural surplus. This problem of 
definition reflects Rey's inadequate integration of Marx's law of value 
(Denis, 1982:137). 
Market prices established by power relations bear more similarity to 
a primitive theory of exploitation than a structural analysis; hence, the 
use of power relations to determine market prices results in a great 
over-simplification of the production and distribution of value between 
producers and nonproducers. Orthodox Marxism ignores the specificity of 
noncapitalist forms of production in predicting uniform capitalist 
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agricultural development, whereas the articulation perspective 
over-emphasizes specificity and takes capital for granted. Thus, 
articulation indicates a shift away from the analysis of capitalist 
economic laws as based on the law of value (Denis, 1982:137). This 
creates a substantial problem for theory. 
The fourth problem associated with articulation is that it is built 
on a rigid conception of capital. The appearance of noncapitalist 
elements are reduced to manifestations of precapitalist modes of 
production (Chevalier, 1983:155). Advocates of articulation view the 
logic of capital as being centered around formal constraints and making 
little allowance for internal variation. The appearance of precapitalist 
elements properly should be accounted for by the complexity of capitalism 
(as seen from its own internal dynamics) or by polymorphous development, 
but they are not. Thus, articulation seems to reduce capitalist dynamics 
to the unfolding of a narrowly defined set of formal invariants. 
Chevalier (1983:155), in contrast, advocates defining capitalism as a 
"polymorphous structure of variable relations of production". This 
definition permits a better understanding of particular relations of 
production not conforming to the productive logic of the CMP. 
The strength of the articulation perspective lies in its recognition 
of the specificity of simple commodity production, and also in the guards 
it sets against a mechanical and simplistic return to orthodox Marxism. 
Articulation allows one to avoid treating precapitalist modes as the 
passive horizons of capitalism, i.e., as historically-given environments 
that merely provide the raw materials, markets, and labor needed for the 
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accumulation of capital (Chevalier, 1983:155). 
Articulation also demonstrates that the SCP can be integrated into 
and transformed by capital in numerous ways, and that the differentiation 
of agriculture can assume various forms (Denis, 1982:137). The analysis 
of "plural" economies is not unique to the articulation perspective, but 
it does to some extent reformulate Trotsky's law of combined and uneven 
development (Chevalier, 1983:155).^ 
Integration and exploitation 
Several theorists have tried either to transcend articulation or 
integrate it with orthodox Marxism. The result combines the orthodox law 
of value with articulation's specificity of dominated forms in an effort 
to account for the gradual transformation and integration of SCP by 
capital. 
The integration perspective explains the lack of rapid 
differentiation within agriculture on the basis of Marx's law of value 
(Denis, 1982:137). The exploitation and subordination of labor to 
capital are central concepts of the integration perspective, and those 
Marxists using it analyze the articulation of agriculture to capital in 
terms of economic laws affecting the CMP in general. 
In this context, capital reproduces itself on an increasing scale 
and transforms all areas of production into wage labor, the highest form 
of domination. The main problem of SCP thus consists in its integration 
and transformation by capital (Denis, 1982:138). 
g 
Although the integration perspective has been used by others, 
Mollard (Denis, 1982) provides the most systematic exposition of both its 
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scope and possible limits through his contention that certain barriers 
9 
exist to the capitalist development of agriculture. The extension of 
capitalist relations of production to agriculture necessarily involves 
integrating SCP agriculture through its transformation and restructuring 
to permit capital to extract the surplus-product from simple commodity 
producers. In appropriating this surplus-product, capital exploits SCP. 
In Mollard's definition, exploitation is based on Marx's distinction 
between the real and formal subordination of labor to capital, and is 
reduced to the process of subsumption of the simple commodity producers' 
labor to capital (Denis, 1982:138). 
Agriculture comes into contact with capital through the 
agro-industrial complex. The goal of this complex is the subordination 
of SCP so as to systematically extract simple commodity producers' 
surplus-product. Mollard refers to "upstream" and "downstream" firms 
having relations with simple commodity producers (Denis, 1982:139). Two 
contradictory processes affecting SCP are connected by exploitation: 
simple commodity producers increase their assets and scale of operation 
while, simultaneously, they are gradually eliminated as a social 
institution. 
The insertion of SCP into the agro-industrial complex occurs through 
the industrialization of agriculture, which modifies the means of 
production and also creates the need for constant modernization (Denis, 
1982:139). Eventually, industrialization changes the fundamental basis 
of commodity production, raising productivity and decreasing the need for 
labor. However, it does not increase simple commodity producers' 
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incomes; thus, industrialization results only in the expropriation by 
capital of a large amount of the simple commodity producers' 
surplus-product. The expropriation by capital of this surplus-product 
forces simple commodity producers to constantly modernize their 
operations in order to increase productivity and maintain their incomes. 
Constant modernization, in turn, further integrates simple commodity 
producers into capital circulation circuits. 
Mollard identifies three mechanisms by which capital expropriates 
simple commodity producers' surplus-product: ground rent, purchase of 
the means of production, and sale of agricultural products (Denis, 
1982:139). In rejecting Marx's analysis of ground rent (because the 
organic composition of capital is similar in both industry and capitalist 
agriculture), Mollard reduces ground rent to the actual cost of land 
rather than the production of value. Like Rey, Mollard believes that 
ground rent was a relation of production under feudalism, but is a 
relation of distribution under capitalism. Mollard keeps the distinction 
between "capitalist" and "SCP" ground rent and argues that only a simple 
commodity producer who owns his land debt free is able to avoid the 
appropriation by capital of his surplus-product, thus realizing his 
ground rent. 
The second mechanism of SCP exploitation is the forced accumulation 
of capital, or the increasing investment in the means of production 
(Denis, 1982:140). In this case, simple commodity producers' 
surplus-product is expropriated before it is realized by the 
"overpricing" and "overselling" of industrial commodities. Overpricing 
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becomes a relation of production when the price paid for an item by the 
simple commodity producer is above its production price. Thus, 
exploitation occurs when higher prices transfer part of the simple 
commodity producers' surplus-product to industry. In overselling, the 
purchase of equipment (the means of agricultural production) is increased 
beyond the necessary levels. 
The sale of agricultural commodities on capitalist markets provides 
the third mechanism of exploitation of SCP (Denis, 1982:141). When 
commodities are purchased below their value, exploitation results. 
Mollard concludes that the SCP sector suffers endemic gaps between prices 
and value. This situation has worsened with the extension of 
international trade, in that prices are now determined nationally and 
internationally rather than locally. Also, superior conditions of 
production eventually become average conditions through continued 
overproduction and international competition, with the result that simple 
commodity producers who cannot modernize are eliminated. Under these 
conditions, continual modernization is required to remain competitive. 
Simple commodity producers are integrated into the functioning of 
the law of value not as capitalists but as workers, and recover only the 
value of their labor-power through the sale of their commodities, Mollard 
states (Denis, 1982:141). This exploitation results in the regression of 
SCP; i.e., its reproduction on an ever-declining base (Denis, 1982:141). 
Such regression is evident in the absolute decline of the number of 
simple commodity producers, in their exodus from agriculture, in their 
marginalization (if they resort to self-sufficiency), in their gradual 
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consumption of assets, and in the increase of both part-time farming and 
off-farm work. 
For those simple commodity producers who remain in agriculture, 
regression means that the very rationality and organization of their 
production is increasingly controlled by capital, and SCP relations of 
production are increasingly transformed into capitalist relations. 
However, the accumulation of constant capital on an enlarged scale is 
possible in SCP, although simple commodity producers' surplus-product is 
expropriated at a high rate as a result of the non-reproduction of 
labor-power, Mollard concludes (Denis, 1982:141). 
Mollard contends that three elements in the current evolution of SCP 
are interrelated; they are: exploitation of simple commodity producers' 
labor, accumulation of constant capital, and regression of SCP (Denis, 
1982:141). Discussing the operation of the law of value in agriculture 
(Denis, 1982:141-143) Mollard affirms its operation in SCP with the 
generalization of exchange between SCP and the CMP. Since the mobility 
of labor and capital necessary to transform values into prices does not 
exist in SCP, however, the law of value operates only in its simplest 
form; i.e., the exchange-value of commodities is determined by the 
socially-necessary labor time involved in their production. Mollard 
gives three reasons for this in capitalist agriculture (Denis, 1982:142). 
First, the organic composition of capital in agriculture is at, or near, 
that of industry; therefore, the production of surplus-value should be 
similar in both sectors. Second, the capital invested in land is 
immobilized; this inhibits equalization of the rate of profit. Third, 
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the immobility of capital between agriculture and other sectors prevents 
any tendency towards the equalization of rates of profit for capital in 
general and, therefore, retards or prevents the development of a general 
rate of profit for capital as a whole. Since surplus-value produced in 
agriculture tends to remain in it, the law of value as it operates in 
capitalist agriculture removes all problems of transforming values into 
prices. Consequently, the process of transforming values into prices 
operates not only for all of agriculture, but also for determining the 
price of commodities produced by simple commodity producers as well as 
capitalist producers. 
Mollard realizes that not all branches of agriculture are uniformly 
capitalist (Denis, 1982:143). Gaps between socially-necessary labor and 
labor actually expended occur as a result of structural imbalances 
between branches; however, price fluctuations usually resolve the 
imbalances : when prices fall, capitalist producers shift to more 
profitable pursuits. In contrast, simple commodity producers who are too 
far removed from the average conditions of production are eliminated; 
when this occurs labor expended realigns with socially-necessary labor, 
and the state intervenes with price supports guaranteeing an average 
profit to capitalist farmers, even in conditions of overproduction 
(Denis, 1982:143). State intervention tends to reduce fluctuations, but 
the intervention only weakens the effect of the operation of the law of 
value by allowing capitalist farmers to remain capitalist and continue 
collecting differential rents. Supported prices conform to value in the 
long run. Simple commodity producers who operate without this 
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protection, however, cannot realize or recover the value of their 
labor-power. 
Mollard's conception of the operation of the law of value in 
agriculture allows for the transfer of value from SCP to capitalist 
agriculture, as well as "upstream" and "downstream" firms. For Mollard, 
this transfer is the result of the monopoly position of capital in 
relation to simple commodity producers, and therefore is exploitation. 
The transfer of value from SCP to capitalist agriculture almost 
guarantees average profits through state supported prices, but the 
consequence of this transfer of value is the increasing 
proletarianization and marginalization of small producers, the forced 
increase in scale of middle-size producers, and the gradual extension of 
capitalist agriculture (Denis, 1982:143). 
Criticisms of the integration and exploitation perspective Mollard 
has been criticized on four points (Denis, 1982:143): (1) His inadequate 
historical perspective; (2) His lack of conceptual rigor; (3) His 
reliance on a voluntaristic concept of exploitation; and (4) His 
inadequate conception of the law of value. These are discussed in more 
detail below. 
First, Mollard's way of regarding the organic composition of capital 
in relation to ground rent, the immobility of labor and capital into 
agriculture, and the continual overproduction of agricultural products 
reflects an inadequate historical perspective. Historical evidence can 
be gathered to refute these characteristics. 
Second, in his reduction of Marx's formal and real subsumption of 
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labor into a general form of exploitation, and in his reduction of ground 
rent to the cost of land, he displays a lack of conceptual rigor. By-
reducing formal and real subsumption to a general process of subsumption, 
he ignores the specific processes by which simple commodity producers' 
labor can be subsumed by capital. Similarly, by reducing ground rent 
only to the cost of land ignores the operation of the law of value in 
agriculture and how value is distributed among producers and 
nonproducers. 
Third, his reliance on a voluntaristic conception of exploitation as 
the result of the monopoly of capital necessarily regards all capital 
uniformly (as monopoly capital) and, thus, does not consider the 
differences between monopoly and nonmonopoly capital. 
Fourth, his contention that state supported commodity prices are 
primarily responsible for an average profit in capitalist agriculture 
similarly relies on a voluntaristic explanation for their persistence. 
Mollard's major weakness, however, lies in his inadequate 
conceptualization of the law of value (Denis, 1982:144). First, he has a 
naturalistic conception of surplus-product (similar to Rey's); this 
weakens his conception of exploitation. Second, contradictions are 
evident in his contention that the law of value operates in its simple 
form in both SCP and capitalist agriculture and also that an average 
profit exists in this sector (Denis, 1982:145). The existence of this 
average profit prohibits the direct determination of market price by 
market value. Therefore, Mollard confuses his levels of analysis. The 
law of value operates in the simple form only in "pure" SCP; it does not 
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operate in its simple form in the CMP generally, nor does it do so 
specifically in either capitalist agriculture or in "integrated" SCP. 
This problem surfaces again in his contention that prices for both 
capitalist and SCP commodities are similar. The issue is not whether 
price is determined directly by value (as Mollard would seem to think), 
but whether the distribution of value (given those common prices) is 
determined by supply and demand. 
Another serious limitation of the exploitation perspective is that 
it only accounts for the easiest cases, where formal and real 
subordination of labor are readily identified (Denis, 1982:145). The 
question of whether the subordination and exploitation of SCP in general 
is possible is left unanswered, and so the issue revolves around the 
question of whether exploitation is a collective or an individual 
phenomenon. Despite all of this, however, the integration and 
exploitation perspective offers two strengths: it transcends the 
problems of the articulation perspective, and seriously attempts to 
ground an analysis of exploitation in Marx's law of value (Denis, 
1982:144). 
Theoretical Questions 
Orthodox Marxism simply does not fit the problems of American 
agriculture; it was formulated for another time, on the basis of another 
country's class structure. The articulation perspective, while more 
contemporary, descends from ambiguous assumptions and inadequate 
definitions; it is also bound by a rigid conception of capital. The 
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integration perspective, while transcending the problems of articulation, 
remains less than adequate in its theory and less than rigorous in its 
conceptualization. This leads one to question whether Marxist theorists 
have addressed the basic issues of simple commodity production 
agriculture. Therefore, it is necessary to pose and answer some basic 
theoretical questions regarding simple commodity production. These 
questions are central to the controversy surrounding Marxist studies of 
family farming: (1) Is simple commodity production a precapitalist, 
noncapitalist, or capitalist mode of production? (2) How are simple 
commodity producers exploited by capitalism? (3) How should one 
conceptualize agrarian class structure? Answers to these questions will 
provide the theoretical foundation for a revised perspective of simple 
commodity production. 
The nature of simple commodity production 
Marxists typically regard SCP as a well-preserved or distorted 
residual of an older form of production and usually present it as follows 
(Chevalier, 1983:157): Simple commodity producers own their means of 
production and exchange their commodities on the market for the goods and 
services which they cannot produce themselves. The circulation of 
production and consumption goods is diagrammed below: 
Personal& v C Selling . M Buying ' Personal& y 
Productive • ' ' Productive ' 
Consumption EXCHANGE Consumption 
Commodities (C) originate through the productive consumption of raw 
materials, labor-power, and instruments of production. In turn, these 
commodities are sold in exchange for money (M) in order to purchase 
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commodities (C) that later enter into personal and productive 
consumption activities. 
Simple commodity producers' primary concern is to reproduce, rather 
than increase, their means of personal and productive consumption; these 
means are regarded as necessary use-values. To accomplish this 
reproduction of means, they must produce use-values which may be 
converted into objects with quantified exchange-values. In brief, they 
must produce commodities that will permit them to reproduce their means 
of exchange and conditions of subsistence. The nature of SCP, therefore, 
consists in its resistance to the formal and real subsumption of labor 
under capital; thus, a limited development of both the forces of 
production and capital's expropriation of commodified factors of 
production takes place within SCP. 
Most Marxists would accept the idea that simple commodity producers' 
labor-power is never purchased by capital, causing SCP to be the location 
of noncapitalist relations of production. Orthodox Marxists tend to 
accept Marx's exposition of simple commodity production as a transitional 
mode, destined to disappear with the development of capitalism (Kautsky, 
Lenin). Articulation proponents view SCP as involving precapitalist 
relations which can be articulated with the CMP and subjected to a 
transitional, yet prolonged, process of primitive accumulation (Rey). 
Integration and exploitation advocates view the absence of a formal 
subsumption process within all forms of SCP as an indication that it is 
the location of precapitalist relations of production (Mollard). 
Chevalier (1983:157) contends that this description of the nature of 
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SCP is inadequate because it is based upon four misleading theses which 
result in an artifical description of SCP as a form partially, or fully, 
governed by its own precapitalist logic. These four theses are: (1) the 
exclusion of simple commodity producers' labor-power from the sphere of 
monetized exchange and, therefore, from the process of labor's formal 
sub sumption to capital; (2) the producers' ownership of some means of 
production, which excludes them from the formal subsumption process; (3) 
the maintenance of some degree of control over the production process, 
which excludes producers from the real subsumption process; and (4) 
simple commodity producers' alleged simple reproduction rationale (or 
subsistence-mindedness). 
Some neomarxists emphasize the theme of SCP as a capitalist labor 
process; therefore, it is subsumed under capitalist relations of 
production. Davis (1980:135) argues that to regard family farming as a 
noncapitalist form of production is to ignore the "capitalist context of 
the agricultural sector and the expanding capitalist domination of the 
family farm". He states that family farming has been transformed from a 
precapitalist form of simple conraiodity production into a capitalist labor 
process, thereby assuring a transfer of value from the propertied laborer 
to the nonfarm capitalist firm. The universality of capitalism, 
according to Davis, has reduced the family farmer to the position of a 
propertied laborer who produces his livelihood only by working as an 
agricultural piece-worker through contract production. 
Banaji (1977) demonstrates how simple commodity production is 
subordinated to capital and converted into a capitalist labor process. 
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Simple commodity producers are subjugated by the substitution of 
commodities for the production of use-values which progressively 
monetizes their cycle of reproduction. As capital extends its 
domination over SCP, the SCP enterprise becomes a "quasi-enterprise" and 
the independent producer becomes a wage laborer. In Banaji's analysis, 
the prices that simple commodity producers receive are in fact a 
concealed wage, and the sale of their commodities is really the sale of 
their labor-power; however, this process stops short of the complete 
extermination and proletarianization of simple commodity producers, who 
retain their independence in a formal sense but are actually within the 
limits of capitalist control over their labor. 
Bernstein (1977, 1979) states farmers have to be located within 
capitalist relations of production as mediated through SCP. In 
Bernstein's perspective, SCP locates the struggle between producers and 
capital for real ownership and control of farm production. Bernstein 
asserts that while simple commodity producers are exploited by capital, 
they are wage-laborer equivalents and not wage laborers; the distinction 
is necessary to specify the limits to the subjugation and real 
subsumption of simple commodity producers' labor by capital. Unlike wage 
laborers, simple commodity producers are neither totally expropriated 
from nor dependent on the sale of their "wage" labor for their 
reproduction. 
Chevalier (1983:158) contends that SCP may be subsumed, both in the 
formal and real sense, to capital, and hence, governed by the logic of 
capital without being transformed into proletarian labor. Chevalier 
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(1983:163) argues that "any factor of material consumption can be 
commodified, and its exchange-value realized, without ever entering the 
sphere of 'real' market transactions". Commodification occurs whenever 
the estimated value of the elements directly appropriated by the simple 
commodity producer, including his own labor-power, is converted into 
other commodities that are exchanged on the market (Chevalier, 1983:162). 
Only those simple commodity producers who do not respond to market forces 
can be seen as effectively resisting the mechanisms of formal 
subsumption. Real subsumption occurs through mechanization of production 
and intensification of family labor, resulting in the production of 
relative surplus-value. Real subsumption does not require the complete 
separation of the worker from his means of production. 
Location of exploitation 
The second major issue regarding SCP concerns specifying the 
location of exploitation. Classical, conventional and Marxist 
economists' studies of agriculture all focus on the role of the 
agricultural surplus in promoting economic development. Thus, for 
Marxists, the question arises of how one conceptualizes this surplus and 
the process of "exploitation" which permits its appropriation by 
capitalist industry (Goodman and Redclift, 1981:77). 
One answer focuses on the class control of the state, which extracts 
resources through taxation, manipulation of the terms of trade and other 
mechanisms (Goodman and Redclift 1981:77). Agriculture's loss of real 
income is imposed through industry's superior economic and political 
power. This process represents a redistribution of surplus-value between 
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direct exploiters - the agrarian and industrial capitalists. This 
redistribution describes the process by which relative price movements 
transfer surplus-value among capitalists. Marx saw these transfers as 
part of the process of equalization of the rates of profit among sectors. 
A second answer is based on the concept of "unequal" exchange (the 
exchange of nonequivalent amounts of labor-power) (Goodman and Redclift, 
1981:79). Because of the differences in the organic composition of 
capital and labor productivity between sectors, the labor content of 
commodities sold by simple commodity producers will be greater than that 
of the industrial commodities they purchase in exchange. This difference 
establishes the basis of unequal exchange by which simple commodity 
producers' surplus-labor is appropriated by capitalist industry. In this 
formulation, the concept of unequal exchange is intertwined with the 
concept of exploitation. 
In a strict Marxist sense, exploitation does not occur in either of 
these two answers. Rather, exploitation is a relation between social 
classes, in which nonproducers extract surplus-labor from direct 
producers (Goodman and Redclift, 1981:77). Evard (Denis, 1982:144) 
argues that the concept of exploitation is defined by social class 
relations expressed in the sphere of production, not in the sphere of 
exchange. Faure (Denis, 1982:144) responds to this criticism by arguing 
that the production process includes both the immediate process of 
production and the exchange of commodities, or the realization of value. 
Commodity production, as well as exploitation, is reproduced through 
exchange. The exchange process allows capital to control simple 
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commodity producers' agricultural production. Faure and Mollard (Denis, 
1982:145) state that relations of exchange between SCP agriculture and 
capitalism conceal relations of production. Through the exchange 
process, labor becomes a mechanism to valorize capital. The exchange 
process allows the increase of industrial relative surplus-value and 
accumulation of capital through monopoly surplus-profits. Exploitation, 
therefore, is a general consequence of capital's domination of SCP 
agriculture. For Mollard and Faure (Denis, 1982:145) exploitation occurs 
in any transfer of surplus to capital through the purchase of inputs or 
through the sale of commodities. Simple commodity producers are 
collectively exploited through the indirect controls and requirements 
that capital in general imposes on SCP as a whole. 
Agrarian class structure 
The third major issue concerns the conceptualization of agrarian 
class structure. Orthodox Marxist class analysis assumes that as 
capitalism develops in agriculture, it will eventually eliminate all 
subordinate modes (Lenin, 1934, 1958). The apparent persistence of 
simple commodity modes of production complicates such analyses. Other 
Marxists contend that such modes are essential to the nature of the CMP 
and the incomplete transformation of SCP to the CMP may be a persistent 
effect of the requirements of the CMP (Davis, 1980; Mottura and Pugliese, 
1980). 
Several problems arise when one uses Lenin's concept of class to 
describe the differentiation of simple commodity production (Lehmann 
1982:139): (1) Deep subjective and objective conflicts of interest exist 
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among simple commodity producers such that they are a class neither in 
themselves nor for themselves. These differences arise from their 
domination by and incorporation into the capitalist mode of production. 
One must use a Weberian (1964:427) concept of class to accommodate these 
conflicts of interest among collectives in a market. This concept of 
class states that an individual's (or a collective's) class status 
depends on "provision with goods", "external conditions of life" and 
"subjective satisfaction". These depend on the "kind and extent of 
control or lack of it which the individual has over the goods and 
services and existing possibilities of their exploitation for the 
attainment of income or receipts within a given economic order", 
(2) Conflicts between rich and poor farmers tend to occur on the 
local level (if at all), and so the two categories remain only 
categories; i.e., they are not status groups, interest groups, corporate 
groups, or classes. Generally, one finds involvement by both rich and 
poor farmers within a social movement, and the movement seldom makes 
demands reflecting the interest of any single category. Thus, the 
absence of corporate organizations or social movements which cohesively 
express each conflict of interests underlies the problem of using Lenin's 
conception of class. 
(3) Lenin's use of the concept of class implies a long-term trend of 
differentiation of simple commodity production into a class of 
capitalists and a class of wage laborers. The analysis of 
differentiation of simple commodity production in the Midwest, however, 
requires an explanation for the lack of such polarization. 
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One way to resolve this problem of class is to describe simple 
commodity producers as a social group differentiated through 
appropriation of their surplus-value and by their loss of control over 
their means of production. The appropriation of surplus-value from 
direct producers is central to the analysis of class relations according 
to Braverman (1974:413). Proletarianization consists in the 
transformation of labor into forms by which surplus-value may be 
appropriated by capital. Wright (1978), in contrast, focuses on the 
three central processes which underlie the capital-labor relationship: 
(1) control over the physical means of production; (2) control over labor 
power; and (3) control over resource allocation. The capitalist class is 
defined by their control over each of these processes while the 
proletariat is defined by their lack of control. Simple commodity 
producers have economic ownership and possession of the means of 
production but have no control over labor power. 
Another problem in Marxist class analysis is that these three 
processes are not perfectly coincident resulting in contradictory class 
locations. Wright (1978) elaborates three contradictory class locations: 
(1) between capitalist and proletariat (e.g., managers and supervisors); 
(2) between petty bourgeoisie and capitalist (e.g., small employers); and 
(3) between petty bourgeoisie and proletariat (e.g., semi-autonomous 
employees). 
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Dissertation Outline 
The proposed theoretical perspective views simple commodity 
production labor as being fully subsumed under capital and explains the 
contradictory trends in agricultural development by the phases of the 
long wave of late capitalist development (Mande1, 1980). This approach 
incorporates orthodox Marxism's law of value, the articulation 
perspective's reformulation of the law of combined and uneven development 
(Mandel, 1980), and the integration and exploitation perspective's 
statement of the formal and real subsumption of labor under capital 
(Chevalier, 1983). While the appropriation of simple commodity 
producers' surplus-value occurs in relations of exchange, it is 
recognized that exploitation occurs in relations of production 
(Bernstein, 1977). The theory of long waves of late capitalist 
development is used to relate the course of agricultural development to 
that of capitalist development generally. This approach is historically 
testable and capable of yielding predictions for the course of future 
agricultural development. 
The dissertation follows the three article format. Although, of 
course, the articles mean more collectively than they do singly, each 
article is intended to stand on its own merits as (respectively) a 
revised theory, a test of the theory, and a projection. The first paper 
proposes two processes which exploit simple commodity producers: (1) the 
production of absolute surplus-value through the formal subsumption of 
their commodified labor; and (2) the production of relative surplus-value 
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through the real subsumption of their commodified labor. Under this 
view, the three mechanisms by which the surplus production of producers 
may be appropriated by capital include: (1) unequal exchange, (2) ground 
rent, and (3) technological rents. 
The main arguments presented in the first paper are; (1) Full 
subsumption of agricultural production under capitalism need not result 
in the complete separation of simple commodity producers from their 
farms; (2) Simple commodity production is presently differentiated into a 
class structure of rural semi-proletarians, simple commodity producers, 
and semi-capitalist producers; (3) This process of differentiation varies 
according to the phases of the long wave of late capitalist development, 
resulting in the combined and uneven development of agricultural 
production. 
The second paper summarizes the propositions of the first and tests 
them within the context of Iowa agriculture for the period 1959 through 
1982. The first half of this period (1959-1967) should show the 
expansion of semi-capitalist agriculture and the contraction of the rural 
semi-proletariat while the second half (1967-1982) should show an 
expansion in the rural semi-proletariat and the slowing down of expansion 
of the semi-capital1st sector. Simple commodity production is 
"regressed" during both of these periods. 
When examined in this fashion, changes in the differentiation of 
simple commodity production agriculture should vary consistently with the 
phases of the long wave of late capitalist development. Changes should 
be found in the centralization and concentration of semi-capitalist 
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producers, the regression of simple commodity producers, and the 
proletarianization of small producers. Data for the analysis come from 
quinquennial censuses of Iowa agriculture for the years 1959-1982. 
Using a discrete time, stationary Markov chain, the third paper 
projects and models the structure of Iowa agriculture for the year 2002. 
Two alternative propositions are tested. The first takes the orthodox 
view and states that one should witness an increasing concentration farms 
in the larger farm-size category and a reduction of farms in the other 
two farm-size categories. The process is assumed to be independent of 
political and economic forces. The second states that with the 
increasing concentration and centralization of farms in the large 
farms-size category, one should witness the regression of farms in the 
medium farm-size category, as well as an increase in the farms in the 
small farm-size category and that this should vary consistently with the 
phases of the long wave of late capitalist development. 
The transition matrices generated by the two models are multiplied 
by the actual distribution of farms by size categories in the base period 
to obtain the predicted distribution of farms by size categories in time 
t+1. The predicted value in time t+1 is again multiplied by the 
transition matrices to obtain the predicted value in time t+2. The 
process is repeated recursively until for each of the T time periods 
is estimated to the year 2002. The data are again taken from the Iowa 
quinquennial censuses of agriculture. 
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Footnotes 
1. There is general agreement that family farming is characterized by 
(1) family ownership of land and capital and (2) dependence on family 
labor. On the basis of these criteria, agricultural production in the 
U.S. is still characterized by a predominance of family-type farms. In 
1978, 87 percent of the operators of farms and farmland in the United 
States were either full or part owners of these means of production (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1980). The family farm provided 65 percent of 
all labor in the agricultural sector -- only in California, Florida, New 
Jersey, Hawaii, Washington, Arizona, and Nevada did hired workers 
constitute more than 50 percent of the total agriculture labor force 
(United States Department of Agriculture, 1981a). 
2. Marx (1967), Lenin (1934), Kautsky (1980), Goss et al., (1980), and 
deJanvry (1980) see simple commodity production as a transitional stage. 
For these theorists, the inexorable forces of centralization and 
concentration of agricultural production will inevitably differentiate 
simple commodity producers into an agricultural bourgeoisie and a 
landless proletariat. 
3. Mann and Dickinson (1978) argue that the excess of production time 
(the period in which capital is tied up in the production process) over 
labor time (that portion of the production period in which labor is 
actually employed in creating value) associated with particular 
agricultural commodities makes the capitalist agricultural production of 
these commodities unattractive. The variance of production and labor 
time produces "an adverse effect of the rate of profit, the inefficient 
use of constant and variable capital, and the smooth functioning of the 
articulation and realization process" (Mann and Dickinson, 1978:466). 
See Perelman (1979) and Mooney (1982) for a critique of Mann and 
Dickinsons' thesis. 
4. Davis (1980) contends that family farming is not incompatible with 
capitalist development. On the contrary, "capitalist development is 
occurring throughout the agricultural sector despite the presence of the 
family farm; indeed, the family farm has itself become the basis for such 
development" (Davis, 1980:146). Capital has become so universal that a 
propertied laborer is unable to independently produce his own livelihood. 
He is unable to avoid participating in production processes where capital 
controls his productive activity and appropriates his surplus product. 
Instead he may be reduced to an agricultural piece worker by means of 
contract production. In this case, individual private property may 
actually be in the interest of capital. 
5. Mottura and Pugliese (1980) contend that the persistence of family 
farming is not a result of the precapitalist nature of such modes of 
production. Agriculture is capitalistic and the apparent persistence of 
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precapitalist modes of production can be interpreted as an aspect of the 
economy's capitalist development, not as a lag or absence of it. 
Precapitalist modes remain functional to the primary objectives of the 
capitalist mode of production. These objectives may be the creation of a 
labor reserve and the production of agricultural commodities or the 
negation of proletarianization. These objectives vary by the course of 
capitalist development in the economy. 
6. Vergopoulos (1978) contends that family farming is a necessary 
mechanism for the accumulation of urban capital. He states that family 
farming is the most successful form of production for putting the maximum 
volume of peasant surplus-labor at the disposal of urban capitalism. As 
such, it constitutes the most efficient way of keeping down the prices of 
agricultural products. Unequal exchange between agriculture and the 
urban economy results in the underpayment of agricultural labor. This 
low remuneration of labor stimulates the family farmer to increase his 
production through intensification of family labor and increased capital 
investment to achieve an adequate standard of living. The disparity 
between prices, incomes, rates of profit, and living standards comprises 
the unique method by which advanced capitalism incorporates family 
farming. 
7. Trotsky (1970:19-20)) defined the law of combined and uneven 
development as follows : 
Capitalism finds various sections of mankind at different 
stages of development, each with its own profound internal 
contradictions. The extreme diversity in the levels 
attained and the extraordinary unevenness in the rate of 
development of the different sections of mankind during the 
various epochs, serve as the starting point of capitalism. 
Capitalism gains mastery only gradually over the inherited 
unevenness, breaking and altering it, employing therein its 
own means and methods. . . . Thereby it brings about their 
rapproachment and equalizes the economic and cultural 
levels of the most progressive and the most backward 
countries.... By drawing the countries economically 
closer to one another and levelling out their stages of 
development, capitalism however operates by methods of its 
own, this is to say by anarchistic methods which constantly 
undermine its own work, set one country against another, 
and one branch of industry against another, developing some 
parts of the world economy while hampering and throwing 
back the development of others. Only the correlation of 
these two fundamental tendencies - both of which arise from 
the nature of capitalism - explains to us the living 
texture of the historical process. 
8. See Davis (1980), Vergopoulos (1978) and Bernstein (1977, 1979) 
and Banaji (1977). 
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9. The low level of technology, the need to displace machinery over 
raw material, the biological nature of the production, fragmentation of 
land ownership, and the political alliance between peasants and the 
bourgeoisie (Denis, 1982:138). 
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SECTION I: 
PROLETARIANIZATION, REGRESSION, AND CONCENTRATION: 
A REVISED PERSPECTIVE OF 
SIMPLE COMMODITY PRODUCTION 
Purpose 
This paper proposes an alternative Marxist perspective built upon 
the law of value from orthodox Marxism, the law of combined and uneven 
development from articulation of modes of production, and the integration 
and exploitation of simple commodity production (SCP) from the 
integration perspective. The proposed alternative views simple commodity 
producers' labor and means of production as being fully subsumed under 
capital; it also recognizes that while expropriation of simple commodity 
producers' surplus-value occurs in relations of exchange, exploitation 
occurs in relations of production (Bernstein, 1977:72). The combined and 
uneven development of SCP agriculture may be explained under this revised 
perspective on the basis of the law of value and the long wave of late 
capitalist development. 
The need for such a revisionist approach is readily apparent; 
Marxist theorists debating the future of the family farm as a form of SCP 
within the capitalist mode of production (CMP) have divided into two 
diametrically opposed factions each with its own predictions.^ 
Orthodox Marxists predict the imminent demise of family farming; 
they find support for Marx's theory of capitalist development in the 
changing structure of American agriculture and contend, that although 
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family farming has survived longer than Marx predicted, its survival is 
2 
only temporary. Thus, the capitalist extermination of family farming 
has been retarded, but not prevented. 
Some neomarxists, in contrast, predict that family farming will 
persist; they contend that the barriers to capitalist development 
3 inherent in agricultural commodity production or in the integration of 
4 family farming into the capitalist sphere of exploitation and control 
guarantee its existence. 
These explanations for the persistence or decline of family farming 
reflect several theoretical approaches. Denis (1982) suggested that the 
explanations for its persistence may be clarified by regrouping the 
literature on the basis of the approach used. His classification scheme 
consists of three broad perspectives, each reflecting a somewhat 
different approach.^ The first (orthodox Marxism) is based on Marx's law 
of value and his analysis of ground rent. The second (specificity of 
dominated forms) corresponds to the more recent literature on the 
articulation of modes of production. The third (integration and 
exploitation) focuses on the concept of exploitation as applied to 
agriculture. 
These three perspectives have been criticized on a number of points. 
The major weakness of orthodox Marxism is that it has been transformed 
into dogma (Denis, 1982:133). Further, its predictions account for 
neither simple commodity production's specificity nor its potential for 
resistance and adaptation to the CMP. 
The articulation perspective emphasizes the specificity of SCP but 
42 
takes the laws of capitalist motion for granted (Denis, 1982:137). Its 
strength lies in its recognition of the specificity of SCP and the guards 
it sets against a mechanical and simplistic return to orthodox Marxism. 
Articulation demonstrates that SCP can be integrated into and transformed 
by capital in numerous ways, and that agricultural differentiation can 
assume various forms (Denis, 1982:137). The analysis of "plural" 
economies, however, is not unique to the articulation perspective and may 
be seen as a reformulation of Trotsky's law of combined and uneven 
development (Chevalier, 1983:155). 
The integration and exploitation perspective accounts for the 
specificity of SCP on the basis of the law of value. The major weakness 
of this perspective is its inadequate conceptualization of ground rent 
and the law of value (Denis, 1982:144); however, it both transcends the 
shortcomings of the articulation perspective and seriously attempts to 
base an analysis of exploitation in Marx's law of value, therefore 
offering many opportunities for the analysis of SCP. 
The present article encompasses a large topic and so, for 
organizational purposes, is divided into major subsections dealing with 
exploitation, expropriation, and combined and uneven development. These 
subsections are then related to the long wave of late capitalist 
development as reflected in the evolution of SCP. 
Two Processes of Exploitation 
The perspective developed in this paper proposes two processes of 
exploitation affecting simple commodity producers. These are the formal, 
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and the real, subsumption of labor under capital. 
Chevalier (1983) builds his conception of the formal subsumption of 
commodified labor under capital upon Marx's (1977:1019-1038) distinction 
between formal and real subsumption.^ Both are needed to establish 
capitalist production as a unique mode of production. Formal subsumption 
occurs through two means : the monetization of labor-power and the 
dispossession of labor from the means of production. Thus, formal 
subsumption effectively reduces simple commodity producers to a 
wage-equivalent status. 
Real subsumption occurs through the intensification of commodity 
relations. The outcome of formal and real subsumption is a strategy of 
maximization without accumulation. This strategy may be seen as a 
response at the level of production to the processes of exploitation by 
capital described above. The two processes of exploitation are discussed 
in more detail below. 
Formal subsumption of labor under capital 
The formal subsumption process consists of two components: the 
monetization of all factors of production, and the dispossession of 
workers from all means of production. Its material expression is the 
production of absolute surplus-value (Marx, 1977:1021). Such absolute 
surplus-value is produced through the lengthening of the working day and 
the intensification of family labor (Bernstein, 1977:73). 
Monetization of labor-power Most Marxists would agree that 
simple commodity producers' labor-power is never purchased by capital, so 
for this reason SCP seems to involve only noncapitalist relations of 
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production. Chevalier (1983:160) contends, however, that "some cases of 
SCP are fully subsumed, although in their own particular fashion, under 
the logic of capital", and thus takes sharp variance with the general 
view. This bears examination. The generally accepted argument runs as 
follows : 
Farm labor is neither purchased by capital nor exchanged for real 
money; therefore, it has no exchange value and cannot be converted into a 
commodity even though the labor is productively consumed. According to 
this argument, simple commodity production's specificity thus seems to 
lie in its resistance to formal subsumption under capital; this would 
imply that the SCP enterprise is noncapitalist or precapitalist, which is 
not the case. 
Chevalier (1983:163) argues, in contrast, that "any factor of 
material consumption can be commodified, and its exchange-value realized, 
without ever entering the sphere of 'real' market transactions". 
Commodification occurs whenever the estimated value of the elements 
directly appropriated by the simple commodity producer, including his own 
labor-power, is converted into other commodities that are exchanged on 
the market (Chevalier, 1983:162). These commodities are then valorized 
in the process of generating optimum profits for productive capital and 
maintaining the conditions of subordinate reproduction of simple 
commodity producers' labor. The exchange-value of subsistence 
commodities is then determined by market calculations according to the 
measurable amounts of labor and other means of production involved. Only 
those simple commodity producers who do not respond to the forces of 
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capital-dominated markets can be seen as effectively resisting the 
mechanisms of formal substimption. 
The formal substimption of simple commodity producers can take place 
without the legal sale of their labor-power to capital, Chevalier 
(1983:154) maintains. Specifically, simple commodity producers' 
labor-power can be commodified and effectively exploited if it is 
subjected to the exploitive relations of a capital-dominated market 
through the purchase of their means of consumption and sale of their 
commodities. In other words, simple commodity producers' labor-power is 
economically purchased (by capital) without ever entering the sphere of 
legal circulation whenever their commodities are sold (to capital) or 
whenever they purchase their commodities for subsistence or as inputs 
into the production of other commodities. 
Through the purchase of their own labor-power, simple commodity 
producers attempt to attain an estimated maximum employment of their 
commodified labor (Chevalier, 1983:163). Similar reasoning applies when 
they "purchase" their own produce rather than selling it for a sum of 
money that would otherwise purchase fewer equivalent goods. Therefore, 
the value of simple commodity producers' subsistence consumption is 
obtained through means other than exchange and is determined by both the 
rate of exchange for their commodities and the markets in labor-power, 
credit, commodities, and other means of production. 
According to Marx, abstract labor is directly associated with the 
formal subsumption principle and becomes a reality only in capitalist 
economies. The commodification of labor gives it an abstract value if 
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labor's consumption either directly influences or is directly influenced 
by the larger market in constant and variable capital. Thus, 
commodification forms a test: if simple commodity producers' labor-power 
fails this test, it cannot be considered abstract labor, and therefore 
must be considered under noncapitalist relations of production 
(Chevalier, 1983:163); in contrast, if it meets this test, simple 
commodity producers' labor must be considered as abstract labor and 
therefore a capitalist relation of production. Thus, the test of 
commodification places at issue the question of whether the Marxian 
analysis of formal subsumption does (or does not) apply to SCP by 
examining the monetization of labor power. 
Dispossession from the means of production Marx (1977:1026) 
states that the formal subsumption of labor under capital involves both 
the commodification of labor by capital and capital's sole ownership of 
the means of production, as well as its appropriation of absolute 
surplus-value; in other words, the simple commodity producer is 
dispossessed from the means of production. Chevalier (1983:164) argues 
that this is not the case; instead, he writes, the distinctions between 
the legal process of property ownership and the exchange and actual 
relations of material expropriation and economic control are necessary to 
assess the exploitation by capital of SCP. Simple commodity producers 
can be dispossessed from their means of production without capital's sole 
ownership of those means (Chevalier, 1983:165), and so it follows that 
while simple commodity producers may own some of the means of production 
(i.e., land) they need not completely own or control more value than that 
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needed for their own reproduction. 
Real subsumption of labor under capital 
Real subsumption of labor under capital, the second process of 
exploitation, occurs whenever the social forces of production are 
revolutionized, resulting in a complete transformation that brings about 
large-scale production and the direct application of science and advanced 
technology (Marx, 1977:1024). Marx claimed that the introduction of 
industrial production techniques in agriculture would result in the 
eventual differentiation of simple commodity producers; however this has 
not necessarily been the case. Agricultural production may (and in the 
U.S., has) become throughly mechanized without causing the complete 
separation of the worker from his means of production. This 
contradictory tendency is just one of the effects of the general process 
of real subsumption and, furthermore, is an example of uneven development 
(Chevalier, 1983:174). 
Relative surplus-value may be viewed as the product of the real 
subsumption of labor under capital (Marx, 1977:1025); it is produced when 
commodity relations are intensified through the general adoption of 
superior production technologies, specialization in cash-crop production, 
or involvement in labor-intensive production as a supplement to household 
income. The general effect is that a greater amount of commodities is 
produced within a specified period of time. Relative surplus-value is 
also produced when the value and monetary cost of commodities consumed by 
the producers are reduced. Both factors reduce the tiT?.e necessary for 
reproduction of simple commodity producers (Bernstein 1977:73). 
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In summary, the real subsumption of labor under capital and the 
production of relative surplus-value cannot be conceived as an 
evolutionary process; rather, it must be conceived as one effect of the 
tendency toward uneven development of the CMP (Chevalier, 1983:176). 
The following model demonstrates how SCP operates in an economy 
marked by formal and real subsumption (Chevalier, 1983:176). 
Figure 1.1 
r subsistence consumption , r' 
(personal and productive) 
—C i ^ M ^ C i- ^ 
g market products g' 
SELLING BUYING 
C = commodity 
r = object of labor (natural resources) 
1 = labor-power 
i = instruments of production 
g = articles of personal consumption 
M = money and credit 
The commodities produced or appropriated by a simple commodity 
producer include personal consumption goods (g) and the factors of 
production: object of labor (natural resources) (r), labor-power (1), 
and instruments of production (machinery) (i). These commodities are 
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further divided into two categories: subsistence commodities and market 
products. Subsistence commodities (upper branch of the model) are 
directly consumed within the household. Market products (lower branch of 
the model) are exchanged for money (and credit) and the commodities (C) 
which money can buy. 
This revised model of SCP goes beyond the traditional Marxist model 
(C - M - C) by including a subsistence component (C - C) which, in its 
reduced form, converts simple commodity producers' labor into consumption 
goods (CI - Cg). The model also allows for the possibility of the 
producer selling his labor to other producers or to non-producers, or to 
increase his production by purchasing other producers' labor. 
Furthermore, the model permits important variations in the relative 
weight assigned to each branch. For instance, the more important the 
subsistence consumption component (upper branch), the less important the 
productive component (lower branch). The operation of the model is 
examined below. 
Maximization without accumulation 
The primary goal of simple commodity producers is to gain access to 
those use-values needed to achieve or maintain an acceptable standard of 
living; however, this cannot be achieved without treating use-values as 
exchange-values, which results in a strategy of "maximization in the 
concrete" (Chevalier, 1983:178). This strategy creates a problem for 
simple commodity producers because the level of concrete consumption may 
(or may not) correspond to the minimum standards for subsistence. Thus, 
they struggle to increase their productivity to maintain their incomes, 
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but their incomes are constantly eroding as a result of falling commodity 
prices. Thus, the falling rate of profit in payment for their labor 
leads to increased technical innovation (at high cost) and also to the 
intensification of family labor. 
In a commodified economy, simple commodity producers' goals and 
activities become embodied in the measurable exchange-value their 
commodities possess. For example, they may be forced out of production 
if they cannot recover the costs of production, or they may be able to 
convert their limited assets into capital investments if the opportunity 
arises. For these reasons, simple commodity producers in either branch 
must calculate the best method to employ their resources if they wish to 
maintain their present level of consumption. 
Market-centered simple commodity producers are primarily concerned 
with economic survival and therefore operate on the principle of 
"concrete economizing". By this measure, they attempt to appropriate a 
(limited) maximum value contained in the means of production they 
purchase, the land they own, the rents they pay if they do not own the 
land, the labor they purchase from others or themselves, and the produce 
they sell or purchase for their own consumption (Chevalier, 1983:178). 
The quantity of commodities produced is comparable to quantifiable 
amounts of exchange-value for those commodities; i.e., commodities used 
as means of personal or productive consumption are not realized as 
use-values only. Thus, simple commodity producers do not seek an 
increase in profits, but rather a maximum level of absolute consumption, 
which might be equal to (or less than) previous levels of consumption. 
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Treating use-values as exchange-values also results in "maximization 
without capitalization" (Chevalier, 1983:179). Basically, if simple 
commodity producers own their means of personal and productive 
consumption, they will attempt to increase them; however, they cannot 
regard their means of production as a method of profit accumulation. 
The means of production and objects of labor owned by simple 
commodity producers are of limited value, either because of the low 
market value placed on certain equipment items or their own long-term 
indebtedness. In this respect, their capital differs from industrial 
capital and so their means of production cannot be a source of profitable 
monopoly over other scarce factors of production. 
In addition, those simple commodity producers who hire wage labor 
cannot be said to constitute a class separate from those they employ 
because generally, the hired laborer is another producer of the same 
class. In general, simple commodity producers hire wage labor as 
temporary help, compensating either for a temporary shortage of household 
labor due to cyclical demographic variations in family structure 
(Friedmann, 1978:80) or for additional short-term manpower needs, such as 
those experienced at harvest. 
Exploitation summary The formal and real subsumption of labor 
under capital effectively reduces simple commodity producers to a 
propertied wage-labor equivalent status and calls for strategies by which 
they may meet the demands of capitalist exploitation. These strategies 
include greater production efforts (entered at the equivalent of a wage 
reduction) for the purpose of maintaining a relatively stable income 
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level (maximization without accumulation), an increased level of absolute 
consumption with or without an increase of profits (maximization in the 
concrete), and an increase of operating expenses, either through 
increased means of production or the hiring of outside labor 
(maximization without capitalization). The formal and real subsumption 
of simple commodity producers' labor under capital, as mechanisms of 
production of surplus-value, and the responses to these mechanisms 
constitute areas of exploitation. 
Three Mechanisms of Appropriation 
The three mechanisms of appropriation of surplus-value are ground 
rent, technological rents, and unequal exchange. Ground rents are 
composed of differential and absolute rents; technological rents are 
monopoly surplus profits which occur as the result of protected 
technlogical advances; unequal exchange occurs when a genuine 
technological revolution creates large differences in production costs 
between those firms which have (and use) the new technology and those 
which do not. Within the context of agriculture, such technological 
advances are generally understood to mean the relative amounts of 
mechanization simple commodity producers employ and consequently the 
labor-to-value ratio of the resulting product. These topics are explored 
in more detail below. 
Ground rent 
Ground rent is the first mechanism by which the surplus-value of 
simple commodity producers is appropriated from them by capital. In 
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discussing ground rent as a mechanism of the distribution of value, Marx 
distinguished between absolute and differential rents, indicating that 
differential ground rents distribute value within agriculture, while 
absolute ground rents distribute value between agricultural and 
nonagricultural capital (Denis, 1983:146). 
Differential rents will occur in agriculture when demand exceeds 
supply or when monopoly price equivalents are in operation. Such rents 
accrue to high-investment farms; these tend to be large-scale farms of 
simple commodity producers as well as semi-capitalist farmers. 
Therefore, differential rents lead to differentiation within agriculture. 
Differential rents are further subdivided into differential rents I 
and differential rents II. Type I rents are due to differences in the 
location and fertility of the land, while Type II rents are categorized 
by land on which productivity is increased through capital investment. 
Type I rents generally tend to equalize with improvements in 
transportation and the removal from production of marginal land; however, 
one should note that differences in location and natural fertility can 
never be totally equalized. 
Type II rents tend to increase in importance with rising investments 
in agricultural production simply because capital investments are made 
for the purpose of increasing productivity. Such a transfer of value 
from low to high productivity farms is not exploitation; rather, this 
transfer of value is the normal operation of the law of value (Denis, 
1983:147). 
Value is also transferred outside of agriculture. Mollard (Denis, 
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1983) and Mandel (1980) contend that the organic composition of capital 
in contemporary capitalist agriculture is similar to that found in 
industry. This increase in the organic composition of value in 
agriculture has led to the disappearance of absolute ground rent on a 
majority of farms in the U.S. (Mandel, 1980). Therefore, the organic 
composition of capital in agriculture hinders neither equalization of the 
rates of profit nor the normal transfer of value between agriculture and 
other sectors of the economy. 
The transfer of value outside of agriculture involves the extent to 
which absolute and differential rents are transferred from simple 
commodity and capitalist producers to nonagricultural capital (Denis, 
1983:147). For capitalist farmers, according to Marx and Mollard, these 
are relations of distribution. For simple commodity producers, however, 
the extent of control by nonproducers over both the production process 
and commodities makes these transfers of value into relations of 
appropriation. 
Chevalier (1983) maintains that the control exerted by the 
marketplace in land and the commodification of the value of land as an 
object of labor in agricultural products results in the subordination of 
land under capital and the appropriation of value. He maintains that the 
value of land originates in its relative scarcity as a quantifiable and 
commodified object of labor (Chevalier, 1983:173). A central component 
of all extensively commodified economies is the "valorization of all 
factors of personal and productive consumption as scarce values amenable 
to the economic laws of market supply and demand" (Chevalier, 1983:172). 
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Chevalier suggests that capitalism survives upon the coimodified 
"exploitation" of both the subject of labor (the laborer) and the 
naturally given object of labor (natural resources used in production). 
This exploitation demonstrates both the subsumption of labor under 
capital and the subsumption of nature to the social logic of abstract 
wealth (Chevalier, 1983:173), i.e., it constitutes a dual expression of 
the formal subsumption principle. Accordingly, the value of agricultural 
rents and surplus production does not originate within the strict 
confines of the agricultural sector, but rather is located in the 
systematic, intersectoral operation of capital-dominated markets. 
Mollard reduces ground rent to the actual cost of land rather than 
to the production of value (Denis, 1983:140). The scarcity of land and 
other means of production integrates simple commodity producers within 
capitalism through the mechanisms of purchase used; i.e., share rent, 
money rent, land purchase, inheritance taxes, and interest on loans for 
land purchase. Mollard argues that surplus-value is appropriated through 
indirect control and the requirements that capital in general imposes on 
SCP as a whole (Denis, 1983:146). 
More specifically, others have equated interest on loans for land 
purchase with the appropriation of surplus-value. Marx notes that where 
the borrower is a direct producer, loans for land purchase are a form of 
usurers' capital (1967:353) which absorbs not only the entire profit but 
even a portion of the wage that the simple commodity producer pays 
himself (1967:275). Kautsky contends that indebtedness is equated with 
the extraction of ground rent and assists in the proletarianization 
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process without resulting in the complete expropriation of the direct 
producer (1980:69-70). Lenin also equates ground rent with interest 
payments and of the debtor undergoing the process of proletarianization 
(1938:17). Stinchcombe similarly notes the equivalence of debt and rent 
(1961:17). 
Technological rents 
The second mechanism by which simple commodity producers' 
surplus-value may be appropriated is in technological rents, i.e., those 
obtained from permanent technological revolution.^ Technological rents 
are monopoly surplus-profits which occur when technological advances are 
protected by monopolies. A genuine technological revolution results in 
large differences in production and involves a fundamental restructuring 
of the basic techniques in all sectors of capitalist production (Mandel, 
1980:119-120). 
The main objective of capital in late capitalism is the reduction of 
direct labor costs, or the removal of human labor from production through 
automation (Mandel, 1980). Industrial production can never be fully 
automated, however, because the production of absolute and relative 
surplus-value would cease (Mandel, 1980:198-207). The total profit 
realized by the technically-advanced sectors is instead appropriated by 
the exchange of commodities with less technically-advanced sectors, such 
as SCP agriculture. 
Simple commodity producers have experienced severe pressure to adopt 
new technology in an effort to overcome the increasing differences in 
productivity between themselves and the more technically-advanced 
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sectors. Otherwise they would lose a significant amount of the 
surplus-value they produce to the more technically-advanced sectors. 
Agricultural labor productivity has increased rapidly through 
technological advance, and in late capitalism, it has experienced an even 
greater increase than has industrial labor productivity (Mandel, 
1980:378). Simple commodity producers have been driven to reduce 
production costs by increasing labor productivity, in an effort to obtain 
differential rents as close to the full value of production as possible 
(Denis, 1983:148). 
Consequently, agriculture has become Inextricably involved in the 
technological treadmill (Cochrane, 1979:387-390), with the result that 
the more-innovative simple commodity producers swallow the farms of their 
less-innovative neighbors. This technological treadmill is a form of 
differential rent (Type II) which contributes to the differentiation of 
simple commodity producers. 
Technological rents also have caused the forced, large-scale 
accumulation of capital. Such accumulation beyond necessary levels 
results in the under-utilization of equipment (Mollard, in Denis, 
1983:140). Much of this forced accumulation is financed by borrowing, 
and is considered by simple commodity producers as an investment in the 
technical conditions of production. Unfortunately, this only places them 
in debt, further integrating them into the circuits of capital 
circulation (Vergopoulos, 1978:452). This has also led to an increase in 
the organic composition of simple commodity producers' capital comparable 
to that of industry, causing the disappearance of capitalist ground 
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rent. 
Unequal exchange 
Technological rents obtained from permanent technological renewal 
are related to unequal exchange, the third mechanism of appropriation. 
A genuine technological revolution results in sectoral 
underdevelopment, i.e., in large differences in production costs between 
those firms which use the revolutionary new technology and those which do 
not. Such underdevelopment has its roots in the unequal exchange of 
commodities between technically-advanced and less-advanced sectors of the 
economy and is a characteristic of late capitalism. This unequal 
exchange of commodities between simple commodity-producing sectors and 
industrial sectors leads to the intensification of family labor among 
simple commodity producers and the decrease in remuneration for their 
commodified labor (Vergopoulos, 1978:454), as well as the production of 
relative surplus-value (Bernstein, 1977:73). In other words, the 
producers must work harder for less money, on a wage-equivalent basis. 
Sectoral underdevelopment is governed by the rates of profit, i.e., 
by competition among capitals in proportion to the total amount of 
capital placed in production by each individual firm. Simple commodity 
producers increase their labor productivity through mechanization in 
order to decrease the proportionate surplus-value appropriated by the 
more technically-advanced sectors. 
Surplus-value flows from simple commodity-producing sectors with 
below-average rates of profit into sectors with above-average rates of 
profit. This outflow results in a redistribution of economic resources 
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from simple commodity-producing sectors to the benefit of the 
more-productive sectors. The outflow will continue until the 
technological advance is generalized in all sectors, and then will begin 
again with a new set of technological advances. 
Appropriation summary 
The two processes of exploitation and the three mechanisms by which 
surplus-value is appropriated results in the "simple reproduction 
squeeze" (Bernstein, 1979:427). This terra refers to those effects of 
commodity relations on the household economy of simple commodity 
producers' households. Briefly, it means that as production costs 
increase, returns to labor decrease. The causal forces of this "squeeze" 
include the exhaustion of both land and labor, and the use of 
technological measures to combat it. Exhausted land loses productivity 
through both mining and soil erosion; exhausted labor occurs through 
intensifing family labor involvement to the detriment of health. 
Technological measures used to combat these forces include the use of 
existing methods of cultivation and more expensive means of production, 
such as improved seeds, machinery, fertilizers, insecticides, and 
pesticides. Of course, there is no guarantee that the return from this 
labor will be equal to the costs incurred, especially when deteriorating 
terms of exchange are considered. 
Therefore, the objective effect of the "simple reproduction squeeze" 
is to intensify the labor of simple commodity producers' households 
seeking to maintain or increase the supply of commodities. Capital 
incurs no costs of management or supervision anywhere in the production 
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process (Bernstein, 1979:429). 
Combined and Uneven Development 
The intensity of the "simple reproduction squeeze" varies with the 
world economy, resulting in the combined and uneven development of 
agriculture. The law of combined and uneven development states that the 
capitalist mode of production reproduces in "varying forms and 
proportions a combination of past and present modes of production, or 
more precisely, of varying past successive stages of the present mode of 
production" (Mande1, 1980:23). 
The development of capitalism, including its inner regularities and 
emerging contradictions, is a function of the six variables of the 
capitalist mode.^ "The interplay of these variables and laws of 
development can be summed up in a tendency for the various sectors of 
production and the various component parts of the value of capital to 
develop unevenly" (Mandel, 1980:42). Variations in the rate of 
appropriation of profit are indicators of this development; they are the 
expression of a mode of production based upon profit or the valorization 
of capital. 
Capitalism attempts to encroach upon new areas, changing sectors of 
SCÎ into spheres of capitalist production and replacing sectors which 
previously produced use-values with commodity production (Mandel, 
1980:47). These various modes of production are linked through the 
exchange of commodities, whose price is determined by the world market. 
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The law of value and simple commodity production 
The law of value underlies the entire combined and uneven 
development of sectors of the economy. Different levels of sectoral 
development are a logical consequence of the universalization of 
capitalist circulation; however, the universalization of capitalist 
production of commodities is not (Mandel, 1980:84). Instead, unequal 
development arises from differences in the rate of profit, and it is 
expressed in the continual search for surplus-profits, produced at the 
expense of less-productive sectors. Therefore, development occurs in 
juxtaposition with underdevelopment. Combined and uneven development 
generally takes the form of development in growth sectors and 
underdevelopment in other sectors. 
On the international level, the law of value concretely underlies 
the entire combined and uneven development of capitalist and 
semi-capitalist relations of production linked by capitalist relations of 
exchange. The development of world market prices and their effect on 
national economies is a concrete expression of this effect (Mandel, 
1980:70-73). 
World markets and agricultural commodity prices Mandel (1980:73) 
and Mollard (Denis, 1982:141) demonstrate that simple commodity 
producers' production may be sold below its real value because 
international market competition changes the classical value-price 
structure for agricultural commodities. The effects of this change are 
summarized below; 
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As capitalist relations are extended, prices are no longer 
determined locally; rather, they are set by national and international 
markets. Superior production conditions eventually become average 
conditions through continued overproduction and international 
competition; also world market prices may be below the values of 
domestically-produced commodities, especially if those commodities are 
produced under semicapitalist conditions. When this occurs, commodities 
are often exported below their "national" value. Consequently, simple 
commodity producers' "wages", considered a part of the commodities' 
value, may be much less than the value of their labor-power in the 
production of those commodities. This is especially true if simple 
commodity producers still own their means of production. 
Price variations also may occur as a result of oscillations of 
stocks and the shortages of major commodities on the world market 
(Handel, 1980:382). These variations determine whether vast expanses of 
9 less-productive land will be brought into production. Contrary to 
orthodox Marxist theory, simple commodity producers do not always extend 
production to less-productive land; they are unable to immediately 
respond to price variations because of fear of recurrent surpluses and 
because of government programs aimed at reduction of commodities (Mande1, 
1980:382) . 
Lack of capitalist agricultural development The more-productive 
lands, because of their natural fertility or larger capital investment, 
no longer yield a ground rent. Consequently, agricultural commodities 
are sold at their social price of production; this price barely covers 
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the cost of production and average profit. The low price obtainable is 
the main reason direct cultivation on a large, capitalist scale has not 
become predominant in capitalist countries. Consequently, the production 
of most agricultural commodities, particularly grain and some livestock, 
has been left to simple commodity producers. Therefore, "super-profit" 
in late capitalist agriculture (over and above the average profit) no 
longer exists. Instead, the average rate of profit in agriculture is the 
same as the rate of profit in other nonmonopolized sectors and can be 
achieved only by employing large amounts of constant capital. Capitalist 
ground rent disappears in consequence, because the organic composition of 
capital in many of the large capitalist enterprises is equal to, or near, 
that of the average industry (Mandel, 1980:383-384). 
Use-value and exchange-value of agricultural commodities The 
capitalist demand for the use-values produced by simple commodity 
producers affects redistribution of those commodities' exchange-values 
(Mandel, 1980:529). 
If demand for commodities produced below the average profit remains 
constant, simple commodity producers with below-average rates of profit 
will face only a temporary outflow of capital. However, if demand for 
commodities produced below the average profit falls, simple commodity 
producers will face a permanent loss of capital. Therefore, the 
accumulation of capital in simple commodity production will be retarded 
if the transfer of surplus-value to the monopolized sectors is not 
accompanied by a change in demand (Mandel, 1980:537). 
Simple commodity producers' decreasing capital accumulation will 
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cause a relative shortage in the use-values of commodities produced; 
hence, the market price of these commodities will increase absolutely as 
well as relatively, when compared with commodities produced by 
monopolies. Surplus-value transfer therefore declines periodically; in 
this case, demand pressure causes an equalization of the rate of profit 
associated with an increase in accumulation of capital. 
In summary, the process of equalization in the rate of profit occurs 
periodically in nonmonopolized sectors, such as agriculture (Mandel, 
1980:537-538), resulting in an increase of the sector's organic 
composition of capital comparable to that found in the monopoly sectors. 
Monopolies historically have attempted to achieve a constant source of 
surplus-value through competition with (and technological domination of) 
the less-developed sectors. This has resulted in the combined and uneven 
development of SCP agriculture. 
The long wave of capitalist development 
The law of combined and uneven development is manifested in the long 
wave of late capitalist development (Mandel, 1980). Mandel based his 
theory of technological revolution and the long waves of capitalist 
development on Marx's theory of crises; i.e., the business cycle 
(1980:109-145). Each successive repetition of the business cycle is 
characterized by the use of more productive technology than the previous 
cycle. 
Mandel noted that there have been four "long waves" in the history 
of international capitalism, each lasting approximately fifty years 
10 (1980:120-122). Each long wave can be divided into expansive and 
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stagnating phases. According to this model, we are now in the 
stagnating second half of the long wave which began with World War II. 
The stagnation is characterized by gradually decelerating capital 
accumulation. One should note, however, that these long waves function 
through the articulation of classical business cycles and are conceivable 
only as manifestations of them; i.e., they are the result of cyclical 
fluctuations and do not assert themselves in a merely mechanical fashion. 
Late capitalism is distinguished by major, long-term growth in the 
forces of production through the establishment of a series of monopolies 
in several "growth sectors" of the U.S. (Mandel, 1980:557-558). These 
sectors obtained real technological surplus-profits through the 
accelerated accumulation of capital. These growth sectors were the 
actual carriers of the expansive phase, characterized by a temporary 
12 
expansion of capitalist activity in the nonmonopolized sectors. In 
other words, the possibility of increasing surplus-profits propelled the 
expansive phase. In contrast, the speed of concentration and 
centralization of monopoly capital increased in the stagnating phase 
which followed, causing the range of capitalist activity in the 
non-monopolized sectors to shrink as the amount of surplus-value and 
surplus-profit produced in the non-monopolized sectors was reduced 
(Mandel, 1980:545). 
Mollard discusses how the integration of simple commodity production 
into the CMP has resulted in the uneven development of SCP, with the 
resulting regression of SCP agriculture, characterized by its continued 
reproduction on an ever-declining base (Denis, 1982:141). The regression 
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of simple commodity production agriculture is demonstrated by: 
. . . the absolute decline in the number of peasants, their 
subsequent rural exodus ; their marglnalization as they 
occasionally withdraw from capitalist circuits to rely 
increasingly on self-sufficiency; the gradual consumption of 
accumulated assets through the sale of land or stock; and the 
increase of part-time farming combined with off-farm work. 
A certain amount of historical support for this view was 
demonstrated by Mottura and Pugliese (1980), who noted the expansion and 
contraction of activity in the non-monopolized sectors within the context 
of Italian agriculture since Unification in 1871. In discussing its 
structural dualism, they noted two processes of development: The 
expansion of capitalist production occurred simultaneously with the 
contraction of the peasantry during periods of rapid capital 
accumulation, and the contraction of capitalist production occurred 
concurrently with the expansion of the peasantry during periods of slow 
capital accumulation. Although the U.S. has not had a peasantry similar 
to that of Italy, this nonlinear model provides a clue to understanding 
agricultural development in the United States. The process of 
peasantization noted by Mottura and Pugliese bears strong structural 
similarities to the recent rapid emergence of large numbers of small 
farms, whose operators rely on off-farm work rather than subsistence or 
commodity production for their reproduction. During the stagnating phase 
of late capitalism's long wave, the contraction of capitalist 
agricultural production appears concurrently with the extension of the 
rural semiproletariat, and the continued regression of simple commodity 
production. 
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Role of the state in agricultural development 
The state performs functions of economic accumulation, social 
control, and legitimation (integration) in late capitalist economies 
(Mandel, 1980; O'Connor, 1973; Bonanno and Ritter, 1983; Bernstein, 
1977). 
Thus, the conscious political support by the state in agricultural 
policy takes the form of aiding in the two contradictory functions of 
13 
accumulation and legitimation. "Accumulation" refers to maintaining or 
creating the conditions necessary for profitable capital accumulation, 
whereas "legitimation" refers to maintaining or creating the conditions 
necessary for social harmony. The state must maintain or create 
conditions in which profitable capital accumulation is possible while 
simultaneously maintaining or creating conditions for social harmony. If 
the state uses its coercive forces to actively assist one class, it loses 
legitimacy and undermines the basis for loyalty and support. But if the 
state ignores its role of assisting in the process of capital 
accumulation, it risks losing the source of its own power, the taxes 
drawn from the economy's surplus production capacity (O'Connor, 1973:5). 
The two roles may appear contradictory, but state policy may serve both 
14 
simultaneously. 
Because of the contradictory nature of state policy, almost every 
state agency is involved in these functions, and almost every state 
expenditure shows that involvement (O'Connor, 1973:6-7). Some 
expenditures, having the character of social capital, are intended to aid 
in profitable private accumulation while others, having the character of 
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social expenses, are intended to finance the projects and services 
required to maintain social harmony. 
Social capital expenditures can be subdivided into social investment 
and social consumption expenditures. The former increase the 
productivity of a given amount of labor power, thus increasing the rate 
of profitthe latter finance projects and services that lower the 
reproduction costs of labor and (other factors being equal) also increase 
the rate of profit.The state thus promotes the extension and 
intensification of commodity relations in conditions of low profitability 
through the expenditure of social capital. Private finance capital would 
be reluctant to operate under these conditions (Bernstein, 1977:70), 
State agricultural policy has generally reinforced the competitive 
character of the farm sector and helped to reduce food costs for the 
working class (Havens, 1982). At the sectoral level, the functions of 
accumulation and legitimation are seen to operate in policies and 
programs of public and private institutions directed at large and 
small-scale farmers (Bonanno and Ritter, 1983). These functions vary by 
the phases of the long wave of late capitalist development: the 
accumulation function takes precedence in the expansive phase while the 
legitimation function takes precedence in the stagnating phase. 
Mottura and Pugliese (1980) emphasize that agriculture performs both 
productive and labor-reserve functions and contend the state actively 
promotes each function. Both functions are present in capitalist 
societies, but their occurrence varies by the particular stage of 
capitalist development present. These stages are characterized by: 1) 
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Eras in which the predominant objective of the state is capitalist 
development and accumulation, distinguished by concentration of private 
investment and public funding in semicapitalist agriculture; 2) Eras in 
•which the predominant objective of the state is legitimation of private 
property, distinguished by a decrease in private investment and an 
increase in public investment aimed at increasing the stability of simple 
commodity production; and 3) Eras in which there is a balance between the 
state's objectives of accumulation and legitimation and the distribution 
of financing between semicapitalist and simple commodity producing 
sectors of agriculture. 
Late Capitalist Evolution of 
Simple Commodity Production 
If the appropriation of simple commodity producers' surplus-value is 
central to an understanding of agrarian class relations (Braverman, 
1974), then a model which includes more than just the appropriation of 
surplus-value from wage laborers is needed. Mooney (1983) has proposed 
such a model. 
Mooney (1983:567) develops several criteria which form the basis of 
the development of a theoretical model of agrarian class structure. The 
first criterion is the status of producers on the labor market. The 
appropriation of surplus-value from direct producers through off-farm 
work indicates proletarianization. If the household is able to retain 
surplus-value from commodity production, then pure SCP will be 
reproduced. The control of the labor power of others indicates 
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transformation toward the CMP because a direct producer who exercises 
such control is nearer a capitalist class location to the extent that 
direct production is performed by hired labor. The second criterion is 
the extent of control that direct producers exercise over the physical 
means of production and investment decisions. The presense of such 
control indicates a pure SCP class location, but the lack of such control 
indicates a proletarianization process. 
These processes are not perfectly coincident with class locations, 
giving rise to contradictory class locations (Wright, 1978). The concept 
of contradictory class location is a break from orthodox Marxist theory 
in that these locations may not be transitional but may have some degree 
of permanence in capitalist social formations. Under late capitalism, 
SCP has been differentiated into a tripartite class structure of rural 
semiproletarians, simple commodity producers, and semicapitalist 
producers. The class locations of the semiproletariat and of 
semicapitalist production are contradictory: semiproletarians are both 
laborers and direct producers; semicapitalists are both employers and 
direct producers. Simple commodity production may also be a 
contradictory class location depending upon the extent of control that 
producers exercise over the physical means of production and investment 
and their amount of off-farm work. 
This classification reformulates Lenin's typology (1958) of agrarian 
transformation in which a labor market is formed at the expense of the 
"middle peasants" to benefit of the "rich peasants". However, as 
Bernstein (1977:59) noted, the classic typology describes a particular 
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case or variant of the process, and not "its sole or necessary form of 
development". The typology of differentiation differs from the classic 
typology in that it requires neither the expropriation of direct 
producers by capital nor their real subsumption as free wage labor. 
Instead, the revised typology emphasizes large-scale, horizontal 
concentration of the means of production as well as the tendency toward 
vertical concentration and control of production. 
Although the typology presents a static picture of agrarian 
structure, it has no discrete class boundaries. Instead, those producers 
whose economic conditions place them at or near the rural semiproletariat 
or semicapitalist "boundaries" would fluctuate in and out of those 
classes according to the phases of the long wave of capitalist 
development. Of course, the same "class mobility" would also apply for 
the border areas of the other two classes. 
This revised model takes account of the three essential elements of 
late capitalist agricultural development: (1) exploitaion and 
commodification of both labor and the means of production; the 
appropriation of surplus-value f^om simple commodity producers; and (3) 
the combined and uneven development of SCP. 
Rural semiproletariat 
These producers cannot insure the needs for maintenance and 
reproduction of the household through simple commodity production alone; 
therefore, they have to sell their labor-power on a regular basis 
(Bernstein, 1977:67). This is their defining characteristic. But, 
because low wage levels do not permit their full proletarianization, they 
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may retain a small farm that contributes to their subsistence which, in 
turn, reduces the wages paid by their employers. This group constitutes 
a rural proletariat or a rural labor reserve in the process of formation. 
It is in this context that Lenin (1958:179) warned against "too 
stereotyped an understanding of the theoretical proposition that 
capitalism requires the free, landless worker". 
During the expansive phase of late capitalism's long wave, members 
of this group rely on the sale of their labor-power; their significance 
in numbers, land, and production decreases as their land is purchased or 
rented from them by simple commodity producers. 
During the stagnating phase, the subsequent decline in employment 
opportunities in off-farm work causes rural semiproletarians to rely more 
on subsistence production than on the sale of their labor-power. This 
sector thus becomes a labor reserve; its significance in numbers, land 
and production increases as the rural semiproletarians rely more on 
subsistence production and the intensification of family labor. 
To establish or enlarge their rural residences, rural 
semiproletarians purchase or rent acreages from simple commodity 
producers or semicapitalist producers. Rural semiproletarians are 
concerned with providing for their subsistence needs rather than selling 
their commodities on the market, and also consider the labor involved in 
subsistence production as costing nothing; therefore, the relationship 
between the price of land and the sale of commodities is no longer 
relevant (Kautsky, 1980:70). Some members of the rural semiproletariat 
are former simple commodity producers recently forced out of SCP; these 
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individuals may have sold their land, stock and machinery but retained 
their rural residence. 
Simple commodity producers 
The position of simple commodity producers, the middle category, is 
especially precarious; they are able to reproduce themselves through 
household production only in the most favorable circumstances (Lenin, 
1958:182), and in many cases, cannot make ends meet without securing 
loans or seeking outside employment through the sale of their 
labor-power. Each crop failure forces more of them into the rural 
semiproletariat. 
Hence, simple commodity producers, as a class, undergo regression or 
depeasantization. The former is defined as continued reproduction on an 
ever-declining base (Mollard in Denis, 1982:141), the latter as the 
wearing away of the middle members and the reinforcement of the extremes 
(Lenin, 1958:182). These processes take place in a manner consistent 
with the phases of the long wave of late capitalist development. 
The source of regression varies by the phases of the long wave. 
During the expansive phase, capitalism is extended into SCP, resulting in 
its horizontal concentration and centralization. The high-investment 
simple commodity producers obtain differential rents (Type II), which 
permit them to swallow the farms of their lower-investment neighbors. 
This high-investment expansion and mechanization is often financed 
through private or public financing. 
Simple commodity producers who cannot reproduce their operation by 
commodity production resort to off-farm employment, part-time farming. 
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and the sale of land, machinery or stock. When this occurs, they move 
towards rural semiproletarian status. The remainder, who can provide for 
their continued reproduction through commodity production, are then 
caught in the "simple reproduction squeeze" (Bernstein, 1979:427). They 
intensify the relations of production by increasing the use of family 
labor, exhaust the soil through intensive cultivation, further 
rationalize production through increased use of technology, and compete 
with semicapitalist producers for access to land (Kautsky, 1980:73). 
This has the effect of increasing relative surplus-value while decreasing 
the wage equivalent value of commodities produced, and hence increasing 
the expense (and therefore, the indebtedness) required to produce them. 
During the stagnating phase, capitalist activity in SCP agriculture 
declines, causing a decline in horizontal concentration and 
centralization, and an increase in vertical concentration and 
centralization. Thus, private and public funding for capitalist 
expansion in SCP decreases while public funding aimed at increasing the 
economic stability of SCP increases (Kautsky, 1980:64). 
Those simple commodity producers who financed their expansion and 
mechanization beyond the ability of the farm to provide for their 
continued reproduction are forced out of production by the prevalent 
economic conditions of the stagnating phase. Their farms are then held 
by private or public lending agencies and are rented to other simple 
commodity producers or semicapitalist producers if the lending agencies 
are unable to sell the farms on the market. 
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Semicapitalist producers 
Semicapitalist producers are not fully capitalist in that they use 
both hired and unpaid family labor; the hired labor force is usually tied 
to the rural semiproletariat. Semicapitalist producers are usually drawn 
from the upper stratum of the successful simple commodity producers. 
Semicapitalist producers derive their power from their economic 
base, and they share that power with nonagricultural capitalists in 
controlling the state (deJanvry, 1981:113). This shared control of the 
state results in public services oriented toward the development of 
capitalism in agriculture through labor-saving technology and 
infrastructure investment. Semicapitalist producers typically share 
ownership with public or private capital. Historically, they accumulated 
sufficient capital from public or private agencies to finance the 
extension of capitalist production. 
They operate neither on the capitalist production principle of 
"maximization in the abstract" nor on the SCP principle of "maximization 
in the concrete"; they are primarily concerned with maintaining an income 
or wage over and above operating expenses. In this respect, they are not 
comparable to capitalists receiving a profit or simple commodity 
producers maintaining a minimally-acceptable standard of living. This 
income or wage is included in the amount of the operating loans they 
receive from the lending agencies. 
Because they are so heavily leveraged, public and private agencies 
are reluctant to discontinue financing them for fear they would never be 
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repaid the interest on their investment (Kautsky, 1980:79). Therefore, 
these semicapitalist producers are usually refinanced, but not always to 
the previous level. During the expansive phase, public and private 
agencies willingly finance the extension of capitalist commodity 
production because the risk is relatively low. During the stagnating 
phase, public and private agencies are reluctant to finance the continued 
extension of capitalist commodity production because the risk is higher. 
The lending agencies are, of course, primarily concerned with maintaining 
the stability and security of their investments. 
The tendency towards increased state financing of large-scale simple 
commodity producers and semicapitalist producers indicates a trend toward 
19 
vertical concentration (Lenin, 1958). This occurs when a central state 
agency undertakes the coordination, standardization, and supervision of 
many commodity producers (Bernstein, 1977:70). According to Marx 
(1967:436-437), the use of credit by stock companies transformed 
capitalist entrepreneurs into managers of capital (Marx, 
20 1967:436-437). The semicapitalist agricultural producer, however, is 
the manager of public rather than private capital, and the farm firm 
takes the form of a public utility rather than a private stock 
21 
company. 
Semicapitalist producers thus effectively become a managerial class 
holding title to the land only in the legal sense; economic ownership 
effectively resides with the public finance agency. This distinction 
between legal and economic ownership confirms Marx's (1973:279) view that 
in an advanced stage, capital regards private property as a hindrance to 
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capitalist development and thus attempts to dissolve it in the effort to 
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transfer ownership to the state. The interest paid on loans received 
by semicapitalist producers from the public finance agency thus becomes 
the universal state rent, or a new form of ground rent. 
In summary, semicapitalist production undergoes periods of 
progressive concentration and centralization in both phases, but the rate 
and kind of centralization and concentration varies by the phase of the 
long wave. The rate is greater in the expansive phase than in the 
stagnating phase; however, the significance of semicapitalist production 
in land, production, and hired labor increases in both phases, thus 
confirming the central law of capitalist development. 
Summary 
This paper describes a revised Marxist position explaining 
contemporary family farming as a form of simple commodity production in 
the context of late capitalism and attempts to overcome the shortcomings 
inherent in the orthodox, articulation, and the integration and 
exploitation perspectives of Marxian analysis. 
In retaining the orthodox perspective's law of value, the revised 
perspective retains a rigorous conception of capital. Its additional 
concepts of permanent technological revolution and technological rents 
further locate SCP agriculture within the context of late capitalism. 
Through defining late capitalism as a combination of varying past 
successive stages in the present mode of production, the revised 
perspective acknowledges that the specificity of SCP is related to the 
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needs and contradictions of late capitalism. 
The concepts of real and formal subsumption of labor under capital 
both acknowledge the specificity of SCP and demonstrate its full 
subordination to capitalism. 
The revised perspective argues; (1) SCP may be fully subsumed under 
capitalism without resulting in the complete separation of simple 
commodity producers from their means of production; (2) SCP is being 
differentiated into a tripartite class structure of rural 
semiproletarians, simple commodity producers and semicapitalist 
producers; (3) this differentiation varies by the phases of the long wave 
of late capitalist development, resulting in the combined and uneven 
development of SCP; and (4) the state aids in this process through 
policies and programs designed to serve legitimation and accumulation 
functions simultaneously.. 
This revised perspective thus predicts the persistence of simple 
commodity producers, on a numerical basis, even though SCP undergoes 
progressive regression in both phases of late capitalism's long wave. 
The long wave is divided into the expansive phase (1940-1967) during 
which SCP is differentiated internally as differential rents (Type II) 
permit the more technically-advanced producers to incorporate the farms 
of their less-technically advanced neighbors, and the stagnating phase 
(1967-1985) during which capitalist activity in SCP decreases. 
Horizontal concentration and centralization occurs in the expansive phase 
while vertical concentration occurs in the stagnating phase. Finally, 
this revised perspective predicts the continued reproduction of SCP on an 
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ever-declining base as it undergoes successive regression at different 
rates during the phases of late capitalism's long wave. 
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Footnotes 
1. There is general agreement that family farming is characterized by 
(1) family ownership of land and capital and (2) dependence on family 
labor. On the basis of these criteria, agricultural production in the 
U.S. is still characterized by a predominance of family-type farms. In 
1978, 87 percent of the operators of farms and farmland in the U.S. were 
either full or part owners of these means of production (U.S. Department 
of Commerce, 1980). Furthermore, the family farm provided 65 percent of 
all labor in the agricultural sector -- only in California, Florida, New 
Jersey, Hawaii, Washington, Arizona, and Nevada did hired workers 
constitute more than 50 percent of the total agriculture labor force 
(United States Department of Agriculture, 1981a). 
2. For Kautsky (1980), Lenin (1934, 1958), Goss et al., (1980), and 
deJanvry (1980) simple commodity production is a transitional stage. The 
inexorable forces of centralization and concentration of agricultural 
production will inevitably differentiate simple commodity production into 
an agricultural bourgeoisie and a landless proletariat. 
3. Mann and Dickinson (1978) argue that the excess of production time 
(the period in which capital is tied up in the production process) over 
labor time (that portion of the production period in which labor is 
actually employed in creating value) associated with particular 
agricultural commodities makes the capitalist agricultural production of 
these commodities unattractive. The variance of production and labor 
time produces "an adverse effect of the rate of profit, the inefficient 
use of constant and variable capital, and the smooth functioning of the 
articulation and realization process" (Mann and Dickinson, 1978:466). 
See Perelman (1979) and Mooney (1982) for a critique of Mann and 
Dickinsons' thesis. 
4. Davis (1980) contends that family farming is not incompatible with 
capitalist development. Instead, "capitalist development is occurring 
throughout the agricultural sector despite the presence of the family 
farm; indeed, the family farm has itself become the basis for such 
development" (Davis, 1980:146). Capital has become so universal that a 
propertied laborer is unable to independently produce his own livelihood. 
He is unable to avoid participating in production processes where capital 
controls his productive activity and appropriates his surplus product. 
Instead, he may be reduced to an agricultural piece worker by means of 
contract production. In this case, individual private property may 
actually be in the interest of capital. 
5. The reader is referred to the introduction to the dissertation for a 
more detailed discussion and critique of these three perspectives. 
6. Formal subsumption implies both the monetization of labor-power and 
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the purchase of labor-power by capital. It presupposes the employer's 
monopoly of workers' objective conditions of labor (means of production) 
and the subjective conditions of labor (means of subsistence). Real 
subsumption occurs as a result of a technical revolution in the mode of 
production and the social forces of production (Marx, 1977:1026-1038). 
7. A technological revolution involves a fundamental restructuring of 
the basic techniques in all sectors of capitalist production (Mandel, 
1980:119-120). Large-scale innovation does not occur during a stagnating 
phase of the long wave of late capitalist development, because of low 
profit expectations. Once the average rate of profit begins to rise, 
capital discovers a supply of unused innovations and uninvested capital 
and now has the means to begin a technological revolution. The 
uninvested capital is added to the rapid increase in new and accumulated 
surplus-value to make a genuine technological revolution possible. 
8. These variables include the following (Mandel, 1980:39): 
. . . the organic composition of capital in general and in 
the most important department in particular (which also 
includes, among other things, the volume of capital and its 
distribution between the departments); the distribution of 
constant capital between fixed and circulating capital (again 
in general and in each of the main departments); the 
development of the rate of surplus-value ; the development of 
the rate of accumulation (the relation between productive 
surplus-value and surplus-value which is unproductively 
consumed); the development of the turnover time of capital; 
and the relations of exchange between the two departments 
(which are mainly, but not exclusively a function of the 
given organic composition in these departments). 
9. Orthodox Marxism posits that the production of agricultural 
commodities will be extended to less-productive lands as a result of 
price variations, and that the costs of production on these lands will 
determine the market price of the commodities (Mandel, 1968:279). 
10. Mandel notes the following four long waves in the history of 
capitalism: (1) The period from the end of the 18th century up to the 
crisis of 1847 was the long wave of the industrial revolution itself and 
was characterized basically by the gradual spread of the steam engine to 
all the most important branches of industry in the industrial countries ; 
(2) The period lasting from the crisis of 1847 until the beginning of the 
1890s was the long wave of the first technological revolution and was 
characterized by the generalization of the steam engine as the principal 
motive machine. (3) The period lasting from the 1890s to the Second World 
War was the long wave of the second technological revolution and was 
characterized by the generalized application of electric and internal 
combustion engines in all branches of industry. (4) The period beginning 
in North America in the 1940 and in the other imperialist countries in 
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1945-48 is the long wave of the third technological revolution (Mande1, 
1980:120-121), characterized by the generalized control of machines by 
means of electronic apparatuses (as well as the gradual introduction of 
nuclear energy). 
11. In the first phase technology is revolutionized, as characterized by 
an increasing rate of profit, accelerated self-expansion of previously 
idle capital and the accelerated dévalorisation of capital previously 
invested in now technologically-obsolete means of production. The second 
phase is characterized by retreating profits, slowly reducing 
accumulation, decelerating economic growth, gradually increasing 
difficulties in the valorization of the total accumulated capital, and 
the gradual, self-reproducing rise in idle capital. The actual 
transformation in productive technology has already occurred and has been 
generally adopted (Mandel, 1980:120-121). 
12. The search for surplus-profits by monopolies is a consequence of 
their attempt to prevent or postpone the equalization of the rate of 
profit. They realize their limitations only in the long-run when such 
equalization cannot be prevented, and the monopoly rate of profit 
descends to the level of the average profit. The monopoly profit can 
only increase above the average profit if the monopolized sector controls 
but a relatively small area of production. Since expansion of the 
monopoly sector lessens the difference between monopoly profit and 
average profit, it is not in the monopolized sector's interest to 
assimilate all the sectors where "free competition" remains; it may 
actually be in monopolies' interest to create new nonmonopolized sectors, 
particularly if the accelerated accumulation of capital primarily 
occurred in the growth sectors that were the actual carriers of the 
expansive phase of late capitalism's long wave. Therefore, monopolies 
try to prevent or indefinitely postpone the equalization of the rate of 
profit by making difficult the inflow or outflow of capital from 
particular sectors of production (Mandel, 1980:536-537). 
13. O'Connor (1973), demonstrates how the state assists in the combined 
and uneven nature of simple commodity production. The reader should 
refer to Mandel (1980) for a detailed discussion of the role of the state 
in late capitalism, and also to Havens (1982) for a discussion of the 
role of the state in agriculture. 
14. The contradictory nature of farm programs is demonstrated by the 
nature of the clientele they actually serve as opposed to the clientele 
they were designed to serve. Most United States Department of 
Agriculture commodity programs, while ostensibly designed to aid small 
farmers, have tended to disproportionately benefit large-scale farmers. 
Such benefit takes place at the expense of small-scale farmers (Schultze, 
1971; Bonnen, 1968). Federal tax laws also disproportionately benefit 
large-scale farmers rather than small-scale farmers (McDonald in Vogeler, 
1981:157). These commodity programs and tax laws simultaneously aid in 
the accumulation and legitimation process by providing nominal support to 
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small-scale farmers, even though some programs (e.g., the Farmers Home 
Administration, an agency explicitly designed to assist small-scale 
farmers) more often benefit large-scale farmers instead (United States 
Department of Agriculture, 1981b:121). Similarly, research and programs 
of the land-grant colleges, experiment stations, and the cooperative 
extension service share a bias toward large-scale producers (Vogeler, 
1981). 
15. The Farmers' Home Administration, and other agencies and programs 
designed to stabilize simple commodity production may all be described 
formally as "social expenses". The Farmers' Home Administration, the 
agricultural lender of last resort, had its origin in the Great 
Depression. Its primary purpose is to provide capital to small farmers 
who do not quality for loans from other sources. 
16. The research conducted by land-grant universities and the programs 
of the cooperative extension service may be described formally as "social 
capital/investment" programs. Historically, much of this research has 
facilitated technological advances in agriculture. Similarly, 
cooperative extension aids in the diffusion of these services to the 
users. Thus, state policy aids in the development of technical advances 
and the diffusion of these advances, leading to capital accumulation in 
industry (through the technological rents received from users) and to an 
increase in surplus-value extracted from simple commodity producers (a 
consequence of the technological rents paid). 
17. The agricultural commodity programs of the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) may be formally described as "social 
capital/consumption" programs; historically, these have subsidized farm 
incomes by providing farmers a guaranteed minimum market price for their 
commodities, thus fostering the reproduction of a competitive commodity 
production sector. Unfortunately, this assured market has led to chronic 
overproduction - caused in part by increases in productivity brought 
about by state-funded research. Such overproduction has caused supply to 
exceed demand, with the result of falling prices and continuing 
agricultural crises. Technically described, capitalist use-value demand 
fell below average profits, resulting in permanent loss of capital to 
commodity producers through the redistribution of the commodities's 
exchange-values. The Cooperative Farm Credit System is another example 
of social capital/investment expenditures in that it is a quasi-public 
agency which extends credit to farmers through member banks in situations 
where private capital is reluctant to do so; its lending agencies include 
local federal land banks and production credit associations. 
18. Kautsky (1980:79) noted this reluctance of usury capital to 
expropriate direct producers from their lands in times of economic 
distress as long as the producers repaid the interest: 
In the present conjuncture, with the profitability of 
agriculture declining as a result of world competition, and 
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the current stagnation and incipient decline of prices and 
rents, usury capital shows less and less interest in 
expropriating the indebted peasantry: if the property is 
auctioned, it stands to lose not only its interest but a part 
of its capital too. Far from hastening the process, it is 
therefore attempting to postpone it by granting arrears in 
payment and even advancing new loans - - just as the worst 
landlords in England are compelled to grant arrears on the 
payment of rent, to lower rent rates and take on the costs of 
improvement. In a recent inquiry, the landowner Winklemann 
of Westphalia states; "many usurers in this part of the 
country are finding it more to their advantage to get the 
peasant to work for them and to take from him the whole 
produce of his labor excepting his subsistence, than to 
auction his property when the gains are uncertain." 
19. In the Development of Capitalism in Russia, Lenin (1958) gave 
examples of vertical concentration in conditions under which it was more 
profitable for productive capital to invest in processing and 
manufacturing enterprises consuming commodities produced by peasants than 
to undertake the production of these commodities itself. Chayanov 
(1956), in the last chapter of his book Peasant Farm Organization called 
attention to the process of vertical concentration brought about by the 
intervention of trading capital in the conditions of production and by 
certain kinds of cooperatives. Bernstein (1979) cited examples of 
vertical concentration through state intervention, such as in the 
Tanzania villagization programs and other rural development schemes in 
African countries. 
20. Marx (1967:436-437) discussed the role of credit in stock companies 
in Capital, Volume III; Chapter 27. Particularly interesting is his 
analysis of the transformation of a capitalist entrepreneur into a 
manager of capital; 
. . . transformation of the actually functioning capitalist 
into a mere manager, administrator of other people's capital, 
and of the owner of capital into a mere owner, a mere 
money-capitalist. Even if the dividends which they receive 
include the interest and the profit of enterprise, i.e., the 
total profit (or the salary of the manager is, or should be, 
simply the wage of a specific type of skilled labour, whose 
price is regulated in the labour-market (like that of any 
other labor), this total profit is henceforth received only 
in the form of interest, i.e., as mere compensation for 
owning capital that now is entirely divorced from the 
function in the actual process of reproduction, just as this 
function in the person of the manager is divorced from 
ownership of capital. 
21. Knutson et al., (1983:250) also noted that the state may assist in 
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transforming agriculture into a public utility: 
In a public utility, government licenses production, 
establishes prices, and sets standards for service and 
performance as well as acceptable profit levels. Government 
could perform the identical function in agriculture. 
Specifically, it could decide who can produce what and how 
much, it could determine how land is used, provide credit to 
agriculture, allocate inputs used in production, and specify 
prices to be charged for inputs and paid for farm products. 
22. In the Grundrisse, Marx (1973:279) stated that in its advanced 
stage, capital: 
. . . regards the existence of landed property itself as a 
merely transitional development, which is required as an 
action of capital on the old relations of landed property, 
and a product of their decomposition; but which, as such -
once this purpose is achieved - is merely a limitation on 
profit, not a necessary requirement for production. It thus 
endeavours to dissolve landed property as private property 
and to transfer it to the state. This is the negative side. 
Thus to transform the entire domestic society into 
capitalists and wage laborers . . . the negation (of landed 
property) from the side of capital is only a change of form, 
towards its undivided rule. (Ground rent is the universal 
state rent (state tax), so that bourgeois society reproduces 
the medieval system in a new way, but as the latter's total 
negation). 
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SECTION II; 
COMBINED AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT 
OF SIMPLE COMMODITY PRODUCTION 
IN LATE CAPITALISM 
Introduction 
The recent concern with the changing structure of agriculture and 
its consequences for family farming as a form of simple commodity 
production (SCP) has led to a rapidly expanding body of research 
conducted by neo-Marxist researchers. 
Havens notes "it is imperative to analyze these changes and develop 
the link between changes in agriculture and the broader political 
economy" (1982:311). Unfortunately, much of the analysis now in the 
literature is merely descriptive and rarely relates changes in the 
structure of agriculture to the larger political-economic context, 
particularly at the global level. Also, "the omission of a theoretical 
framework which integrates these levels or units of analysis 
convincingly, uniting the development of capitalism on a world scale with 
its varied course in different social formations, is the critical 
weakness of recent Marxist underdevelopment theory and the fundamental 
cause of its deep divisions" Goodman and Redclift note (1981:66). 
This paper summarizes a theoretical perspective linking the dynamics 
of agricultural development to the capitalist world economy and 
demonstrates that the integration of agriculture into the world economy 
has resulted in its combined and uneven development. 
87 
Previous Studies 
Buttel (1980) notes two major variants within contemporary Marxist 
political economy regarding the future of the family farm as a form of 
SCP. The first predicts that the inexorable forces of centralization and 
concentration of agricultural production will inevitably differentiate 
simple commodity producers into an agricultural bourgeoisie and a 
landless proletariat. The second predicts a continued, if marginal, 
existence for simple commodity producers. Neither of these predictions 
have yet been fully realized even within American agriculture. 
Rodefeld (1978) notes that previous studies of agricultural change 
have been in near complete agreement when they found: (1) no decline in 
the levels of land and capital ownership; (2) no decline in labor 
provision by farm managers; and (3) no decline in the status of 
"family-type" farms.^ However, Rodefeld notes that recently levels of 
farmland ownership, capital ownership, labor provision and business 
ownership by farm managers have all declined. In each case, farms with 
high levels of land ownership, capital ownership, labor provision, and 
business ownership have declined relative to farms with lower levels. 
Also, small-scale farms have declined substantially relative to 
large-scale farms, and both family and tenant-type farms have declined, 
relative to larger-than-family and industrial-type farms. 
From 1959 to 1964, industrial-type farms experienced the greatest 
increase of all farm types in numbers and sales. This trend has 
continued so that today, although family-type farms account for a 
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numerical majority of farms, they do not account for a majority in either 
2 production or sales. Hence, there is today great heterogeneity and 
rapid differentiation within the family-farm sector, such that this 
sector's upper category participates in the tendency toward concentration 
3 
of production while the lower category is disintegrating. In the latter 
category, the significance of off-farm employment as a source of income 
4 has increased rapidly. 
Nikolitch (1972b) notes that while the absolute size of the farm 
work force has decreased substantially in the last thirty to forty years, 
there has been little or no change in: (1) its composition, (2) the 
relative significance of its elements, or (3) the relative proportions of 
farms employing low and high amounts of labor (Nikolitch, 1972a). 
Further examination of Nikolitch's data suggests other trends. Among 
them are a decline in short-term labor (seasonal help) and an increase in 
more permanent laborthat is, while the provision of labor by farmers, 
their families and short-term laborers (less than 75 days a year) has 
declined, the number of laborers employed for longer periods has 
increased.^ In addition, the employment of full-time laborers is 
becoming more concentrated.^ 
Further, while few studies have been conducted at the level of 
concrete social formations, one study of family labor farms in New York 
state found a tendency toward the differentiation of SCP into two 
classes: an agricultural proletariat, and a capitalist class. 
Additionally, some family labor farmers were able to reproduce the 
relations of simple commoditity production (Gillespie, 1981). 
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These data support neither the inevitability of capitalist 
development in agriculture nor the persistence of SCP, so the problem, 
then, becomes one of accounting for these contradictory trends. An 
alternative theory is needed that accounts for the gradual integration 
and transformation of SCP agriculture by capital and the lack of rapid 
differentiation within agriculture in order to explain the continued 
proportional dominance and ongoing differentiation of family farms. 
A Revised Theoretical Perspective 
The revised perspective views simple commodity producers' labor and 
means of production as being fully subsumed under capital and recognizes 
that, while appropriation of simple commodity producers' surplus-value 
occurs in relations of exchange, exploitation occurs in relations of 
production (Bernstein, 1977:72). The combined and uneven development of 
SCP agriculture may also be explained under this revised perspective on 
the basis of the law of value and the long waves of late capitalist 
g 
development. 
The revised perspective views the production of surplus-value as 
occurring in relations of production and the appropriation of 
surplus-value as occurring in relations of exchange (Bernstein, 1979). 
The two processes of exploitation affecting simple commodity producers 
are (Chevalier, 1983): (1) the formal subsumption of commodified labor 
and the production of absolute surplus-value ; and (2) the real 
subsumption of commodified labor and the production of relative 
surplus-value. The mechanisms of appropriation of simple commodity 
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producers' surplus-value include: (1) ground rent; (2) technological 
rents; and (3) unequal exchange. 
The two processes of exploitation and the three mechanisms by which 
surplus-value is appropriated results in the "simple reproduction 
squeeze" (Bernstein, 1979:427). This term refers to those effects of 
commodity relations on the household economy of simple commodity 
producers' households. Briefly, it means that as production costs 
increase, returns to labor decrease. The causal forces of this "squeeze" 
include the exhaustion of both land and labor and the use of 
technological measures to combat it. Land is exhausted when it loses 
productivity through both mining and soil erosion; labor is exhausted 
through intensification of family labor involvement to the detriment of 
health. Technological measures used to combat these forces include the 
use of existing methods of cultivation and more expensive means of 
production, such as improved seeds, machinery, fertilizers, insecticides, 
and pesticides. Of course there is no guarantee that the return from 
this labor will be equal to the costs incurred, especially when 
deteriorating terms of exchange are considered. 
Therefore, the objective effect of the "simple reproduction squeeze" 
is to intensify the labor of simple commodity producers' households, 
while maintaining or increasing the supply of commodities. Capital 
incurs no costs of management or supervision anywhere in the production 
process (Bernstein, 1979:429). 
The two processes of exploitation of simple commodity producers and 
the three mechanisms of appropriation of their surplus-value are 
91 
articulated through the phases of the long wave of late capitalist 
development which results in the uneven and combined development of SCP 
agriculture (Mandel, 1980). The expansionary phase of the long wave is 
characterized by a temporary extension of capitalist activity in simple 
commodity production agriculture. In the stagnating phase which follows, 
in contrast, the range of capitalist activity in simple commodity 
production agriculture declines. 
The state aids in this alternating expansion and contraction of 
simple commodity production agriculture through its agricultural programs 
and policies directed at capitalist and simple commodity producers 
(Bonanno and Ritter, 1983). State policy takes the form of aiding in the 
two contradictory functions of accumulation and legitimation (0'Conner, 
1973). During the expansionary phase, state policy promotes the 
accumulation of capital and the extension of capitalist activity in 
agriculture. In the stagnating phase, however, state policy promotes the 
legitimation of the state and the stabilization of simple commodity 
production agriculture. 
Late Capitalist Evolution of 
Simple Commodity Production 
If the appropriation of simple commodity producers' surplus-value is 
central to an understanding of agrarian class relations (Braverman, 
1974), then a model which includes more than just the appropriation of 
surplus-value from wage laborers is needed. Mooney (1983) has proposed 
such a model. 
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Mooney (1983:567) develops several criteria which form the basis of 
the development of a theoretical model of agrarian class structure. The 
first criterion is the status of producers on the labor market. The 
appropriation of surplus-value from direct producers through off-farm 
work indicates proletarianization. If the household is able to retain 
surplus-value from commodity production, pure SCP will be reproduced. 
The control of the labor power of others indicates transformation toward 
the CMP because a direct producer who exercises such control is nearer a 
capitalist class location to the extent that direct production is 
performed by hired labor. The second criterion is the extent of control 
that direct producers exercise over the physical means of production and 
investment decisions. The presense of such control indicates a pure SCP 
class location, but the lack of such control indictes a 
proletarianization process. 
These processes are not perfectly coincident with class locations, 
giving rise to contradictory class locations (Wright, 1978). The concept 
of contradictory class location is a break from orthodox Marxist theory 
in that these locations may not be transitional but may have some degree 
of permanence in capitalist social formations. Under late capitalism, 
SCP has been differentiated into a tripartite class structure of rural 
semiproletarians, simple commodity producers, and semicapitalist 
producers. The class locations of the semiproletariat and of 
semicapitalist production are contradictory: semiproletarians are both 
laborers and direct producers; semicapitalists are both employers and 
direct producers. Simple commodity production may also be a 
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contradictory class location depending upon the extent of control that 
producers exercise over the physical means of production and investment 
and their amount of off-farm work. 
This classification reformulates Lenin's typology (1958) of agrarian 
transformation in which a labor market is formed at the expense of the 
"middle peasants" to the benefit of the "rich peasants". However, as 
Bernstein (1977:69) noted, the classic typology describes a particular 
case or variant of the process, and not "its sole or necessary form of 
development". The typology of differentiation differs from the classic 
typology in that it requires neither the expropriation of direct 
producers by capital nor their real subsumption as free wage labor. 
Instead, the revised typology emphasizes large-scale, horizontal 
concentration of the means of production as well as the tendency toward 
vertical concentration and control of production. 
Although the typology presents a static picture of agrarian 
structure, it has no discrete class boundaries. Instead, those farmers 
whose economic conditions place them at or near the rural semiproletariat 
or semicapitalist "boundaries" would fluctuate in and out of those 
classes according to the phases of the long wave of capitalist 
development. Of course, the same "class mobility" would also apply for 
the border areas of the other two classes. 
This revised model takes account of the three essential elements of 
late capitalist agricultural development: (1) exploitation and 
commodification of both labor and the means of production (Chevalier, 
1983); (2) the appropriation of surplus-value from simple commodity 
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producers; and (3) the combined and uneven development of SCP (Kautsky, 
1980:71). 
Rural semiproletariat 
These producers cannot insure the needs for maintenance and 
reproduction of the household through simple commodity production alone; 
therefore, they have to sell their labor-power on a regular basis 
(Bernstein, 1977:67). This is their defining characteristic. But, 
because low wage levels do not permit their full proletarianization, they 
may retain a small farm that contributes to their subsistence which, in 
turn, reduces the wages paid by their employers. This group constitutes 
a rural proletariat or a rural labor reserve in the process of formation. 
It is in this context that Lenin (1958:179) warned against "too 
stereotyped an understanding of the theoretical proposition that 
capitalism requires the free, landless worker". 
During the expansive phase of late capitalism's long wave, members 
of this group rely on the sale of their labor-power; their significance 
in numbers, land, and production decreases as their land is purchased or 
rented from them by simple commodity producers. 
During the stagnating phase, the subsequent decline in employment 
opportunities in off-farm work causes rural semiproletarians to rely more 
on subsistence production than on the sale of their labor-power. This 
sector thus becomes a labor reserve; its significance in numbers, land 
and production increases as the rural semiproletarians rely more on 
subsistence production and the intensification of family labor. 
To establish or enlarge their rural residences, rural 
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semiproletarians purchase or rent acreages from simple commodity 
producers or semicapitalist producers. Rural semiproletarians are 
concerned with providing for their subsistence needs rather than selling 
their commodities on the market, and also consider the labor involved in 
subsistence production as costing nothing; therefore, the relationship 
between the price of land and the sale of commodities is no longer 
relevant (Kautsky, 1980:70). Some members of the rural semiproletariat 
are former simple commodity producers recently forced out of SCP; these 
individuals may have sold their land, stock and machinery but retained 
their rural residence. 
Simple commodity producers 
The position of simple commodity producers, the middle category, is 
especially precarious ; they are able to reproduce themselves through 
household production only in the most favorable circumstances (Lenin, 
1958:182), and in many cases, cannot make ends meet without securing 
loans or seeking outside employment through the sale of their 
labor-power. Each crop failure forces more of them into the rural 
semiproletariat. 
Hence, simple commodity producers, as a class, undergo regression or 
depeasantization. The former is defined as continued reproduction on an 
ever-declining base (Mollard in Denis, 1982:141), the latter as the 
wearing away of the middle members and the reinforcement of the extremes 
(Lenin, 1958:182). These processes take place in a manner consistent 
with the phases of the long wave of late capitalist development. 
The source of regression varies by the phases of the long wave. 
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During the expansive phase, capitalism is extended into SCP, resulting in 
its horizontal concentration and centralization. The high-investment 
simple commodity producers obtain differential rents (Type II), which 
permit them to swallow the farms of their lower-investment neighbors. 
This high-investment expansion and mechanization is often financed 
through private or public financing. 
Simple commodity producers who cannot reproduce their operation by 
commodity production resort to off-farm employment, part-time farming, 
and the sale of land, machinery or stock. When this occurs, they move 
towards rural semiproletarian status. The remainder, who can provide for 
their continued reproduction through commodity production, are then 
caught in the "simple reproduction squeeze" (Bernstein, 1979:427). They 
intensify the relations of production by increasing the use of family 
labor, exhaust the soil through intensive cultivation, further 
rationalize production through increased use of technology, and compete 
with semicapitalist producers for access to land (Kautsky, 1980:73). 
This has the affect of increasing relative surplus-value while decreasing 
the wage equivalent value of commodities produced, and hence increasing 
the expense (and therefore, the indebtedness) required to produce them. 
During the stagnating phase, capitalist activity in SCP agriculture 
declines, causing a decline in horizontal concentration and 
centralization, and an increase in vertical concentration and 
centralization. Thus, private and public funding for capitalist 
expansion in SCP decreases while public funding aimed at increasing the 
economic stability of SCP increases (Kautsky, 1980:64). 
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Those simple commodity producers who financed their expansion and 
mechanization beyond the ability of the farm to provide for their 
continued reproduction are forced out of production by the prevalent 
economic conditions of the stagnating phase. Their farms are then held 
by private or public lending agencies and are rented to other simple 
commodity producers or semicapitalist producers if the lending agencies 
are unable to sell the farms on the market. 
Semicapitalist producers 
Semicapitalist producers are not fully capitalist in that they use 
both hired and unpaid family labor. The hired labor force is usually 
tied to the rural semiproletariat. Semicapitalist producers are usually 
drawn from the upper stratum of the successful simple commodity 
producers. 
Semicapitalist producers derive their power from their economic 
base, and they share that power with nonagricultural capitalists in 
controlling the state (deJanvry, 1981:113). This shared control of the 
state results in public services oriented toward the development of 
capitalism in agriculture through labor-saving technology and 
infrastructure investment. Semi-capitalist producers typically share 
ownership with public or private capital. Historically, they accumulated 
sufficient capital from public or private agencies to finance the 
extension of capitalist production. 
They operate neither on the capitalist production principle of 
"maximization in the abstract" nor on the SCP principle of "maximization 
in the concrete"; they are primarily concerned with maintaining an income 
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or wage over and above operating expenses. In this respect, they are not 
comparable to capitalists receiving a profit or simple commodity 
producers maintaining a minimally-acceptable standard of living. This 
income or wage is included in the amount of the operating loans they 
receive from the lending agencies. 
Because they are so heavily leveraged, public and private agencies 
are reluctant to discontinue financing them for fear they would never be 
repaid the interest on their investment (Kautsky, 1980:79). Therefore, 
these semicapitalist producers are usually refinanced, but not always to 
the previous level. During the expansive phase, public and private 
agencies willingly finance the extension of capitalist commodity 
production because the risk is relatively low. During the stagnating 
phase, public and private agencies are reluctant to finance the continued 
extension of capitalist commodity production because the risk is higher. 
The lending agencies are. of course, primarily concerned with maintaining 
the stability and security of their investments. 
The tendency towards increased state financing of large-scale simple 
commodity producers and semicapitalist producers indicates a trend toward 
9 
vertical concentration (Lenin, 1958). This occurs when a central state 
agency undertakes the coordination, standardization, and supervision of 
many commodity producers (Bernstein, 1977;70). According to Marx 
(1967:436-437), the use of credit by stock companies transformed 
capitalist entrepreneurs into managers of capital (Marx, 1967:436-437). 
The semicapitalist agricultural producer, however, is the manager of 
public rather than private capital, and the farm firm takes the form of a 
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public utility rather than a private stock company. 
Semicapitalist producers thus effectively become a managerial class 
holding title to the land only in the legal sense; economic ownership 
effectively resides with the public finance agency. This distinction 
between legal and economic ownership confirms Marx's (1973:279) view that 
in an advanced stage, capital regards private property as a hindrance to 
capitalist development and thus attempts to dissolve it in the effort to 
transfer ownership to the state. The interest paid on loans received by 
semicapitalist producers from the public finance agency thus becomes the 
universal state rent, or a new form of ground rent. 
In summary, semicapitalist production undergoes periods of 
progressive concentration and centralization in both phases, but the rate 
and kind of centralization and concentration varies by the phase of the 
long wave. The rate is greater in the expansive phase than in the 
stagnating phase; however, the significance of semicapitalist production 
in land, production, and hired labor increases in both phases, thus 
confirming the central law of capitalist development. 
Setting and Data 
The era between 1959 and 1982 was selected for analysis because it 
spans parts of two different eras of agricultural development in the 
United States. Cochrane (1979) described the period from 1930 to 1970 as 
"The Era of Technological Revolution" and the years after 1970 as "The 
Era of Market Instability and Uncertainty". During the later part of the 
"Era of Technological Revolution" (1950-1970), American agriculture 
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underwent a great structural transformation. 
These two "eras" correspond approximately with Handel's (1980) 
analysis of the closing years of the expansive phase of late capitalism's 
long wave (1959-1967) and the beginning of the stagnating phase 
(1967-1982). If the law of combined and uneven development is valid, the 
contradictory tendencies of capitalist agricultural development should 
then be more apparent during the period of transition from the expansive 
to the stagnating phase of the long wave of late capitalist development. 
Iowa was chosen for study because 98 percent of the farms in the 
state were classified as family farms (Nikolitch, 1962). Therefore, if 
the processes of late capitalist development occur as predicted by the 
law of combined and uneven development in an area where SCP agriculture 
predominates, one might generalize to other areas where similar 
conditions prevail. The quinquennial censuses of agriculture for Iowa 
for the years 1959 to 1982 provided the data for this analysis.Each 
12 
census reports various characteristics by ten farm-size categories. 
Measurement 
Agrarian class structure 
Farmers were separated into one of three classes based on 
examination of the percentage distribution of various farm structural 
characteristics over time and among the ten farm-size categories reported 
13 in the cenuses. The natural breaking points in the percent 
distribution of number of farms, acres in farms, value of products sold, 
and farms with a full-time labor force appeared after the 10 to 49 acres 
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and 260-499 acres farm-size categories. Collapsing the ten farm-size 
categories around these natural breaks provided three farm-size 
categories: less than 50 acres, 50 to 499 acres, and 500 or more 
14 
acres. These categories correspond respectively to the rural 
semiproletariat, simple commodity producers, and semicapitalist 
producers. These size categories also have been used by other 
researchers to describe the structure of Iowa agriculture (Lasley and 
Goudy, 1982; 1984). 
Rural semiproletarianization 
Rural semiproletarians reproduce their operations through the sale 
of their labor-power, their subsistence production, and their rental or 
ownership of small tracts of land. These characteristics are indicated 
by the percent of the total number of farms, acres in farms, value of 
products sold, farms reporting 100 or more days off-farm work a year, 
ownership, part ownership, and tenancy in the less than 50 acres 
farm-size category. 
Regression of simple commodity production 
Regression refers to the "continued reproduction of simple commodity 
production on an ever-declining base" and is indicated as the overall 
decline in significance of SCP when measured in terms of the absolute 
number of farms, production, acreage, and ownership. Under such 
declining conditions, one should see an increase in part-time farming and 
off-farm work, an increase the use of family labor, and an increased 
rationalization of production through the use of technology. 
All measures of "regression of SCP" were computed for the 50-499 
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acres farm-size category. The absolute decline in the significance of 
SCP is indicated by the percent decrease in the total number of farms, 
value of products sold, acres in farms, ownership, part-ownership, and 
tenancy of farms. Semiproletarianization is indicated by the percent and 
percent change of the total of the number of farms reporting 100 or more 
days off-farm work a year. 
Concentration and centralization of semicapitalist production 
"Centralization" refers to the union of different farms into a 
single farm. "Concentration" refers to the growth in value in each 
semicapitalist farm resulting from the processes of accumulation and 
competition which have eliminated smaller and weaker farms. Kautsky 
(1980) asserts that centralization proceeds through tenure arrangements 
and is therefore impeded wherever owner operation prevails. The process 
of concentration cannot take place independently of centralization, he 
asserts (because land is a unique factor in agricultural production). 
From this, it follows that centralization must take place either prior to 
or concurrent with concentration of assets. The indicators of 
centralization and concentration of semicapitalist production are 
discussed in more detail below. 
All the measures of centralization and concentration are computed 
for the 500 or more acres farm-size category. Centralization is 
indicated by an increase in the percent of the total number of farms ; and 
the increase in percent of total ownership, part ownership, and tenancy. 
Concentration is indicated by an increase in percent of the total value 
of products sold and of acres. The presence of full-time wage labor is 
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used to distinguish capitalist production from SCP (Mann and Dickinson, 
1978) . The increase in the employment of a full-time labor force is 
indicated by percent and change in percent of the total number of farms 
employing labor for 150 or more days a year. 
Hypotheses 
The hypotheses are designed to test whether Handel's (1980) theory 
of combined and uneven development associated with late capitalism's long 
wave provides an accurate theoretical explanation of what has actually 
happened in SCP agriculture. 
Many of the hypotheses are dualistic in character because the phases 
of late capitalism's long wave are inherently dualistic; i.e., the theory 
posits both expansive and stagnating phases of late capitalism's long 
wave. For this reason, all hypotheses are presented as simple 
assertions, sometimes .in two parts which may be separately supported or 
not supported. 
The year 1969 was chosen as the division between the expansive and 
stagnating phases of late capitalism's long wave. If the theory fits the 
data one should see a change of direction in patterns after this point. 
In other words, 1969 is seen as the crest of the long wave's expansive 
phase. 
Hypotheses 1 through 3 examine rural semiproletariaization. 
Hypotheses 4 through 6 examine the regression of simple commodity 
production. Hypotheses 7 through 9 examine concentration and 
centralization of semicapitalist production. 
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Rural semiproletarianization 
1. a. A decrease will be evident in the percent of total farms, acres 
in farms, and value of products sold in the period 1959 to 1969. 
b. An increase will be evident in the percent of total farms, acres 
in farms, and value of products sold in the period 1959 to 1982. 
2. a. A decrease will be evident in the percent of total ownership, 
part ownership, and tenancy in the period 1959 to 1969. 
b. An increase will be evident in the percent of total ownership, 
part ownership, and tenancy in the period 1969 to 1982. 
3. a. A decrease will be evident in the percent of total farms 
reporting more than 100 days off-farm work in the period 1959 to 
1969. 
b. An increase will be evident in the percent of total farms 
reporting more than 100 days off-farm work in the period 1969 to 
1982. 
Regression of simple commodity production 
4. A decrease will be evident in the percent of total farms, acres in 
farms, and value of products sold for the period 1959 to 1982. 
5. A decrease will be evident in the percent of total ownership, part 
ownership, and tenancy for the period 1959 to 1982. 
6. a. An increase will be evident in the percent of total farms 
reporting 100 or more days off-farm work per year for the period 
1959 to 1969. 
b. A decrease will be evident in the percent of total farms 
reporting 100 or more days off-farm work per year for the period 
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1969 to 1982. 
Concentration and centralization of semicapitalist production 
7. An increase will be evident in the percent of the total number of 
farms, acres in farms, and value of products sold for the period 
1959-1982. 
8. An increase will be evident in the percent of total ownership, part 
ownership, and tenancy for the period 1959-1982. 
9. a. An increase will be evident in the percent of farms employing 
labor 150 or more days per year for the period 1959-1969. 
b. A decrease will be evident in the percent of farms employing labor 
150 or more days per year for the period 1969-1982. 
Discussion 
The hypotheses were phrased so as to be either supported or not 
supported. Support required complete consistency with the hypothesis as 
stated. Nonsupport covered a broader range - i.e., in a nonsupported 
hypothesis, the data (a) did not support expectations, (b) partially 
supported expectations, (c) or were so mixed that no trend could be 
discovered, and therefore could be considered as neutral, i.e., the 
expectations were neither supported nor not supported. 
Hypotheses 1-2" semiproletarianization 
Hypotheses 1 predicted an evident decrease in the percent of total 
farms, acres, and value of products sold for the first half of the period 
followed by an increase in the second half for farms of 50 acres or less. 
The percentages are reported in Tables 2.1 through 2.3 and shown in 
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Figures 2.1 through 2.3. These trends were generally supported. 
However, hypothesis 1(a) predicted a decrease in percent of the total 
number of farms, acres in farms, and value of products sold for the 
period 1959 to 1969. The acres in farms decreased by half, from 1.7 
percent (1959) to 0.8 percent (1959). The value of products sold 
decreased slightly, from 2.1 percent (1959) to 1.9 percent (1969). 
However, the total number of farms in the size category remained 
relatively stable through 1969, fluctuating around 10 or 14 percent. 
Because the percent of total number of farms remained stable through 
this period, hypothesis 1(a) was not supported - even though its 
prediction was solidly supported in terms of percent of total acreage and 
arguably supported in terms of percent of value of products sold. 
Hypothesis 1(b) predicted an increase in percent in the total number 
of farms in this size category, an increase in percent in acreage, and an 
increase in percent in the value of products sold for the period 1969 to 
1982. 
The total number of farms increased from the 11 percent level of 
1969 to 17.5 percent in 1982. Acres in farms held stable at the 0.8 
percent level from 1969 to 1974, but increased after that to a 1.1 
percent level in 1978 and 1982. The value of products sold increased 
from 1.9 percent in 1969 to 4.5 percent in 1982. Since ail predicted 
increases were demonstrated, the hypothesis of a general increase for the 
second half of the period was supported. 
For the entire period, then, the picture is this: the percent of 
total number of acres in farms for this size category dramatically 
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decreased through the expansive phase of the 1960s and then increased 
slightly, falling from 1.7 percent at the beginning of the period to 0.8 
percent at the middle, rising to an apparently stable 1.1 percent at the 
end. Taken as a trend, this indicates a pattern of decreasing and then 
increasing percent of acreage in the smallest farms. 
While the percent of total number of farms in this category remained 
relatively stable through the first half of the period (11 percent in 
1969), it nearly doubled (to 17.5 percent) by 1982, indicating that 
during the stagnating phase of the long wave, more farmers were reduced 
to a semiproletarian status. 
The slight drop in percent of value of products sold from 1959 to 
1969 (2.1 percent to 1.9 percent) was followed by a sharp increase by 
1982 (to 4.5 percent), indicating that during the stagnating phase, 
farmers in this size category increased the volume of their production by 
twice of what it was in the relatively stable period of expansion which 
preceded it. 
By the end of the period, approximately twice as many farmers were 
working small plots which yielded a higher value of products sold. 
However, this value was still too small for economic self-sufficiency so 
the large numbers in this economically marginal category had to seek 
outside employment. 
These data therefore provide some support for the proposition that 
the rural semiproletariat performs a labor reserve function which varies 
by the phases of the long wave of late capitalist development. 
Hypothesis 2(a) predicted a decrease in the percent of total 
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ownership, part ownership, and tenancy for the period 1959 through 1969, 
followed by an increase in percent of total ownership, part ownership, 
and tenancy for the period 1969 to 1982 (2b). The percentages are 
reported in Tables 2.6 to 2.8 and Figures 2.15 to 2.24. Both parts of 
the hypothesis were supported. 
In the period 1959 to 1969, the percent of total ownership of farms 
in this category dropped by slightly more than half (from 19.8 percent in 
1959 to 8.6 percent in 1969). However, ownership increased dramatically 
by 1982, rising to 30.4 percent; this figure is nearly triple that of the 
1969 level. It would appear that in the expansive phase of the 1950s, 
farmers in this size category sold their land to join the labor force, 
while in the more stagnant period of the 1970s, their labor-force 
participation declined, and they increased their subsistence production. 
An alternative explanation not addressed by the present study is that the 
dramatic increase in ownership in this category may be due to land 
purchase by hobby or retired farmers, the rural gentry, or land-intensive 
simple commodity or semicapitalist producers. 
Part ownership decreased dramatically between 1959 and 1959 (falling 
from 3.4 percent to 0.5 percent), then increased just as dramatically 
between 1969 and 1982 (rising to 3.6 percent). It would appear that for 
every part owner in this category by 1969, six had moved out of this 
category altogether since 1959; it would also appear that for every part 
owner in 1969, there were six part owners in 1982. Again, it would 
appear that during the expansive phase, the owners of these small farms 
sold some of their land to join the labor force, while during the 
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stagnating phase, more farmers rented additional land to increase their 
subsistence production. 
The anticipated decrease in percent of tenancy from 1959 through 
1969 was supported, as was the anticipated increase in percent of tenancy 
from 1959 through 1982. The tenancy level in 1959 was 3.6 percent; in 
1969, it was 2.4 percent; in 1982, it was 11.4 percent. Examining only 
the gross elements of this trend, tenancy tripled in percent between 1959 
and 1982, and quadrupled between 1969 and 1982. 
Taken together, the decrease in tenancy for these very small farms 
for the first half of the period, followed by the increase for the 
second, support the hypothesis completely and lends strong support to the 
proposition that the labor-reserve function of the rural semiproletariat 
varies with the phases of the long wave of late capitalist development. 
The third hypothesis predicted (a) a decrease in percent of off-farm 
work (>100 days per year) for the expansive phase (1959-1969) followed by 
(b) a increase in percent of off-farm work for the stagnating phase 
(1969-1982). The percentages are reported in Table 2.4 and Figures 2.10 
to 2.12. Both of the individual hypotheses were supported. During the 
expansive phase, off-farm work of 100 days or more per year decreased 
from 37.5 percent in 1959 to 12.7 percent in 1969. During the stagnating 
phase, it increased from 12.7 percent in 1969 to 39.8 percent in 1982, 
slightly higher than the 1959 level. The proposition of a rural 
labor-reserve function which varies according to the phases of late 
capitalism's long wave was supported. 
The data as here presented suggest that ownership and off-farm work 
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provide a better descriptive measure of rural semiproletarianization than 
does size or scale of operation. Generally, the data support the 
proposition that the rural semiproletariat serves a labor-reserve 
function which varies according to the phases of the long wave of late 
capitalist development. 
A decrease was evident in the percent of total farms, acres in farms 
and value of products sold for the first half followed by an increase in 
these indicators for the second half. A decrease in percent of total 
ownership, part ownership, tenancy and off-farm work in the first half 
was followed by an increase of these indicators in the second half. 
Hypotheses 4 - Regression of simple commodity production 
Those hypotheses predicting a general decrease in percent of the 
total number of farms, acres in farms, and value of products sold (4); 
and ownership, part ownership, and tenancy (5) for the entire period 1959 
to 1982 were supported. Also, those hypotheses predicting an increase in 
percent of total off-farm employment for the first half of the period 
(5a) followed by a decrease in off-farm employment for the second half of 
the period (6b) were supported. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted a decrease in the percent of total farms, 
acres in farms, and value of products sold in the 50 to 499 acres 
farm-size category. The percentages are reported in Tables 2.1 through 
2.3 and shown in Figures 2.1 through 2.3. The hypothesis was supported. 
The percent of total number of farms decreased from 86.3 percent in 1959 
to 66.9 percent in 1982. The percent of total acres decreased from 89.1 
percent in 1959 to 55.1 percent in 1982. The percent of total value of 
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products sold held steady at 89 percent from 1959 to 1964, then dropped 
sharply to 53.3 percent in 1982. The overall decline in percent of total 
numbers of farms, acres in farms, and value of products sold supports 
completely the proposition of the regression of SCP through both phases 
of the late capitalism's long wave. 
Hypothesis 5 posited a decrease in the percent of total ownership, 
part-ownership and tenancy for the entire period 1959 to 1982. The 
percentages are reported in Tables 2.6 through 2.8 and are shown in 
Figures 2.16 through 2.24. The hypothesis was supported. The percent of 
total ownership in 1959 was approximately 80 percent. It increased 
slightly (to 87.7) percent in 1969, after which it dropped sharply - to 
63.5 percent in 1982. The percent of total part ownership increased 
slightly between 1959 and 1964 (from 84.3 percent to 85.9 percent) but 
decreased thereafter until it reached a 1982 level of 64.6 percent. The 
percent of total tenancy decreased from 94.5 percent in 1959 to 78 
percent in 1982. 
Thus, while there was a small increase in both percent of total 
ownership and part ownership for the expansive phase, there was an 
obvious and significant decrease in all tenure measures for the entire 
period. In summary, ownership declined by 25 percent between 1959 and 
1982; part ownership declined by 20 percent ; and tenancy declined by 17 
percent. 
The overall trends of the tenure measures thus offer strong support 
for the proposition of the continued regression of simple commodity 
producers through both phases of late capitalism's long wave. 
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Hypothesis 6 predicted (a) an increase in the percent of total farms 
reporting 100 or more days off-farm work for the period 1959 to 1969, 
followed by (b) a decrease in the percent of farms reporting the same 
amount of off-farm work for the period 1969 to 1982. The percentages are 
reported in Table 2.4 and shown in Figure 2.10 to 2,12. Both parts of 
the hypothesis were supported. 
The first half of the period saw an increase from the 1959 level of 
61.3 percent to the 1969 level of 84.1 percent, while the second half saw 
off-farm employment drop to 56.4 percent in 1982. One should note that 
the 1982 level is not only below the 1969 level but also below the 1959 
level. 
For this, there are several possible explanations. If the trend is 
taken as a measure of rural semiproletarianism, then it may be taken as 
lending support to the proposition that the regression of SCP occurs in 
accordance with the phases of late capitalism's long wave. The trend may 
also be considered as illustrative of the general decrease in percent of 
both total number of farms, acres in farms, value of products sold, 
ownership, part ownership, and tenancy over the entire period. 
The regression of SCP was hypothesized to include three components: 
(1) A decline in the percent of total number of farms, acres in farms, 
and value of products sold; (2) A decline in percent of total ownership, 
part ownership, and tenancy; and (3) An increase in percent of total 
off-farm work within late capitalism's expansive phase, followed by a 
decrease in such labor within the stagnating phase. 
In fact, all three of these components did occur in the SCP sector. 
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whereas they did not in the rural semiproletariat. The net effect has 
been the semiproletarianization of the SCP as dispossessed members of the 
SCP joined the labor reserve after a long decline in the numbers of 
farms, acres in farms, and value of products sold. 
Interestingly, throughout the period 1959 through 1982, the rural 
semiproletariat gained in the total percent of the total number of farms, 
acres in farms, and value of products sold while the SCP sector lost in 
the percent of the total number of farms, acres in farms, and value of 
products sold. Although semiproletarians (having 50 acres of land or 
less) show an increase in percent of total farms, acres and sales over 
time, they are not relying on subsistence agriculture for their 
reproduction. Rather, they rely on the sale of their labor power as the 
percentage reporting off-farm work demonstrates. 
Similarly, if the percent of total farms reporting 100 days or more 
off-farm work throughout the period remains relatively stable for the 
rural semiproletariat, it would appear that simple commodity producers 
(rather than the rural semiproletariat) form the group dependent upon 
agriculture for its reproduction. 
This trend is further indicated by the general decrease in percent 
of total ownership, part ownership, and tenancy experienced by SCP over 
the entire period, as compared with the decrease in percent of total 
ownership, part ownership, and tenancy experienced by the rural 
semiproletariat in the 1950s and the increase which followed it. 
Tenure measures for the rural semiproletariat all decreased sharply 
between 1959 and 1959, after which they all rose dramatically. In 
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conjunction with the apparent stability of percent of total off-farm work 
and the evident increase in percent of total value of products sold, 
tenancy, ownership, and part ownership one might conclude that these 
small farmers were not dependent upon subsistence agriculture, whereas 
their predecessors were. 
This trend becomes interesting when compared with the tenure 
measures of SCP, wherein it appears that the percent of total ownership 
increased rapidly through the 1960s then decreased throughout the 1970s. 
In terms of ownership and tenancy, SCP appears to respond more 
immediately to the conditions in the general agricultural economy than 
does the rural semiproletariat. 
While there are several measures which one might examine to 
determine agricultural class boundaries, the most important one is the 
degree to which a class appears dependent for its subsistence on 
production of agricultural commodities. SCP appears dependent for its 
subsistence on commodity production while the rural semiproletariat is 
not. This analysis indicates that the "class boundary" between the rural 
semiproletariat and SCP should be determined by the percent of off-farm 
work by farm-size category. If this measure is used to delineate "class 
boundaries", then the dividing line between the rural semiproletariat and 
SCP may be as high as 100 acres. Such an elevation of class boundaries 
would provide a demarcation above which farmers could reasonably be 
expected to depend upon commodity production as their primary means of 
reproduction and would - almost incidentally - demonstrate a substantial 
regression of SCP into the rural semiproletariat. 
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Hypotheses 7-9: Concentration and centralization of semicapitalist 
production 
The anticipated increases in the percent of total farms, acres, and 
value of products sold, ownership, part ownership, tenancy, and 
employment of full-time labor throughout the period 1959 through 1982 
were all supported. 
Hypothesis 7 predicted an increase in the percent of total farms, 
acres in farms, and value of products sold of semicapitalist producers in 
the 500 acres or more category for the entire period 1959 to 1982. The 
percentages are reported in Tables 2.1. through 2.3 and shown in Figures 
2.1 through 2.3. The hypothesis was supported. 
The percent of the total number of large farms increased from 2.8 
percent in 1959 to 15.6 percent in 1982 so it would appear that by the 
end of the period there were approximately five times as many large 
farmers as at the beginning. 
The percent of total acres in farms and value of products sold 
increased almost as dramatically as did the percent of total number of 
large farms; total acreage in these farms grew from 9.8 percent in 1959 
to 43.8 percent in 1982, and total value of products sold grew from 9.1 
percent in 1959 to 42.2 percent in 1982. In each case, the multiple of 
growth is about 4.5, which appears reasonable in connection with the 
five-fold increase in the percent of total number of large farms. Thus, 
by the end of the period, aproximately one-seventh of the farmers held 
approximately two-fifths of the land and value of products sold. 
This dramatic increase over time in the percent of the total number 
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of farms, acres in farms, and value of products sold in this size 
category supports the proposition of the increasing concentration and 
centralization of semicapitalist production. When considered in view of 
the decrease in percent of total number of farms, acres in farms, and 
value of products sold experienced by simple commodity producers for the 
same period, it may be taken as further evidence of the regression of 
SCP. 
Hypothesis 8 predicted an increase in the percent of total 
ownership, part ownership, and tenancy for the entire period 1959 to 
1982. The percentages are reported in Tables 2.6 through 2.8 and shown 
in Figures 2.16 through 2.24. The hypothesis was supported. 
The percent of ownership increased from 1.5 percent in 1959 to 6.1 
percent in 1982, indicating that by the end of the period there were four 
times as many fully-owned large farms as at the beginning. There were 
also nearly five times as many part-owners (6.6 percent in 1959 and 31.8 
percent in 1982) and tenants (2.0 percent in 1959 and 10.6 percent in 
1982). The data indicate that the process of centralization and 
concentration of farms in semicapitalist production occurs through lease 
arrangements. 
The growth in percent for the tenure measures over the period - a 
five-fold increase - is consistent with that for the growth in the 
percent of the number of farms and acres in farms. The land required for 
such expansive growth in semicapitalist production came from the decrease 
in the percent of farms and acres in farms in SCP. 
Hypothesis 9 predicted an increase in percent of the number of farms 
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employing full-time labor (150 days or more a year) for the period 1959 
to 1982. The percentages are reported in Table 2.5 and shown in Figures 
2.13 to 2.15. Not surprisingly in view of the approximate four-fold 
increases in percent for both farms, acres, sales, ownership, part 
ownership, and tenancy throughout the period, the hypothesis was 
supported. 
The percent of farms employing full-time labor more than doubled 
between 1959 and 1982, rising from a 1959 level of 17.7 percent to a 1974 
high of 44.4 percent, after which it decreased to a 1978 level of 40.2 
percent and increased slightly by 1982 to 41.1 percent. 
These data support the proposition that the employment of full-time 
wage labor is becoming more concentrated in semicaptialist production. 
That the twofold employment increase is somewhat smaller than might be 
expected (given the fourfold increase in percent both in farms, acres, 
sales, ownership, part ownership, and tenancy) may be attributed to the 
higher level of mechanization to be expected in semicapitalist 
production. Given the present data, one might hypothesize that the 
full-time laborers came from the rural semiproletariat in the first half 
of the period and from SCP in the second. However, such an analysis in 
necessarily speculative. 
Summary 
Nine hypotheses, comprising fourteen assertions, were tested. 
Thirteen assertions were supported and one was not supported. 
Although 1967 marks the turning point between the expansive and 
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stagnating phases of late capitalism's long wave, agriculture continued 
to perform a productive function through the early 1970s. A series of 
poor harvests in the early 1970s in the Soviet Union and Southeast Asian 
countries increased concern about a "World Food Crisis". These countries 
began to purchase grain on the world market to make up for their 
déficiences. The United States increased its exports significantly and 
reduced its carryover stocks to very low levels. Importing countries and 
private handlers, fearing further supply reductions, began a wild 
scramble to acquire additional stocks, and grain prices increased 
dramatically. Government programs encouraged farmers to "plant fence row 
to fence row" in order to feed the world and meet the increasing export 
demand. Consequently, American farmers experienced two years of 
prosperity between 1972 and 1974. After 1975, however, world harvests 
improved and the world food crisis was over. As grain stocks began to 
accumulate again, grain prices fell sharply between 1975 and 1977 and 
returned to world market prices. The 1980 agricultural act continued to 
support prices below world market levels. 
Another reason for the inexactness of predicting a general increase 
or decrease in percent prior to and after 1969 is that farmers cannot 
immediately respond to changes in the economy. They may take several 
years to respond to changes in the economy because of the nature of the 
composition of agricultural capital. 
Fixed capital (constant capital in land, machinery and buildings) is 
relatively unresponsive to changes in the economy whereas circulating 
capital (constant capital in raw materials, energy and associated 
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products) and variable capital (capital used for purchase of labor power 
as well as the household's own labor power) are relatively more 
responsive to changes in the economy. One would therefore expect that 
simple commodity producers would respond to changes in the economy by 
varying the components of circulating capital and variable capital before 
changing the components of fixed capital. 
Nevertheless, the support for thirteen of the fourteen assertions 
does provide support for the proposition that the proletarianization, 
regression, and concentration and centralization of simple commodity 
production does vary by the phases of the long wave of late capitalist 
development resulting in its combined and uneven development. Kautsky 
(Mottura and Pugliese, 1980:174-175) arrived at a similar conclusion in 
his analysis of German agriculture; 
I have carried out research to see which of the two opinions 
might be true, and contrary to all expectations, I reached 
the conclusion that neither one was universally true and that 
we must not expect to find in agriculture either the end of 
the big enterprise or that of the small. We do find at one 
pole the universal tendency towards proletarianization, but 
we also find at the other pole a constant oscillation between 
the progress of the small enterprise and that of the large. 
In conformity with this I have likewise reached the 
conclusion that agriculture does not by itself produce the 
elements it needs to reach socialism. But agriculture 
independent of industry, be it peasant or capitalist farming, 
increasingly ceases to have a function in society. Industry 
dominates agriculture to the extent that industrial 
development increasingly determines the laws of agricultural 
development. 
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Footnotes 
1. During the period 1949-1969, family farms (defined as farms using 
less than 1.5 man years of hired labor and operated by risk-taking 
managers) represented 95 percent of all farms and accounted for 62 
percent of gross farm sales; also 75 percent of all farm labor was 
provided by the farmer and his family (Nikolitch, 1972a) 
2. By one estimate, family farms accounted for 79 percent of all farms 
in 1964 and 49 percent of all sales. Both of these percentages would 
have been lower, however, if part-owners (owning less than half of the 
land in their farms) had been removed from the category (Rodefeld, 1978). 
3. The upper category accounted for 25 percent of all farms and received 
38 percent of all cash receipts in 1977; the lower category accounted for 
70 percent of all farms and received 11 percent of the total cash 
receipts for the same period (Economics Research Service, 1978). 
4. In 1978, 65 percent of the households in the lower family-farm 
category reported off-farm employment, with non-farm income accounting 
for 83 percent of the total net income. By comparison, in the upper 
family-farm category, the share of the nonfarm income in total net income 
was only 31 percent; it dropped to 20 percent in the six percent of large 
capitalist farms surveyed (Economics Research Service, 1978). 
5. The percentage of hired farm workers in the agricultural work force 
was 20 to 22 percent in 1948-1952, 24 to 27 percent in 1953-1973, and 30 
percent in 1974-1977 (Goss et al., 1980). 
6. The percentage of full-time (more than 150 days) hired workers in the 
agricultural work force increased from 20 percent (1968-1970) to 23 
percent (1974-1976). The percentage of the total agricultural wage work 
rose from 66 percent (1968-1970) to 68 percent (1975) (Goss et al., 
1980). 
7. Although the number of total and full-time workers has increased 
since 1970, the number and percentage of farms employing full-time 
laborers decreased from 1964-1974 (Goss et al., 1980). 
8. The reader should refer to Section I for a more explicit elaboration 
of the revised theory. 
9. In The Development of Capitalism in Russia, Lenin (1958) gave 
examples of vertical concentration under conditions which made it more 
profitable for productive capital to invest in processing and 
manufacturing enterprises than to undertake the production task itself. 
In the last chapter of his book, Peasant Farm Organization, Chayanov 
(1966) also called attention to the process of vertical concentration. 
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brought about by the intervention of trading capital both in the 
conditions of production and in certain kinds of cooperatives. Bernstein 
(1979) cited examples of vertical concentration through state 
intervention, such as in the Tanzania villagization programs and other 
rural development schemes in African countries. 
10. In 1959, the Cooperative Farm Credit System held 15.5 percent of 
outstanding farm debt (excluding Commodity Credit Corportion loans) while 
the Farmers Home Administration held 4.7 percent. By contrast, in 1982 
the Cooperative Farm Credit System held 33.8 percent of all outstanding 
farm debt while the Farmers Home Administration held another 11.4 percent 
(Federal Reserve System, 1984). 
11. Data by farm-size categories for all the variables used in this 
analysis were not available before 1959. 
12. Gillespie (1981:38) includes among the problems of using census data 
the following; 
. . . (1) definitions, categories used in analysis, and the 
analyses themselves are not consistent through successive 
censuses, all of which add an element of ambiguity of 
interpretation; (2) the questions asked varied among 
censuses, sometimes to better reflect changing conditions, 
but rendering interpretation problematic; (3) respondents to 
the census questionnaires can be expected to not have 
interpreted the census questions in the same way; (4) 
respondents may have dissembled on some of the questions 
because they wished to conceal certain facts from local 
census takers whose confidentiality they doubted, or to 
embellish on facts to make a good impression on local census 
takers; (5) respondents may not have known the answers to all 
the questions, especially if they were not the operator, but 
rather were the wife or other member of the operator's 
family, landlord, hired laborer, neighbor, or other, which 
were indicated as possible respondents in a block at the end 
of the questionnaire of the 1964 and other censuses. 
Despite these problems, however, the censuses are the best available 
source of longitudinal data. 
13. Before the 1974 agricultural census, a farm was defined as "any 
place with less than 10 acres from which $250 or more of agricultural 
products were sold or normally would have been sold during the census 
year, or any place of 10 acres of more from which $50 or more of 
agricultural products were sold or normally would have been sold during 
the census year". The 1974 agricultural census and those following have 
defined a farm as "any place from which $1000 or more of agricultural 
products were sold, or normally would have been sold, during the census 
year". 
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14. Pointing out the problems inherent in measuring the development of 
capitalism in agriculture either by farm size or the number and 
importance of large farms, when judged by their total acreage, Lenin 
(1934:12) noted that they are only indirect indications; farm size does 
not always indicate that the farm is really big (as an economic 
enterprise) or does it give any direct indication as to its capitalist 
nature. Ideally, one would obtain a better indication of the state of 
capitalist agricultural development by comparing sales data across 
censuses. This approach would provide measures of 
semi-proletarianization, regression, and concentration/centralization by 
sales classes. Unfortunately, agricultural sales classes are not 
comparable: inflation across years deflates the significance of some 
sales classes and increases the significance of others. Additionally, 
data for measures of semi-proletarianization, regression, and 
concentration/centralization were not available by sales classes. 
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Table 2.1 Percent distribution of farms by farm size categories 
Farm-Size 1959^ 1964^ 1 9 6 9 °  1 9 7 4 ^  1978® 1982^ 
Categories % % % % % % 
<50 acres 11, .0 9 . 8  10, ,8 11.8 16, ,9 17. ,5 
50-499 acres 8 6 ,  3 85.3 81, ,4 7 6 . 8  70, .0 6 6 .  ,9 
500+ acres 2, .8 4.8 7 .7 11.3 13 .1 15, .6 
Total 175,681 157,153 140,354 125,016 126,454 115,359 
^1954 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 16, Iowa. State 
Table 2. Also in Tables 2.2 - 2.8. 
^1959 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 16, Iowa. 
Chapter A, table 20. Also in Tables 2.2 - 2.8. 
^^1964 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 16, Iowa. State 
Table 20. Also in Tables 2.2 - 2.8. 
^^1959 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 16, Iowa. 
Chapter 1, Table 26 (Farms with more than $2,500 sales). Also in 
Tables 2.2 - 2.8. 
^1974 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 15, Iowa. 
Chapter 1, Table 30 (Farms with more than $2,500 sales). Also in 
Tables 2.2 - 2.8. 
^1978 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 15, Iowa. 
Chapter 1, Table 33. Also in Tables 2.2 - 2.8. 
Table 2.2 Percent distribution of acres by farm-size categories 
Farm-Size 1959* 1964^ 1969^ 1974^ 1978® 1982^ 
Categories %%%%%%
<50 acres 1.7 1.0 .8 .8 1.1 1.1 
50-499 acres 88.9 83.5 76.0 66.8 60.8 55.1 
500+ acres 9.8 15.7 23.0 32.3 35.8 43.8 
Total 33,898,181 33,758,321 33,569,629 33,044,768 33,580,851 32,589,554 
Table 2.3 Percent distribution of sales by farm-size categories 
Farm-Size 1 9 5 9 *  1964^ 1 9 6 9 ^  1 9 7 4 ^  1978® 1982^ 
Categories %%%%%%
<50 acres 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.5 4.2 4.5 
50-499 acres 88.8 89.1 74.8 65.3 59.3 53.3 
5 0 0 +  acres 9.1 16.2 23.3 32.2 36.5 42.2 
Total 2,603,154 2,793,881 3,310,408 4 , 2 6 6 , 9 3 1  4,200,316 3,398,820 
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Table 2.4 Percent distribution of farms reporting 100+ days off 
farm work by farm size categories 
Farm-Size 
Categories 
1959* 
% 
1964^ 
% 
1 9 6 9 ^  
% 
1974^ 
% 
1978® 
% 
1982^ 
% 
<50 acres 37.5 2 9 . 2  1 2 . 7  17.5 3 8 . 9  3 9 . 8  
50-499 acres 61.3 6 9 . 0  84.1 79.4 58.2 56.4 
500+ acres 1.3 1.7 3.4 3.0 2.8 3,5 
Total 23,456 25,414 21,741 19,627 35,137 3 2 , 0 6 6  
Table 2.5 Percent distribution of farms employing laborers 150+ 
days by farm size categories 
Farm-Size 
Categories 
1 9 5 9 *  
% 
1964^ 
% 
1969^ 
% 
1974^ 
% 
1978® 
% 
1982^ 
% 
<50 acres 2.4 1.5 2.4 2 . 8  4.1 5.3 
50-499 acres 79.8 72.5 59.0 52.8 55.7 53.6 
500+ acres 17.7 2 6 . 0  3 8 . 6  44.4 40.2 41.1 
Total 13,319 14,249 8 , 8 4 7  10,053 14,637 14,647 
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Table 2.6 Percent of distribution of ownership by farm-size 
categories 
Farm-Size 
Categories 
1 9 5 9 *  
% 
1964^ 
% 
1 9 6 9 ^  
% 
1974^ 
% 
1978® 
% 
1982^ 
% 
<50 acres 19.8 18.4 8.6 13.7 2 8 . 6  30.4 
50-499 acres 7 8 . 8  79.6 87.7 81.7 67.0 63.5 
500+ acres 1.5 2.0 3.7 4.6 4.4 6.1 
Total 79,677 69,981 57,102 56,178 58,775 52,907 
Table 2.7 Percent of distribution of part-ownership by farm-size 
categories 
Farm-Size 1959* 1964^ 1969^ 1974^ 1978® 1982^ 
C a t e g o r i e s  % % % % % %  
<50 acres 3.4 2.3 .6 1.4 3.1 3.6 
50-499 acres 84.3 85.9 80.4 72.6 6 8 . 2  64.6 
500+ acres 6.6 11.8 19.0 2 6 . 0  2 8 . 8  31.8 
Total 35,546 34,853 34,347 35,834 39,532 3 8 , 4 1 8  
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Table 2.8 Percent of distribution of tenancy by farm-size 
categories 
Farm-Size 1959* 1964^ 1969^ 1974"^ 1978® 1982^ 
C a t e g o r i e s  % % % % % %  
<50 acres 3.5 3.6 2.4 4.7 11.8 11.4 
50-499 acres 94.5 92.5 90.8 85.8 79.1 78.0 
500+ acres 2.0 3.9 6.9 9.7 9.4 10.6 
Total 61,071 48,823 32,046 25,063 28,073 24,044 
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SECTION III: 
THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF SIMPLE COMMODITY PRODUCTION 
IN LATE CAPITALISM: 
AN APPLICATION OF A MARKOV CHAIN MODEL 
Introduction 
"Iowa's family farms are an endangered species" declared George 
Antham in The Des Moines Register (January, 10, 1982). This dismal 
headline was based upon a USDA report (McDonald and Coffman, 1980) that 
predicted the number of U.S. farms would decrease by 33 percent by the 
year 2000. The report also predicted that the number of large farms 
(>$100,000 in sales) would quadruple ; however, the number of medium-size 
farms ($20,000 - $100,000 in sales) would continue to decline, and the 
numerical predominance of small farms (<$20,000 in sales) would diminish 
substantially. The number of small farms and large farms were predicted 
to be nearly equal resulting in a bimodal distribution; both are 
predicted to outnumber the middle-sized farms. 
The report indicated that family farms will continue to dominate; 
however, the significance in terms of sales volume of small farms will 
decrease while the significance of large farms will increase. While many 
of the large farms probably will be corporations, most of these will most 
likely remain family-labor farms. The report's authors found the family 
farm organization was sound and would probably survive with some changes. 
Even though most studies of the future distribution of farms by 
farm-size categories have been conducted at the national level, national 
137 
studies do not account for the diversity of farming enterprises across 
the country. Therefore, studies need to be conducted at the state Level, 
especially in states where family farming is predominant, to determine if 
the national predictions are valid. The purpose of this paper is to 
predict the future distribution of Iowa farms among three size categories 
to the year 2000 using a discrete-time, stationary Markov chain model. 
A Revised Perspective of 
Simple Commodity Production 
Family farming usually has been considered a form of simple 
commodity production (SCP) left untouched by capitalist development. 
Under this perspective, the family farmer is considered an independent 
producer owning both the means of production and the product of his 
labor. However, all SCP forms are transitional according to Marx's 
theory of capitalist development, which sees them as organizational 
residues of a former stage. Eventually, the family farm will be replaced 
by capitalist forms of production based upon the hired employment of 
landless laborers, Marx's theory argues. Therefore, the persistence of 
family farming within advanced capitalism has presented a problem for a 
Marxian analysis of agricultural development. 
Buttel (1980) notes that there are two major variants within 
contemporary Marxist political economy regarding the future of SCP. The 
first variant predicts that the inexorable forces of centralization and 
concentration of agricultural production will inevitably differentiate 
SCP into an agricultural bourgeoisie and a landless proletariat. The 
138 
second predicts a continued, if marginal, existence for SCP. The problem 
then, is in accounting for these contradictory predictions - the 
continued dominance and the ongoing differentiation of family farms. A 
revised perspective is needed that accounts for these contradictory 
predictions. 
This revised perspective views simple commodity producers' labor and 
means of production as being fully subsumed under capital and explains 
the uneven and combined development of SCP on the basis of the phases of 
the long wave of late capitalist development (Mande1, 1980).^ This 
perspective views the production of surplus-value as occurring in 
relations of production and the appropriation of surplus-value as 
occurring in relations of exchange. The two process of exploitation of 
simple commodity producers are (Chevalier, 1983): (1) the formal 
subsumption of coramodified labor and the production of absolute 
surplus-value ; and (2) the real subsumption of commodified labor and the 
production of relative surplus-value. The mechanisms of appropriation of 
simple commodity producers' surplus-value include; (1) ground rent; (2) 
technological rents; and (3) unequal exchange. 
The outcome of the two processes of exploitation of simple commodity 
producers and the three mechanisms of appropriation of their 
surplus-value is the "simple reproduction squeeze" (Bernstein, 1979:427). 
It refers to those effects of commodity relations on the economy of 
simple commodity producers households. Briefly, it can be summarized by 
2 increasing costs of production with decreasing returns to labor. The 
objective effect of the "simple reproduction squeeze" is to intensify the 
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labor of simple commodity producers' households to maintain or increase 
the supply of commodities without capital incurring any costs of 
management or supervision of the production process (Bernstein, 
1979:429). 
The two processes of exploitation of simple commodity producers and 
the three mechanisms of appropriation of their surplus-value are 
articulated through the phases of the long wave of late capitalist 
development resulting in the combined and uneven development of 
agriculture (Mande1, 1980). The expansive phase of late capitalism's 
long wave is characterized by a temporary extension of capitalist 
activity in SCP agriculture. In the stagnating phase which follows, the 
range of capitalist activity in SCP agriculture declines. 
The state aids in this alternating expansion and contraction of SCP 
agriculture through its agricultural programs and policies directed at 
capitalist and simple commodity producers (Bonnano and Ritter, 1983). 
State policy takes the form of aiding in two contradictory functions of 
accumulation and legitimation (O'Connor, 1973). In the expansive phase 
of late capitalism's long wave, state policy promotes the accumulation of 
capital and the extension of capitalist activity in agriculture. In the 
stagnating phase, however, state policy promotes the legitimation of the 
state and the stabilization of SCP agriculture. 
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Late Capitalist Evolution of 
Simple Commodity Production 
If the appropriation of simple commodity producers' surplus-value is 
central to an understanding of agrarian class relations (Braverman, 
1974), then a model which includes more than just the appropriation of 
surplus-value from wage laborers is needed. Mooney (1983) has proposed 
such a model. 
Mooney (1983:567) develops several criteria which form the basis of 
the development of a theoretical model of agrarian class structure. The 
first criterion is the status of producers on the labor market. The 
appropriation of surplus-value from direct producers through off-farm 
work indicates proletarianization. If the household is able to retain 
surplus-value from commodity production, pure SCP will be reproduced. 
The control of the labor power of others indicates transformation toward 
the CMP because a direct producer who exercises such control is nearer a 
capitalist class location to the extent that direct production is 
performed by hired labor. The second criterion is the extent of control 
that direct producers exercise over the physical means of production and 
investment decisions. The presense of such control indicates a pure SCP 
class location, but the lack of such control indictes a 
proletarianization process. 
These processes are not perfectly coincident with class locations, 
giving rise to contradictory class locations (Wright, 1978). The concept 
of contradictory class location is a break from orthodox Marxist theory 
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in that these locations may not be transitional but may have some degree 
of permanence in capitalist social formations. Under late capitalism, 
SCP has been differentiated into a tripartite class structure of rural 
semiproletarians, simple commodity producers, and semicapitalist 
producers. The class locations of the semiproletariat and of 
semicapitalist production are contradictory: semiproletarians are both 
laborers and direct producers; semicapitalists are both employers and 
direct producers. Simple commodity production may also be a 
contradictory class location depending upon the extent of control that 
producers exercise over the physical means of production and investment 
and their amount of off-farm work. 
This classification reformulates Lenin's typology (1958) of agrarian 
transformation in which a labor market is formed at the expense of the 
"middle peasants" to benefit of the "rich peasants". However, as 
Bernstein (1977:69) noted, the classic typology describes a particular 
case or variant of the process, and not "its sole or necessary form of 
development". The typology of differentiation differs from the classic 
typology in that it requires neither the expropriation of direct 
producers by capital nor their real subsumption as free wage labor. 
Instead, the revised typology emphasizes large-scale, horizontal 
concentration of the means of production as well as the tendency toward 
vertical concentration and control of production. 
Although the typology presents a static picture of agrarian 
structure, it has no discrete class boundaries. Instead, those producers 
whose economic conditions place them at or near the rural semiproletariat 
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or semicapitalist "boundaries" would fluctuate in and out of those 
classes according to the phases of the long wave of capitalist 
development. Of course, the same "class mobility" would also apply for 
the border areas of the other two classes. 
This revised model takes account of the three essential elements of 
late capitalist agricultural development; (1) exploitation and 
commodification of both labor and the means of production (Chevalier, 
1983); the appropriation of surplus-value from simple commodity 
producers; and (3) the combined and uneven development of SCP (Kautsky, 
1980:71). 
Rural semiproletariat 
These producers cannot insure the needs for maintenance and 
reproduction of the household through simple commodity production alone; 
therefore, they have to sell their labor-power on a regular basis 
(Bernstein, 1977:67). This is their defining characteristic. But, 
because low wage levels do not permit their full proletarianization, they 
may retain a small farm that contributes to their subsistence which, in 
turn, reduces the wages paid by their employers. This group constitutes 
a rural proletariat or a rural labor reserve in the process of formation. 
It is in this context that Lenin (1958:179) warned against "too 
stereotyped an understanding of the theoretical proposition that 
capitalism requires the free, landless worker". 
During the expansive phase of late capitalism's long wave, members 
of this group rely on the sale of their labor-power; their significance 
in numbers, land, and production decreases as their land is purchased or 
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rented from them by simple commodity producers. 
During the stagnating phase, the subsequent decline in employment 
opportunities in off-farm work causes rural semiproletarians to rely more 
on subsistence production than on the sale of their labor-power. This 
sector thus becomes a labor reserve; its significance in numbers, land 
and production increases as rural semiproletarians rely more on 
subsistence production and intensification of family labor. 
To establish or enlarge their rural residences, rural 
semiproletarians purchase or rent acreages from simple commodity or 
semicapitalist producers. Rural semiproletarians are concerned with 
providing for their subsistence needs rather than selling their 
commodities on the market, and also consider the labor involved in 
subsistence production as costing nothing; therefore, the relationship 
between the price of land and the sale of commodities is no longer 
relevant (Kautsky, 1980:70). Some members of the rural semiproletariat 
are former simple commodity producers recently forced out of SCP; these 
individuals may have sold their land, stock and machinery but retained 
their rural residence. 
Simple commodity producers 
The position of simple commodity producers, the middle category, is 
especially precarious; they are able to reproduce themselves through 
household production only in the most favorable circumstances (Lenin, 
1958:182), and in many cases, cannot make ends meet without securing 
loans or seeking outside employment through the sale of their 
labor-power. Each crop failure forces more of them into the rural 
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semiproletariat. 
Hence, simple commodity producers, as a class, undergo regression or 
depeasantization. The former is defined as continued reproduction on an 
ever-declining base (Mollard in Denis, 1982:141), the latter as the 
wearing away of the middle members and the reinforcement of the extremes 
(Lenin, 1958:182). These processes take place in a manner consistent 
with the phases of the long wave of late capitalist development. 
The source of regression varies by the phases of the long wave. 
During the expansive phase, capitalism is extended into SCP, resulting in 
its horizontal concentration and centralization. The high-investment 
simple commodity producers obtain differential rents (Type II), which 
permit them to swallow the farms of their lower-investment neighbors. 
This high-investment expansion and mechanization is often financed 
through private or public financing. 
Simple commodity producers who cannot reproduce their operation by 
commodity production resort to off-farm employment, part-time farming, 
and the sale of land, machinery or stock. When this occurs, they move 
towards rural semiproletarian status. The remainder, who can provide for 
their continued reproduction through commodity production, are then 
caught in the "simple reproduction squeeze" (Bernstein, 1979:427). They 
intensify the relations of production by increasing the use of family 
labor, exhaust the soil through intensive cultivation, further 
rationalize production through increased use of technology, and compete 
with semicapitalist producers for access to land (Kautsky, 1980:73). 
This has the effect of increasing relative surplus-value while decreasing 
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the wage equivalent value of commodities produced, and hence increasing 
the expense (and therefore, the indebtedness) required to produce them. 
During the stagnating phase, capitalist activity in SCP agriculture 
declines, causing a decline in horizontal concentration and 
centralization, and an increase in vertical concentration and 
centralization. Thus, private and public funding for capitalist 
expansion in SCP decreases while public funding aimed at increasing the 
economic stability of SCP increases (Kautsky, 1980:64). 
Those simple commodity producers who financed their expansion and 
mechanization beyond the ability of the farm to provide for their 
continued reproduction are forced out of production by the prevalent 
economic conditions of the stagnating phase. Their farms are then held 
by private or public lending agencies and are rented to other simple 
commodity producers or semicapitalist producers if the lending agencies 
are unable to sell the farms on the market. 
Semicapitalist producers 
Semicapitalist producers are not fully capitalist in that they use 
both hired and unpaid family labor. The hired labor force is usually 
tied to the rural semiproletariat. Semicapitalist producers are usually 
drawn from the upper stratum of the successful simple commodity 
producers. 
Semicapitalist producers derive their power from their economic 
base, and they share that power with nonagricultural capitalists in 
controlling the state (deJanvry, 1981:113). This shared control of the 
state results in public services oriented toward the development of 
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capitalism in agriculture through labor-saving technology and 
infrastructure investment. Semicapitalist producers typically share 
ownership with public or private capital. Historically, they accumulated 
sufficient capital from public or private agencies to finance the 
extension of capitalist production. 
They operate neither on the capitalist production principle of 
"maximization in the abstract" nor on the SCP principle of "maximization 
in the concrete"; they are primarily concerned with maintaining an income 
or wage over and above operating expenses. In this respect, they are not 
comparable to capitalists receiving a profit or simple commodity 
producers maintaining a minimally-acceptable standard of living. This 
income or wage is included in the amount of the operating loans they 
receive from the lending agencies. 
Because they are so heavily leveraged, public and private agencies 
are reluctant to discontinue financing them for fear they would never be 
repaid the interest on their investment (Kautsky, 1980:79). Therefore, 
these semicapitalist producers are usually refinanced, but not always to 
the previous level. During the expansive phase, however, public and 
private agencies willingly finance the extension of capitalist commodity 
production because the risk is relatively low. During the stagnating 
phase, public and private agencies are reluctant to finance the continued 
extension of capitalist commodity production because the risk is higher. 
The lending agencies are, of course, primarily concerned with maintaining 
the stability and security of their investments. 
The tendency towards increased state financing of large-scale simple 
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commodity producers and semicapitalist producers indicates a trend toward 
3 
vertical concentration (Lenin, 1958). This occurs when a central state 
agency undertakes the coordination, standardization, and supervision of 
many commodity producers (Bernstein, 1977:70). According to Marx 
(1967:436-437), the use of credit by stock companies transformed 
capitalist entrepreneurs into managers of capital (Marx, 1967:435-437). 
The semicapitalist agricultural producer, however, is the manager of 
public rather than private capital, and the farm firm takes the form of a 
public utility rather than a private stock company.^ 
Semicapitali,<t producers thus effectively become a managerial class 
holding title to the land only in the legal sense; economic ownership 
effectively resides with the public finance agency. This distinction 
between legal and economic ownership confirms Marx's (1973:279) view that 
in an advanced stage, capital regards private property as a hindrance to 
capitalist development and thus attempts to dissolve it in the effort to 
transfer ownership to the state.^ The interest paid on loans received by 
semicapitalist producers from the public finance agency thus becomes the 
universal state rent, or a new form of ground rent. 
In summary, semicapitalist production undergoes periods of 
progressive concentration and centralization, but the rate and kind of 
centralization and concentration varies by the phase of the long wave.^ 
The rate is greater in the expansive phase than in the stagnating phase; 
however, the significance of semicapitalist production in land, 
production, and hired labor increases in both phases, thus confirming the 
central law of capitalist development. 
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Propositions 
Two alternative propositions are tested. The first takes the 
orthodox view and states that one should witness an increasing 
concentration of the number of farms in semicapitalist production 
together with a decrease of the number of farms in the other two 
categories. The process is assumed to be independent of political and 
economic forces. The second states that with the increasing 
concentration and centralization of the number of farms in semicapitalist 
production, one should witness the regression of the number of farms in 
simple commodity production, as well as an increase in the number of 
farms in the rural semiproletariart and that this should vary 
consistently with the phases of the long wave of late capitalist 
development. During the expansive phase, the processes of concentration 
and centralization and of proletarianization should increase. In 
contrast, during the stagnating phase the processes should decrease. 
Regression of simple commodity production continues in both phases. 
Setting and Data 
The period 1940 and 1982 spans two different eras of U.S. 
agricultural development; it was selected for analysis for this reason. 
Cochrane (1979) described the period from 1930 to 1970 as "The Era of 
Technological Revolution" and the years after 1970 as "The Era of Market 
Instability and Uncertainty". These two "eras" correspond approximately 
with Handel's analysis of the expansive (1940-1967) and stagnating 
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(1967-1982) phases of the long wave of late capitalist development. 
Iowa was chosen for study because 98 percent of the farms in the 
state were classified as family farms (Nikolitch, 1962). If the 
processes of late capitalist development occur as predicted by the law of 
combined and uneven development in an area where SCP agriculture 
predominates, one might generalize to other areas having similar 
conditions. The quinquennial censuses of agriculture for Iowa for the 
years 1940 to 1982 provided the data for this analysis.^ Each census 
9 
reports various characteristics by ten farm-size categories. 
Measurement 
Long wave of late capitalist development 
The period 1940-1969 is used to designate the expansive phase of the 
long wave, and the period 1969-1982 is used to designate the stagnating 
phase of the long wave. 
Class structure 
Farmers were separated into one of three classes based on 
examination of the percentage distribution of various farm structural 
characteristics over time and among the ten farm-size categories reported 
in the censuses. The natural breaks in the percent distribution of 
number of farms, acres in farms, value of products sold, and farms with a 
full-time labor force appeared after the 10 to 49 acres and the 260-499 
acres farm-size categories. Collapsing the ten farm-size categories 
around these natural breaks provided three farm-size categories: less 
than 50 acres, 50 to 499 acres, and 500 or more acres. These size 
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categories correspond respectively to the rural semiproletariat, simple 
commodity producers, and semicapitalist producers. These size categories 
have been used by other researchers to describe the structure of Iowa 
agriculture (Lasley and Goudy, 1982; 1984). 
Rural semiproletariatization 
Rural semiproletarians reproduce their operations through the sale 
of their labor-power, their subsistence production, and their rental or 
ownership of small tracts of land. Semiproletarianization is indicated 
by the increase in the total number of farms in the less than 50 acres 
farm-size category. 
Regression of simple commodity production 
Regression refers to the "continued reproduction of simple commodity 
production on an ever-declining base" and is indicated as the overall 
decline in significance of SCP when measured by the overall decline of 
the absolute number of farms in the 50 to 499 acres farm-size category. 
Concentration and centralization of semicapitalist production 
"Centralization" refers to the unification of different farms into a 
single farm. "Concentration" refers to the growth in value in each 
semicapitalist farm resulting from the processes of accumulation and 
competition which have eliminated smaller and weaker farms. Kautsky 
(1980) asserts that centralization proceeds through tenure arrangements 
and is therefore impeded wherever owner operation prevails. The process 
of concentration cannot take place independently of centralization, he 
asserts (because land is a unique factor in agricultural production). 
From this, it follows that centralization must take place either prior to 
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or concurrent with concentration of assets. Concentration and 
centralization are indicated by the increase in the percent of the total 
number of farms in the 500 or more acres farm-size category. 
Markov Processes 
Few researchers have attempted to forecast the distribution of firms 
by size classes. Adelman suggested that the forces determining the 
distribution of firm sizes within a particular industry are so varied and 
complex that any theoretical attempt to portray the effects of their 
interactions must of necessity be either drastically simplified, or else, 
hopelessly complicated. He also suggested that the movement of firms 
between size classes was a stochastic process which could be explained by 
one of a variety of Markov processes (Adelman, 1958:893). 
A Markov process is defined as a stochastic process where the 
outcome of a given trial (t, t+1, . . . T) depends only on the outcome of 
the preceding trial (t-1); this dependence is the same at all stages in 
the sequence of trials (Lee et al., 1965:743). The transition matrix "P" 
is common to all Markov processes. The elements of the transition matrix 
are the individual probabilities of moving from one state to another in 
the time period under examination. 
The basic components of the Markov model are listed below (Hallberg, 
1969:290); 
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(1) P = transition matrix 
^2 • 
S  
n  
Pii P12 • Pin 
P =  S g  P21 P22 P2n 
s 
n  Pnl Pn2 • Pnn 
where S.P.. =1.0 and P. .> 0, for all i and j. 
J  
(2) r = number of states. The transition matrix will be of size 
(rXr). 
(3) = probability of moving from state i to state j during a 
time period. 
(4) = vector of elements by states in the initial time period. 
(5) X^P = X^, the distribution of elements by states in time period 
t. 
The assumptions on which first order, stationary Markov models are 
built are inherently restrictive: (1) the evolution of a firm through 
size classes is a stochastic process; (2) the effects of the interactions 
among the political-economic variables remain stationary throughout the 
development process; and (3) the system is closed. 
The first assumption means that the probability a firm will proceed 
through a given number of size classes during a period depends only upon 
its firm size at the beginning of the period and the number of firm sizes 
involved, and it is independenent of the previous history of the firm. 
The development of a firm is seen as being probabilistic in nature with 
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the size of the firm at the beginning of the period as the only 
determinant of development (Lee et al., 1977:17). All the 
political-economic forces which determine the development of firms are 
thus reduced to a single variable - firm size. This amounts to the 
assumption that individual firm enterprise characteristics are all highly 
correlated with size, or that the magnitude and behavior of 
political-economic variables which induce development are more nearly 
homogeneous within a particular size category than they are from one size 
category to another. 
The second assumption is that the effects of the interactions among 
the political-economic variables, which are summarized in a Markov chain 
model by size-dependent transition probabilities, are assumed to remain 
stationary throughout the development process (Adelman, 1958:894). 
Mandel (1980) has noted, however, that the political-economic forces 
which determine the development of firms, vary by the phase of the long 
wave of late capitalist development. One may expect, therefore, that the 
transition probabilities among firm-size classes would be more nearly 
stationary within the expansive and stagnating phases of late 
capitalism's long wave, but nonstationary from the expansive phase to the 
stagnating phase of the long wave. 
The third assumption is that the system is closed; there is no exit 
or entry. This problem can be remedied by having an absorbing class that 
contains all the firms which have gone out of business since the initial 
starting period (Zumbach, 1980:103). By having a size class which 
collects all firms which have gone out of business, the model will always 
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account for the total number of firms in the initial period. 
Only a few researchers have used Markov processes to estimate the 
number and size distribution of farms (Daly et al., 1972; Judge and 
Swanson, 1962; Krenz, 1964; Libbin, 1982; Linn et al., 1980; and Zumbach, 
1980). 
Traditional Markov analysis projects future farm numbers by 
multiplying the row vector of farm numbers in the initial period by the 
transition matrix which was constructed from actual farm numbers in the 
past. In order to estimate the transition matrix, it is necessary to 
have data which indicate the number of farms that move from one size 
category to another during each time period. Because the only data which 
are available are aggregate data that indicate the number of farms in a 
size category at the end of a period, an estimation technique is needed 
that will permit the estimation of transition probabilities from 
aggregate proportion data. 
Most researchers have used variants or modifications of a Markov 
process (Krenz, 1954,; Lee et al., 1965; Zumbach, 1980). Some of the 
modifications are concerned with the estimation of a transition matrix 
which is a description of how firms move among size categories over time. 
Modifications are also necessary because of limited data describing the 
movement of farms from one time period to another. Lee, et al., (1977) 
developed a technique which can be used to estimate transition 
probabilities from aggregate proportion data in the situation where 
sample observations are not available. From the aggregate data, the 
proportion of elements in each state in each time period can be 
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determined. The observed proportions may be used as estimates of the 
farm-size probabilities at specified points in time. 
Methodology 
Since many factors may cause a firm's transition probabilities to 
change between the expansive and stagnating phases of late capitalism's 
long wave, it was not clear whether the assumptions of stationary Markov 
transition probabilities was reasonable. Therefore, two alternate 
hypotheses were proposed to test the assumption. These are stated below 
as ; 
1. The projected distribution of farms by size categories should 
closely approximate the actual distribution for the entire 
period (1940 to 1982). 
2. (a) The projected distribution of farms by size category should 
closely approximate the actual distribution for the period 1940 
to 1969. 
(b) The projected distribution of farms by size category should 
closely approximate the actual distribution for the period 1969 
to 1982. 
The first hypothesis assumes that the transition probabilities are 
stationary throughout the period. By implication it means that the 
transition probabilities are independent of political-economic trends of 
late capitalism's long wave. The second hypothesis assumes that the 
transition probabilities are stationary within each phase but vary 
between phases of the long wave of late capitalist development. 
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In considering the uncertainty of the assumed stationary transition 
probabilities and the hypotheses deriving from it, the analysis was 
conducted as described below: 
(1) Estimates were computed for the elements of a stationary 
transition matrix, assuming a first-order, finite, discrete Markov 
process from aggregate data. 
2 (2) The chi-square (x ) coefficient then was used to determine if 
the estimated distribution was unusual. The chi-square goodness of 
fit test determines whether the observed proportions are "usual" or 
"unusual" outcomes, given the assumption that they are generated by 
a Markov process (Lee et al., 1977:140).If the outcomes seem 
quite unusual on the application of the chi-square test, one either 
may tenatively conclude that the data may not have been generated by 
a Markov process. The conclusion is tentative because the 
occurrence of an unusual event is possible, given that the assumed 
process is the one generating the data, and also because the 
chi-square test used does not stand in any simple relationship to 
measures of degree of confidence in the assumed model (Lee et al., 
1977:142). 
(3) The vector of farms-by-size category (X^) for the initial time 
period (t) was then multiplied by the transition matrix (P) to 
obtain the projected distribution of farms by size categories (X^) 
in time period t+1. The process was then repeated recursively until 
X^ for each of the T time periods was estimated, 
(4) The Theil coefficient of inequality (U) was then used to 
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measure the deviations between the actual and projected distribution 
of farms by size categories. If the chi-square test did not 
conclusively indicate that the data may have been generated by a 
Markov process, the Theil Coefficient was used to measure the 
percentage error between actual and projected number of farms 
12 (Theil, 1966). The accuracy of projections is determined 
primarily by comparing actual numbers with projected numbers. 
(5) To further indicate the degree of projection accuracy in each 
size category, the simple percentage differences between actual and 
projected numbers of a size category were also used. 
(6) Distribution of farms by size categories was then estimated at 
five year intervals for the period 1982 to 2002, using the best 
prediction transition probability matrix. 
Analysis 
This section summarizes jointly the data for Hypothesis 1 and 2 (a) 
and (b), and discusses the results separately. 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis states that the projected distribution of farms 
by size categories should closely approximate the actual distribution of 
farms by size categories for the period 1940 to 1982. The estimated 
probability transition matrix for the 1940 to 1982 time period is 
presented in Table 3.1. The calculated chi-square value exceeded the 
tabulated chi-square value, suggesting that the observed proportions may 
not have been generated by a stationary Markov process. The actual and 
158 
projected distributions of farms by size clases for the 1940 to 1982 time 
period are presented in Table 3.4 and Figures 3.1 to 3.3. 
The simple percentage differences between observed and projected 
numbers for the small-size category indicate that the projected numbers 
underestimated the actual numbers of farms by six to nine percent for the 
years 1945 to 1954, underestimated the actual numbers by twenty-two to 
twenty-five percent in the years 1978 to 1982, and overestimated by four 
to twenty percent for the years 1959 to 1974. In the mid-size category, 
the projected numbers underestimated the actual numbers by three to seven 
percent for the years 1945 to 1959 but overestimated the actual numbers 
by four to forty-one percent for the years 1964 to 1982. Projected 
numbers underestimated the actual numbers by fourteen to forty-nine 
percent in the large size category for the years 1945 to 1982. 
The Theil coefficient indicated that the percentage error between 
the projected and actual number of farms increased from four to seven 
percent from 1945 to 1954, decreased to four percent in 1959, and 
increased to forty percent by 1982, On the basis of the chi-square test, 
the simple percentage differences, and the Theil coefficients, one may 
conclude that the data do not support the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2a 
This hypothesis states that the projected distribution of farms by 
size categories should closely approximate the actual distribution of 
farms by size categories for the period 1940-1969. The estimated 
probability transition matrix for the 1940 to 1969 time period is 
presented in Table 3.2. The calculated chi-square value again exceeded 
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the tabulated chi-square value, suggesting that the observed proportions 
may not have been generated by a stationary Markov process. 
The actual and projected distributions of farms by the three size 
categories are presented in Table 3.5 and Figures 3.1 to 3.3. The simple 
percentage differences between the observed and projected numbers in the 
small-size category indicated that the projected numbers underestimated 
the actual numbers by three percent for the years 1945 to 1950, 
overestimated by two to forty percent for the years 1954 to 1974, and 
underestimated by eleven to twelve percent for the years 1973 to 1982. 
In the mid-size category, the projected numbers underestimated actual 
numbers by two to four percent for the years 1945 to 1954, but the 
overestimates increased from two percent in 1959 to sixty percent in 
1982. The projected estimates consistently underestimated the actual 
numbers in the large-size category by ten percent in 1945 to fifty-four 
percent in 1982. 
The Theil coefficients increased from two percent in 1945 to 
fifty-eight percent in 1982. On the basis of the chi-square test, the 
simple percentage differences, and the Theil coefficients, one may 
conclude that the projected data do not support Hypothesis 2a. 
Hypothesis 2b 
This hypothesis states that the projected distribution of farms by 
size categories should closely approximate the actual distribution of 
farms by size categories for the period 1959 to 1982. The estimated 
probability transition matrix for the 1969 to 1982 time period is 
presented in Table 3.3. The calculated chi-square value exceeded the 
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tabulated chi-square value, therefore, one may tenatively conclude that 
the observed proportions may not have been generated by a stationary 
Markov process. 
The actual and projected distributions of farms by the three size 
categories are presented in Table 3.5 and Figures 3.1 to 3.3. The simple 
percentage differences between observed and projected numbers of the 
small-size category indicate a small underestimation of the actual 
numbers of farms. In the mid-size category, the simple percentage 
differences indicated a slight underestimation for the years 1974 to 1978 
and a slight overestimation for 1982. The simple percentage differences 
indicated a twelve percent underestimation in the large size category for 
1974, exact estimation in 1978, and a small overestimation in 1982. The 
Theil coefficient indicated a small overestimation of two and three 
percent for the years 1974 and 1978 respectively and a one percent 
overestimation for 1982. 
Discussion 
The first hypothesis, which corresponds to the orthodox Marxist 
perspective, was not supported. An examination of the projected numbers 
of farms in the three size categories based upon the 1940-1982 transition 
probability matrix revealed substantial discrepancies with the actual 
number of farms. The Theil coefficients also demonstrated that the 
projected numbers of farms became increasingly inaccurate over time. 
When the actual number of farms for each size category was plotted over 
time, the tragectory revealed a nonlinear course of development contrary 
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to that predicted by the orthodox Marxist perspective. 
The second hypothesis which corresponds to the course of SCP 
development associated with the long wave of late capitalist development, 
was proposed as an alternative to the orthodox Marxist perspective. 
Hypothesis 2a, which corresponds to late capitalism's expansive 
phase, was not supported. The projected numbers of farms in the three 
size categories based upon the 1940-1969 transition probability matrix 
exhibited substantial discrepancies with the actual number of farms. The 
Theil coefficient also demonstrated that the projected number of farms 
became increasingly inaccurate over time. 
Hypothesis 2b corresponds to the course of SCP development 
associated with the stagnating phase of late capitalism's long wave. The 
projected number of farms in the three size categories provided some 
support to the hypothesis. An examination of the simple percentage 
differences, as well as the Theil coefficients, revealed only slight 
discrepancies between actual and projected numbers of farms in the three 
size categories. A comparison of the first three years of projections of 
numbers of farms in the three size categories based upon the three 
transition matrices indicated that the 1969-1982 transition matrix 
exhibited the least amount of error. 
Individually, the calculated chi-square values for Hypothesis 2a and 
2b would lead one to reject both parts of the hypothesis. However, a 
comparison of the sum of the calculated chi-square values for the second 
hypothesis with the calculated chi-square value of the first hypothesis 
indicated that the sum was considerably less than the calculated 
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chi-square value of the first hypothesis. This would tend to indicate 
that, overall, the second hypothesis more nearly fit the data than did 
the first hypothesis. 
Projection of Numbers of Farms 
The 1969-1982 transition probability matrix was used to project the 
numbers of farms in the three size categories by five year intervals to 
2002. It was assumed that the transition probabilities would remain 
stationary throughout the remainder of the period; this assumption is 
congruent with the assumption that the same political-economic trends of 
the 1969-1982 period would continue through the remainder of the 
stagnating phase of the long wave. 
The projected number of farms by size categories in the year 2002 
for the 1959-1982 transition matrix is presented in Table 3.6 and Figures 
3.4 to 3.6. The projected total number of farms is estimated to decrease 
by five percent from 1982 to 2002 (115369 to 110133). An eighteen 
percent increase in the number of small farms is predicted (20240 to 
23950). A sixteen percent decrease in mid-size farms is projected 
between 1982 and 2002 (77598 to 64879). The number of farms in the 
large-size category is projected to increase by sixteen percent between 
1982 and 2002 (18292 to 21304). 
The actual and projected distributions of farms by size categories 
based upon the 1969 to 1982 transition probability matrix is given in 
Table 3.9 and Figures 3.5 and 3.6. The proportion of all farms in the 
small-size category is projected to increase from seventeen percent in 
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1982 to twenty-two percent in 2002. The estimated proportion of all 
farms in the mid-size category is projected to decline from sixty-seven 
percent in 1982 to sixty-one percent in 2002. The estimated proportion 
of all farms in the large-size category is projected to increase from 
sixteen percent in 1982 to nineteen percent in 2002. 
Conclusions 
The projections based upon the 1969-1982 transition probability 
matrix tend to confirm the predictions of the perspective based upon the 
long wave of late capitalist development. The projections should be 
regarded as tentative, however, given the limiting assumptions on which 
the stationary transition Markov chain is based. The assumption of 
stationary transition probabilities may not be appropriate for a Markov 
chain which traces the movement of farms between size categories in 
future time periods. 
The year 1959 was used to divide the long wave of late capitalist 
development into its expansive and stagnating phases. Mandel(1980:122) 
notes, however, that the crises of overproduction in the expansive phase 
are transitory and shallow while the crises in the stagnating phase are 
longer and deeper. One can imagine late capitalism's long wave as a 
continuum in which the crises of overproduction gradually become deeper 
and longer as the expansive phase draws to a close, or, conversely, 
become shallower and more transitory as the stagnating phase draws to a 
close. Thus, one cannot draw an artificial division between late 
capitalism's expansive and stagnating phases. 
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The intensity of the crises of overproduction affect the components 
of the law of value and the rate of appropriation of simple commodity 
producers' surplus through technological rents, ground rent, and unequal 
exchange. All of these variables affect the probability of an 
occurrence of particular outcome in any one time period in a sequence of 
time periods. Therefore, it might be assumed that the transitional 
probabilities are functions of these explanatory variables and that the 
transition probabilities change as the explanatory variables change. 
Future research should use a nonstationary Markov chain which includes 
these explanatory variables or a composite index of these variables. 
Future research should also attempt to use value of products sold by farm 
size categories, rather than number of farms by farm size categories, 
because value of products sold would provide a better measure of the 
scale of a farm unit than its acre-size classification. 
Nevertheless, the limited support for the second hypothesis does 
provide some support for the proposition that concurrent with the 
increasing concentration and centralization of semicapitalist production 
is the regression of simple commodity production and the increase in the 
rural semiproletariat. 
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Footnotes 
1. The reader should refer to Section I for a more explicit elaboration 
of the revised theory. 
2. The pressures which result in the "squeeze" on simple reproduction 
include those that develop from the exhaustion of both land (reduction in 
productivity through mining and soil erosion) and labor (intensification 
of family labor and endangerment of health) with the exisiting methods of 
cultivation, the use of more expensive means of production (improved 
seeds, machinery, fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides, etc.) with no 
guarantee that the return to their labor will be equal to the costs 
incurred, and from deteriorating terms of exchange for simple commodity 
producers' commodities. 
3. In The Development of Capitalism in Russia, Lenin (1958) gave 
examples of vertical concentration under conditions which made it more 
profitable for productive capital to invest in processing and 
manufacturing enterprises than to undertake the production task itself. 
In the last chapter of his book. Peasant Farm Organization, Chayanov 
(1966) also called attention to the process of vertical concentration, 
brought about by the intervention of trading capital both in the 
conditions of production and in certain kinds of cooperatives. Bernstein 
(1979) cited examples of vertical concentration through state 
intervention, such as in the Tanzania villagization programs and other 
rural development schemes in African countries. 
4. Marx (1967:436-437) discussed the role of credit in stock companies 
in Capital, Volume III : Chapter 27. Particularly interesting is his 
analysis of the transformation of a capitalist entrepreneur into a 
manager of capital: 
. . . transformation of the actually functioning capitalist 
into a mere manager, administrator of other people's capital, 
and of the owner of capital into a mere owner, a mere 
money-capitalist. Even if the dividends which they receive 
include the interest and the profit of enterprise, i.e., the 
total profit (or the salary of the manager is, or should be, 
simply the wage of a specific type of skilled labour, whose 
price is regulated in the labour-market (like that of any 
other labor), this total profit is henceforth received only 
in the form of interest, i.e., as mere compensation for 
owning capital that now is entirely divorced from the 
function in the actual process of reproduction, just as this 
function in the person of the manager is divorced from 
ownership of capital. 
5. Knutson et al., (1983:250) also noted that the state may assist in 
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transforming agriculture into a public utility: 
In a public utility, government licenses production, 
establishes prices, and sets standards for service and 
performance as well as acceptable profit levels. Government 
could perform the identical function in agriculture. 
Specifically, it could decide who can produce what and how 
much, it could determine how land is used, provide credit to 
agriculture, allocate inputs used in production, and specify 
prices to be charged for inputs and paid for farm products. 
6. In the Grundrisse, Marx (1973:279) stated that in its advanced 
stage, capital: 
. . . regards the existence of landed property itself as a 
merely transitional development, which is required as an 
action of capital on the old relations of landed property, 
and a product of their decomposition; but which, as such -
once this purpose is achieved - is merely a limitation on 
profit, not a necessary requirement for production. It thus 
endeavours to dissolve landed property as private property 
and to transfer it to the state. This is the negative side. 
Thus to transform the entire domestic society into 
capitalists and wage laborers . . . the negation (of landed 
property) from the side of capital is only a change of form, 
towards its undivided rule. (Ground rent is the universal 
state rent (state tax), so that bourgeois society reproduces 
the medieval system in a new way, but as the latter's total 
negation). 
7. In the first phase, technology is revolutionized, as characterized by 
an increasing rate of profit, accelerated self-expansion of previously 
idle capital and the accelerated devalorization of capital previously 
invested in now technologically-obsolete means of production. 
The second phase is characterized by retreating profits, slowly 
reducing accumulation, decelerating economic growth, gradually increasing 
difficulties in the valorization of the total accumulated capital, and 
the gradual, self-reproducing rise in idle capital. The actual 
transformation in productive technology has already occurred and has been 
generally adopted (Mandel, 1980:120-121). 
8. The definition of a farm was changed for the 1974 and succeeding 
agricultural censuses. The previous definition counted as a farm any 
place with less than 10 acres from which $250 or more of agricultural 
products were sold or normally would have been sold during the census 
year, or any place of 10 acres of more from which $50 or more of 
agricultural products were sold or normally would have been sold during 
the census year. The new defintion of farm is any place from which $1000 
or more of agricultural products were sold, or normally would have been 
sold, during the census year. 
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9. The use of census data has a number of problems (Gillespie, 1981:38); 
. . . (1) definitions, categories used in analysis, and the 
analyses themselves are not consistent through successive 
censuses, all of which add an element of ambiguity and 
interpretation; (2) the questions asked varied among 
censuses, sometimes to better reflect changing conditions, 
but rendering interpretation problematic; (3) respondents to 
the census questionnaires can be expected to not have 
interpreted the census questions in the same way; (4) 
respondents may have dissembled on some of the questions 
because they wished to conceal certain facts from local 
census takers whose confidentiality they doubted, or to 
embellish on facts to make a good impression on local census 
takers; (5) respondents may not have known the answers to all 
the questions, especially if they were not the operator, but 
rather were the wife or other member of the operator's 
family, landlord, hired laborer, neighbor, or other, which 
were indicated as possible respondents in a block at the end 
of the questionnaire of the 1964 and other censuses. 
Despite these problems, however, the censuses are the best source of 
longitudinal data that I know to be available. 
10. Pointing out the problems inherent in measuring the development of 
capitalism in agriculture either by farm size or the number and 
importance of large farms, when judged by their total acreage, Lenin 
(1934:12) noted that they are only indirect indications; farm size does 
not always indicate that the farm is really big (as an economic 
enterprise) or does it give any direct indication as to its capitalist 
nature. Ideally, one would obtain a better indication of the state of 
capitalist agricultural development by comparing sales by farm-size 
categories across censuses. This approach would provide measures of 
semi-proletarianization, regression, and concentration and centralization 
by sales classes. Unfortunately, agricultural sales classes are not 
comparable: inflation across years deflates the significance of some 
sales classes and increases the significance of others. Additionally, 
data for measures of semi-proletarianization, regression, and 
concentration and centralization were not available by sales classes. 
11. X^(r-1)= N(t)(y^(t)-y^(t))^/y'^(t) with df = (r-l)T 
12. 
A 2 
u= (y^ - y^) 
168 
u = the Theil inequality coefficient 
y. = projected number of farms in size class i, and 
y^ = actual number of farms in size class i. 
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Table 3.1 Probability transition matrix for 1940-1982 
Probability of moving from state i to state j. 
^il ^12 ^i3 ^14 
P.. .96 0 0 .04 
0 .90 .10 0 
p::4 .07 0 .93 0 
p,-^ 0 .14 0 .86 
X = 24931 X @.10 " 
Table 3.2 Probability transition matrix for 1940-1969 
Probability of moving from state i to state j 
I 
^1 ^2 ^3 ^4 
.98  0 0 .02 
0 .75 .25 0 
.05 .03 .92 0 
0 0 0 1 
X 15273 X @.10 = 30 
Table 3.3 Probability transition matrix for 1969-1982 
I 
Probability of moving from state i to state j 
^il ^i2 ^i3 ^14 
09 .56 .36 0 
97 .01 0 .02 
0 .11 .84 .04 
0 .13 0 .87 
^ ^ i2df @.10 
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Table 3.4 Actual and projected number of farms based on 1940-1982 
transition matrix 
0 - 49 Acres 50 - 499 Acres 
Percent Percent 
Year Actual Projected Difference Actual Proj ected Difference 
1940 28625 182110 
1945 27838 26124 - 6.2 178222 172225 - 3.4 
1950 26264 23823 - 9.3 173802 162781 - 6.3 
1954 23540 21779 - 7.5 165832 153769 - 7.3 
1959 19179 20029 4.4 150684 145183 - 3.6 
1964 15480 18588 20.1 131091 137023 4.5 
1969 15223 17459 14.7 114254 129290 13.2 
1974 14892 16635 11.7 96838 121986 26.0  
1978 21377 16101 -24.7 88478 115111 30.0 
1982 20228 15834 -21.7 77192 108663 40.8  
500+ Acres Total Acres 
Percent Percent 
Year Actual Pro]ected Difference Actual Projected Difference U 
1940 2583 213318 
1945 2874 2221 -22.8 208934 200570 - 4.0 3. 5 
1950 3093 2420 -21.8 203159 189024 - 7.0 3. 7 
1954 3555 3053 -14.1 192933 178601 - 7.4 7. 3 
1959 4822 4014 -16.8 174685 169226 - 3.1 3, ,7 
1964 7591 5216 -31.3 154162 160827 4.3 5. 4 
1969 10877 6585 -39.5 140354 153334 9.2 13, ,6 
1974 14374 8063 -43.9  126104 146684 16.3 17 .1 
1978 16601 9599 -48.7 126456 140811 11.3 30 .3 
1982 17949 11156 -37.8 115369 135653 17.6 39 .7 
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Table 3.5 Actual and projected number of farms based on 1940-1969 
transition matrix 
0 - 49 Acres 50 - 499 Acres 
Percent Percent 
Year Actual Proj ected Difference Actual Proj ected Difference 
1940 28625 182110 
1945 27838 26932 - 3.2 178222 174697 .  2 .0  
1950 26264 25440 - 3.1 173802 167455 - 3.6 
1954 23540 24104 2.4 165838 160418 - 3.3 
1959 19179 22890 19.3 150684 153611 1.9 
1964 15480 21776 40.7 131091 147044 12.2 
1969 15223 20743 36.3  114254 140725 23.2  
500+ Acres Total Acres 
Percent 
Year Actual Projected Difference 
Percent 
Actual Projected Difference U 
1940 2583 213318 
1945 2874 2583 -10. 1 208934 204212 - 2, ,3 2, ,1 
1950 3093 2765 -10. ,6 203159 195660 - 3, .7 3, .6 
1954 3555 3118 -12. ,3 192933 187640 - 2, .7 3, ,3 
1959 4822 3632 -24. ,7 175685 180133 3, .1 3 .2 
1964 7591 4296 -43, .4 154162 173116 12 .3 13 .0 
1969 10877 5100 -53, ,1 140354 166568 18 .7 23 .9 
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Table 3.5 Actual and projected number of farms based on 1959-1982 
transition matrix 
0 - 4 9  A c r e s  5 0  -  4 9 9  A c r e s  
Percent Percent 
Year Actual Projected Difference Actual Projected Difference 
1969 15233 114254 
1974 14892 14134 - 5.1 95838 95973 - .1 
1978 21377 20831 - 2.5 88478 85934 - 2.9 
1982 20228 20240 - .1 77192 77598 .5 
1987 23190 72944 
1992 22862 69040 
1997 24143 56790 
2002 23950 54879 
500+ Acres Total Acres 
Percent Percent 
Year Actual Proj ected Difference Actual Proj ected Difference u 
1969 10877 140354 
1974 16374 14338 -12.4 125104 124445 - 1.3 2 . 4 
1978 16601 16595 126456 123360 -  2 .4  2  ,S 
1982 17949 18292 1.9 115369 115130 .7 .5 
1987 19423 115557 
1992 20279 112181 
1997 20662 111795 
2002 21304 110133 
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Table 3.7 Projected proportions of farms using the 1940-1982 transition 
matrix. 
0-49 Acres 50-499 Acres 500 + Acres 
Year Actual Projected Actual Projected Actual Proj ected 
1940 13, ,4 85. 3 1. 2 
1945 13. ,3 13. ,0 85. ,3 85. 9 1. ,4 1. 1 
1950 12. 0 12. ,6 85. ,5 86.  1 1, .5 1. 3 
1954 12. ,2 12. 2 86,  0 86.  0 1, ,8 1. 7 
1959 11. ,0 11. ,8 86.  ,3 85. ,6 2, .8 2. 4 
1964 10, .0 11. 6 85. ,0 85. ,2 4, .9 3. 2 
1969 10, .8 11, .4 81. 4 84. ,3 7 .7 4. ,3 
1974 11, .8 11, .3 76, .8 83, .2 11 .4 5, ,5 
1978 16 .9 11 .4 70 .0 81, ,7 13 .1 6, ,8 
1982 17 . 5 11 ,7 66 .9 80 .1 15 .6 8 .2 
Table 3.8 Projected proportions of farms using the 1940-1969 transition 
matrix. 
0-49 Acres 50-499 Acres 500 + Acres 
Year Actual Projected Actual Projected Actual Projected 
1940 13. ,4 85. 3 1. 2 
1945 13. 3 13. ,2 85. ,3 83. 6 1. ,4 1. 3 
1950 12. 9 13. ,0 85. 5 85. ,5 1. ,5 1. ,4 
1954 12 .2 12, .8 86,  .0 85. ,5 1, .8 1, .7 
1959 10 .9 12, .7 85. 8 85. ,3 2 .7 2, 0 
1964 10 .0 12 .6 85 .0 84,  .9 4 .9 2 .5 
1969 10 .8 12 .4 81 .4 84 .5 7 .7 3 .1 
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Table 3.9 Projected proportions of farms using the 1969-1982 transition 
matrix. 
0-49 Acres 50-499 Acres 500 + Acres 
Year Actual Projected Actual Proj acted Actual Proj ected 
1969 10 .8 81.4 7.7 
1974 11 .8 11.4 76.8  77.1 13.0 11.5 
1978 16 .9 16.9  70.0  69.7 13.1 13.4 
1982 17 .5 17.4 66.9 66.8  15.6 15.6 
1987 20.1 63.1 16.8 
1992 20.4 61.5 18.1 
1997 21.6 59.7 18.9 
2002 21.9 60.6 18.9 
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SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Marxist theorists debating the future of the family farm as a form 
of simple commodity production (SCP) within the capitalist mode of 
production have divided into two diametrically opposed factions each with 
its own predictions. The first variant predicts that the inexorable 
forces of centralizaion and concentration of agricultural production will 
inevitably differentiate SCP into an agricultural bourgeoisie and a 
landless proletariat. The second predicts a continued, if marginal, 
existence for SCP. 
Data support neither the inevitability of capitalist development in 
agriculture nor the persistence of SCP, so the problem then, becomes one 
of accounting for these contradictory trends. An alternative theory is 
needed that accounts for the gradual integration and transformation of 
SCP agriculture by capital and the lack of rapid differentiation within 
agriculture in order to explain the continued proportional dominance and 
ongoing differentiation of family farms. 
The perspective proposed in the first paper views simple commodity 
producers' labor and means of production as being fuly subsumed under 
capital and recognizes that, while appropriation of simple commodity 
producers' surplus-value occurs in relations of exchange, exploitation 
occurs in relations of production. 
The two processes of exploitation affecting simple commodity 
producers are: (1) the formal subsumption of commodified labor and the 
production of absolute surplus-value; and (2) the real subsumption of 
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commodified labor and the production of relative surplus-value. The 
mechanisms of appropriation of simple commodity producers' surlus-value 
include: (1) ground rent; (2) technological rents; and (3) unequal 
exchange. 
The revised perspective argues: (1) SCP may be fully subsumed under 
capital without resulting in the complete separation of simple commodity 
producers from their means of production; (2) SCP is being differentiated 
into a tripartite class structture of rural semiproletarians, simle 
commodity producers, and semicapitalist producers; (3) this 
differentiation varies by the phases of the long wave of late capitalist 
development, resulting in the combined and uneven development of SCP; and 
(4) the state aids in this process through policies and programs designed 
to serve legitimation and accumulation functions. 
The second paper summarized the propositions of the first paper 
concerning the evolution of SCP in late capitalism and tested them within 
the context of Iowa agriculture for the period 1959 to 1982. Changes in 
the differentiaiton of SCP agriculture were hypothesized to vary 
consistently with the phases of the long wave of late capitalist 
development. Changes should be found in the centralization and 
concentrâtionof semicapitalist production, the regression of SCP and the 
proletarianization of the rural semiproletariat. 
Twelve hypotheses, comprising fourteen assertions, were tested. 
Support for thirteen of the fourteen assertions provided support for the 
proposition that the proletarianization, regression and concentration and 
centralization of SCP does vary by the phases of the long wave of late 
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capitalist development resulting in its combined and uneven development. 
Using a discrete time, stationary transition probability Markov 
chain, the third paper projected the structure of Iowa agriculture to the 
year 2002. With the increasing concentration and centralization of farms 
in semicapitalist production, one should witness the regression of farms 
in SCP, as well as an increase in the farms in the rural semiproletariat 
and that this should vary consistently with the phases of the long wave 
of late capitalist development. 
The first hypothesis, which corresponded to the orthodox Marxist 
perspective, was not supported. When the actual number of farms for each 
size category was plotted over time, the tragectory revealed a nonlinear 
course of development contrary to that predicted by the orthodox Marxist 
perspective. 
The second hypothesis, which corresponded to the course of SCP 
development associated with the long wave of late capitalist development, 
was proposed as an alternative to the orthodox Marxist perspective. 
Hypothesis 2a, which corresponded to the course of SCP development 
associated with late capitalism's expansive phases, was not supported. 
Hypothesis 2b, which corresponded to the course of SCP development 
associated with the stagnating phase of late capitalism's long wave, was 
also not supported. However, the sum of the calculated chi-square values 
for the two parts of the second hypothesis was considerably less than the 
calculated chi-square value of the first hypothesis. Overall this 
indicated that the second hypothesis more nearly fit the data than did 
the first hypothesis. 
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The 1969 to 1982 transition probability matrix was used to project 
the numbers of farms in the three size categories by five-year intervals 
to the year 2002. The transition matrix projected a five percent 
decrease in the total number of farms, an eighteen percent increase in 
the number of small farms, a sixteen percent decrease in medium farms, 
and a sixteen percent increase in large farms by the year 2002. 
The distribution of small farms in the three size categories was 
projected to increase from seventeen to twenty-two percent, the 
proportion of medium farms was projected to decrease from sixty-seven to 
sixty-one percent, and the proportion of large farms was projected to 
increase from sixteen to nineteen percent. 
The projections based upon the transition probability matrix tended 
to support the predictions of the alternaive perspective. The 
projections should be regarded as tentative, however, given the limiting 
assumptions on which the stationary transition proability Markov chain is 
based. 
Nevertheless, the limited suport for the second hypothesis provided 
some support for the proposition that concurrent with the increasing 
concentration and centralization of semicapitalist production is the 
regression of SCP and an increase in the rural semiproletariat. 
In summary the papers in this dissertation provide some support for 
the proposition that the differentiation of SCP does vary by the phases 
of the long wave of late capitalist development. 
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APPENDIX A: 
MARX ON GROUND RENT 
Ground rent is connected to the equalization of rates of profit and 
its factors: market price, market value, and production price. Varying 
levels of productivity in sectors implies that their commodities will 
also have different values, but a general average value will develop out 
of these individual values. The individual values are composed of the 
average cost of production and the average profit which are themselves 
determined by the average conditions of production. Market prices vary 
around the market or average value; these variations are determined by 
demand and supply conditions. Average market value determines market 
prices when ordinary demand equals normal supply. Since all commodités 
have a common market price, a balanced supply and demand market implies 
that commodities produced at a value below average value will receive 
extra value and profit. Commodities produced at a value above average 
value lose part of their surplus-value and are sold at a loss. This lost 
value is transferred to those commodities produced at a value below 
average value. 
If supply is greater than demand, market price is determined by 
commodities produced under the most favorable conditions. In this 
situation, even those commodities produced under average conditions sell 
at a loss. Conversely, if demand is greater than supply, the commodities 
produced under the worst conditions determine market price. In this 
situation all commodities produced under favorable conditions, including 
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those produced under average conditions, realize more than their 
individual value (Marx, 1967:178-184). The fact that commodities may 
realize more than the value they contain leads to Marx's discussion of 
ground rent (Marx, 1967 Part VI). 
Marx distinguishes between differential and absolute ground rents. 
When an average rate of profit develops in a sector, ground rent, a 
special kind of surplus profit, emerges. Certain high productivity firms 
monopolize the naturally productive factors. These factors, combined 
with labor productivity, result in super profits or ground rent. These 
are differential ground rents since they do not determine production 
price but are instead based upon it, These rents are received by all 
agricultural producers with below average rates of profit only if the 
most favorable conditions do not determine market values and thus demand 
and supply conditions. 
With the development of an average rate of profit in agriculture, 
productivity differences and differential rent are determined by three 
factors: access to markets, natural fertility and intensity of 
production. Access to markets and natural fertility comprise 
differential rent I. Intensity of production, differential rent II, 
depends on constant and variable capital investment. The amount of 
capital invested in lands of equal natural fertility and similar location 
will result in variations in yields. These differential rents, however, 
do not determine agricultural prices. They instead describe how 
surplus-value is distributed within agriculture on the basis of average 
prices of production for agricultural commodities. Differential rents 
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will continue to exist in simple commodity production as long as 
commodities are sold at the common average market price. 
The assumption that demand would slightly exceed supply for 
agricultural commodities led Marx to conclude that the value of 
commodities produced under the worst conditions would determine market 
price and that all other land would receive differential rents. This 
conclusion is consistent with his earlier assumption of a totally 
capitalist agriculture so that demand fluctuations would determine 
whether land was used in production. Since farmers could not realize a 
profit on commodities produced under the worst conditions, they would 
invest their capital elsewhere. 
Since, as Marx assumed, there was a lower organic composition of 
capital in agriculture than in industry, the production of value and 
surplus-value therefore would be higher in agriculture. If the free 
movement of capital into and out of agriculture is assumed, this higher 
surplus-value would be transferred to industrial and other capital 
through the development of the average rate of profit. Private property 
in land, however, acts as a barrier to the transfer of value. Capital 
cannot be invested in land unless the landlord agrees to it. The 
landlord usually requests a share of value produced in exchange for the 
renter's privilege of using the land. This payment is essentially a 
transfer of a portion of the value produced on the land. Even land of 
the worst quality, therefore, commands ground rent. This rent is 
absolute rent; it is not related to the natural fertility or location 
(differential rent) but exists merely as a condition of use. 
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Absolute rent increases agricultural market prices above production 
price and thus appropriates a portion or all of surplus-value which 
exceeds agricultural production price. Under conditions of free movement 
of capital, the excess would be appropriated by nonagricultural capital. 
Landed monopoly, however, acts as a barrier to the equalization of the 
rate of profit and reduces the general rate of profit by blocking this 
transfer. 
Surplus labor in agriculture can be appropriated by means other than 
surplus-value above average profit, (capitalist ground rent). It can 
also be appropriated by labor rent, rent in kind, or money rent which are 
the primary methods of appropriation of surplus labor in noncapitalist 
eras. These forms of appropriation are equal to capitalist profit and, 
unlike ground rent, they do not refer to an excess above profit. 
Where simple commodity production prevails under the capitalist mode 
of production, the simple commodity producers may own their land and not 
pay rent. The cost of land is subtracted from their surplus labor which 
is equivalent to the capitalist average rate of profit. On the other 
hand, cost of land is an excess above average profit for capitalist 
farmers. In this case, the cost of land is deducted from the simple 
commodity producer's surplus labor, whereas with capitalist producers, it 
is the excess above average profit. In either situation, differential 
rents I and that part of differential rents II which is attached to the 
land, are included in the price of land. 
Rent and land prices can influence the price of commodities only in 
the case of absolute rent. In this case, the lower organic composition 
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of capital in agriculture produces value above production price and 
market conditions or monopoly prices permit landlords or nonagricultural 
capital to appropriate the excess value. Absolute rent, therefore, 
represents a hindrance to the equalization of the rates of profit. 
Although it applies to both capitalist and simple commodity producer 
landowners, the later cannot collect it. In this case, absolute ground 
rent is used to extract simple commodity producers' surplus product and 
labor. 
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APPENDIX B: 
MARXIST METHODOLOGY 
Popper (1957) has criticized Marxist laws of motion as being 
"historicist" in that they are predictive laws which reveal a hidden 
evolutionary pattern in human history. This criticism arises from a 
serious misreading of Marx (McQuarie, 1977:478-483). The debate over 
historicist prediction has obscured a fundamental fact: Marx was not a 
historicist as Popper defines the word, and, therefore, his refutation of 
Marx's laws of motion is irrelevant. Marx does not propose a universal 
scheme of social evolution in his theoretical writings, but he rather 
develops a theory of structures and their correspondence within the 
abstract conditions of the limits of the capitalist mode of production. 
His theory should be considered as a holistic system's model for the 
analysis of empirical social formations. The laws of motion of capital 
are, therefore, perfectly ahistorical; they apply under any conditions of 
capitalist production and exchange. The conditional antecedents, howver, 
apply only in limited historical periods. Popper's claim that Marxian 
laws are historically limited, therefore, actually reduces to Marx's 
assertion that the conditions under which these laws apply are 
historically limited. 
A second area of methodological concern is the compatibility of 
Marxian methodology with the logic of positivistic sociological inquiry. 
Marx employed a method of successive approximation (McQuarie, 
1978:222-223) which consists of two movements or procedures. The first 
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is movement from the empirical to the abstract level involving a period 
of preliminary observation, empirical examination and tentative 
explanation, leading to the abstraction of certain prominent features of 
the phenomenon under study. The unusual or accidental features are 
discarded so that the phenomenon may be considered in its "most typical 
form most free from disturbing influences" (Marx, 1977:90). The end 
result of this procedure is separating the phenomenon in its pure or 
ideal form and stating theory in terms of simplified hypotheses at the 
highest level of theoretical abstraction. 
The method's second procedure involves a series of transitions from 
abstract theory to the empirical level by successive approximations. In 
this procedure, mediations are introduced and the theory is reconstructed 
making it more complex and conditional. This procedure enriches the 
theory and permits it to consider and explain a wider variety of 
empirical phenomenon. The procedure theortically reconstructs reality so 
that it is not "a chaotic conception of a whole but a rich totality of 
many attributes and relations" (Marx, 1977:100). Successive 
approximation involves two related steps (McQuarie, 1978:223): (1) 
expanding the theory so that propositions can account for the behavior of 
an increasing number of variables, and (2) verifying or rejecting the 
theory through empirical observation and experimentation. 
If the theory is valid, it is only through its elaboration in 
successive approximations that it can describe a concrete phenomenon. 
Data gathering and empirical observation guide the elaboration and 
modification of abstract historical predictive hypotheses and general 
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laws. The logic of successive approximations is that generality in 
prediction is achieved with a loss in precision. The internal 
consistency of the abstract model is sacrificed to clarify a specific 
empirical phenomenon. Marx's methodological procedures are not 
incompatible with the logic of contemporary sociology (Wardell, 
1979:425). His use of an inductive-deductive method of theory 
construction and verification of theory by prediction along with an 
implicit system's orientation are not very far removed from conventional 
sociological practice. 
204 
APPENDIX C; 
GLOSSARY^ 
Absolute Land Rent : specific form of surplus-profit originating from a 
monopoly of landownership by a special class of agrarian proprietors, who 
prevent the sum total of surplus-value produced in agriculture from being 
redistributed among all capitalists, by appropriating part of that 
surplus-value as a prior condition of access to the land which they own. 
Accumulation in the Abstract : pursuit of profit for its own sake, one of 
the two versions of the economic maximizing rationale (Chevalier, 
1982:145). 
Accumulation of Capital : increase in the value of capital by the 
transformation of part of surplus-value into additional capital. That 
part of surplus-value which is not accumulated will be unproductively 
consumed by capitalists or their dependents. 
Articulation: refers to the internal movement by which relations which 
were primary or dominant become secondary or dominated and secondary 
relations become primary (Denis, 1982:135). 
^All definitions are from Handel's (1980) glossary except where 
noted. 
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Average Social Productivity of Labor : the level of productivity of labor 
at which the average commodity is produced in each important branch of 
production. A minority of goods will be produced below this average in 
"backward" firms, and another minority at a higher level of productivity 
in "advanced" firms. 
Capital : exchange value which seeks a further accretion of value. 
Capital first appears in a society of petty commodity producers in the 
form of owners of money who intervene in the market with the aim of 
buying goods in order to resell them at a profit. 
Capitalist Ground Rent : presupposes the existence in agriculture of 
capitalists and wage workers; capitalist rent is that part of 
surplus-value which remains after deduction of entrepreneur's profit 
(Lenin, 1958:175). 
Capitalist Mode of Production: generalized commodity production, in 
which the direct producers have been dispossessed of their means of 
production, and therefore have to sell their labor power to those who own 
the means of production. Labor power and means of production have become 
commodities. Means of production in turn become capital - acruing 
further exchange value by the surplus-value created by direct producers 
and appropriated by the owners of capital. A society dominated by the 
capitalist mode of production is basically divided into two classes: the 
capitalist class which monopolizes the means of production, and the 
proletariat which is economically compelled to sell its labor power. 
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Centralization of Capital : the fusion of different capitals under a 
single common command. 
Circulating Capital: that part of constant capital used to purchase raw 
materials, energy, and auxiliary products; plus variable capital needed 
to purchase labor power. 
Concentrât ion of Capital : the growth in the value of capital in each 
major capitalist firm as a result of accumulation and competition 
(elimination of smaller and weaker firms). 
Concrete Economizing : appropriation of a optimum - albeit limited -
magnitude of value which is embodied in the following elements: (a) 
instruments of production which they (producers) purchase; (b) the land 
which they own and the rent they pay to retain it; (c) the labor power 
which they purchase from others or themselves; and (d) the foodstuffs 
which they produce and sell (or buy from their own production) 
(Chevalier, 1983:178-179). 
Constant Capital : that part of capital which is used to purchase 
buildings, machinery, raw materials or energy, and whose value remains 
constant because it is incorporated into the value of final commodities 
and conserved by the activity of labor power. 
Department I; branches of capitalist production producing means of 
production (raw materials, energy, machinery and tools, buildings). 
Department II : branches of capitalist production producing means of 
consumption (consumer goods), which reconstitute the labor-force of the 
direct producers and contribute to the livelihood of the capitalists and 
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their dependents. 
Devalorization: the process whereby capital loses a part of its value, 
which takes two main forms during a capitalist crisis. Firstly, as a 
result of the decline in the value (price of production) of commodities, 
especially means of production, the capital invested in these commodities 
is devalorized. Secondly, as a result of commerical bankruptcies and 
firms going out of business, much of the value of their capital is 
destroyed. This capital was part of the total social capital, which 
thereby loses part of its aggregate value. 
Development : the maturation of the forces and relations of the 
capitalist mode of production. 
Differential Land Rent: specific form of surplus-profit originating from 
the differential productivity of specific agricultural or mining land (or 
successive investments in these lands), so long as the value and market 
price of the agricultural or mining products in question are regulated by 
less productive land. 
Equalization of Rate of Profit : the price that equilibrates rates of 
profit for all departments is a price such that all products, except 
those of the department where the value composition of capital is the 
social average, sell either above or below their value (Becker, 
1977:144). Capital will relinquish the branches with lower rates of 
profit and flow into the branches with a higher rate. There, 
over-production and over-accumulation will take place, lowering market 
prices and suppressing surplus-profits, while the branches which have 
suffered a drain of capital will no longer be able wholly to supply 
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socially effective demand at current output. Market prices in the later 
sectors will thus rise again. In the analysis of the process, however, 
it should be recalled once more that even with complete mobility of 
capital, there is no immediate equalization of the rate of profit. A 
significant period of time separates the first moment that a 
technological discovery is given a productive application from the moment 
that there is an equalization of the rate of profit. Only when 
intensified competition has lowered the profit of the innovating firm 
once more to the social average by a reduction in market value 
proportionate to the saving of social labor and consequent diminution in 
the value of the commodity, can one say that equalization of the rate of 
profit has been achieved. In the entire intermediate period, technical 
innovation does actually permit the realization of a surplus-profit. It 
should be further pointed out that the whole process of the appearance 
and disappearance of surplus-profits unleashed by technical innovation is 
simultaneously a process of the accumulation and devalorization of 
capital, in which many capitals operating with an insufficient 
productivity of labor are ruined before the equalization of the rate of 
profit takes place (Mandel, 1980:92-93). 
Equalization of Terms of Exchange : if prices cover the costs of 
reproduction in all sectors, equality of terms of exchange mean that 
prices per unit of exported value equal prices per unit of imported 
value. Thus, producers in all sectors have equal shares in the costs and 
gains of reproduction (Becker, 1977:138). 
Exchange Value : value for which a commodity is exchanged on the market. 
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According to Marx's labor theory of value, the exchange value of a 
commodity is determined by the socially necessary quantity of unskilled 
labor needed for its reproduction at a given social average productivity 
of labor, and measured by the length of labor time (hours or days) needed 
to produce it. 
Family Farming : characterized by (1) family ownership of land and other 
capital items, and (2) dependence on family labor (Rodefeld, 1978). It 
is usually considered as a precapitalist form of simple commodity 
production which has been left untouched by capitalist development (Goss 
et al., 1980). The family farmer is a propertied laborer, an independent 
producer of agricultural commodities who owns both the means of 
production and the product of his labor (Davis, 1980). Parallel concepts 
include simple commodity production (Mandel, 1980; Friedmann, 1978), 
petty commodity production (Davis, 1980; Hedley, 1980; Goss et al., 
1980); and independent production (Kelley, 1979). 
Fixed Capital: that part of constant capital used to purchase buildings 
and machinery. 
Forces of Production: a particular arrangement of labor and the objects 
and instruments of labor as a technical process (O'Laughlin, 1975:351). 
Formal Subsumption of Labor Under Capital : consists of two mechanisms: 
the monetization of all factors of production, and the dispossession of 
workers from all means of production. The production of absolute 
surplus-value is the material expression of the formal subsumption of 
labor under capital (Chevalier, 1983:158,173). 
Homoficence: literally doing the same thing or having the same effect. 
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Rey elsewhere calls it the parallelism of the action of capital 
(Foster-Carter, 1978:57). 
Increase of Absolute Surplus-Value : obtained by a lengthening of the 
working day (or week) without any commensurate increase in wages for the 
direct producers. 
Increase in Relative Surplus Value : obtained by a shortening of that 
part of the working day (or week) during which the worker reproduces the 
equivalent of his wage, without any overall reduction of the working day 
(or week), via an increase in the productivity of labor in agriculture 
and those branches of industry which produce consumer goods for the 
working class. 
Late Capitalism: began when fascism and the Second World War generated a 
significant increase in the rate of surplus-value, which was prolonged by 
a substantial reduction in the price of important elements of constant 
capital, which allowed capital in general to overcome the long-term 
decline or stagnation of the average rate of profit. The result was an 
acceleration in the accumulation of capital (further favored by the 
permanent arms economy), which then seized the discoveries and 
innovations that had been maturing over the previous decade, and thereby 
unleashed a Third Technological Revolution (Mandel, 1980:557). 
Law of Combined and Uneven Development : the capitalist mode of 
production reproduces in varying patterns and degrees a combination of 
past and present modes (Mandel, 1980:29). 
Law of Unequal Exchange : is a law of price-value relationships as they 
arise in the course of capitalist development. The more advanced sectors 
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export and import from the backward sectors. As a consequence, the 
capitalists in the advanced sectors realize comparatively beneficial 
terms of trade. The price per unit of exported value is hgher than the 
price per unit of imported value (Becker, 1977:147). 
Law of Value : the economic mechanism in a society of private producers 
which distributes the total labor power at the disposal of society (and 
thereby all material resources necessary for production) between its 
various branches of production, via the mediation of the exchange of all 
commodities at their values (in the capitalist mode of production). 
Under capitalism, this law determines the pattern of investment - i.e., 
the inflow and outflow of capital in different branches of production, 
according to the deviation of their specific rate of profit from the 
average rate of profit. 
Long Waves of Capitalist Development : there have been four long waves in 
the history of international capitalism, each.lasting approximately 50 
years. Each long wave can be divided into two parts. The first part is 
an initial phase in which technology is revolutionized and is 
characterized by an increased rate of profit, accelerated accumulation, 
accelerated growth, accelerated self-expansion of previously idle capital 
and the accelerated devalorization of capital previously invested in the 
production of the means of production but now technically obsolescent. 
In the second phase, the actual transformation in productive technology 
has already occurred and has been generally adopted. This phase is 
characterized by retreating profits, slowly reducing accumulation, 
decelerating economic growth, gradually increasing difficulties in the 
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valorization of the total accumulated capital, and the gradual, 
self-reproducing rise in idle capital. According to this scheme, the 
second half of the long wave, which began with the Second World War and 
which is characterized by decelerated capital accumulation, has begun. 
The numerous recessions in the most important industrial countries in the 
1960s and 1970s confirm this hypothesis. These long waves do not assert 
themselves in a mechanical fashion but function through the articulation 
of the classical cycles. In a phase of expansion, the cyclical periods 
of boom will be longer and more intensive, the cyclical crises of 
overproduction shorter and more superficial. Conversely, in those phases 
of the long wave where a tendency to stagnation is prevalent, the periods 
of boom will prove less feverish and more transitory, while the periods 
of cyclical crisis of over-production will, by contrast, be longer and 
more profound. The long wave is conceivable only as the result of these 
cyclical fluctuations (Mandel, 1980:120-122). 
Maximization in the Concrete : the working owner is driven not by the 
pursuit of greater profits, but rather by the quest for a feasible 
optimum of actual consumption (which may or may not be superior - or even 
equal to prior levels of consumption); one of the two versions of the 
economic maximizing rationale (Chevalier, 1982:145). 
Maximization Without Accumulation: a strategy geared to the attainment 
of a maximum and feasible level of concrete consumption (which may or may 
not correspond to the minimum standards of subsistence (Chevalier, 
1982:9). 
Maximization Without Capitalization: simple commodity producers own 
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their own means of personal and productive consumption and will seek to 
enlarge them, yet they cannot treat the later as a means of profitable 
accumulation. They sell goods which they have produced and in such a 
limited quantity (or low prices) that the money thus derived is not 
always sufficient to sustain minimum standards of personal consumption. 
The instruments of production and the object of labor which they own 
possess limited worth (because of low market value or long-term 
indebtedness problems) and can hardly be considered as a source of 
profitable monopoly over scarce factors of production. The labor-power 
that workers purchase from others or themselves cannot be treated as 
capital but only as needed use-values that are indispensable in securing 
the reproduction of the household economy (Chevalier, 1983:178). 
Mode of Production: describes the essential forces and relations of 
production of the economic base in a particular form of society. The 
base, furthermore, is not self-reproducing; it only can be realized 
within a social totality (O'Laughlin, 1975:358). 
Monopoly Capitalism: that phase in the development of the capitalist 
mode of production in which a qualitative increase in the concentration 
and centralization of capital leads to the elimination of price 
competition from a series of key branches of industry, monopolistic 
agreements are formed, a few firms completely dominate successive 
markets, banking capital increasingly merges with industrial capital into 
finance capital, a few very large financial groups dominate the economy 
of each capitalist country, these giant monopolies divide the world 
markets of key commodities between themselves, and the imperialist powers 
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divide the globe into colonial empires or semi-colonial spheres of 
influence. A trend to "regulate" (i.e., limit) investment and production 
in monopolized sectors henceforward prevails, in spite of the emergence 
of monopolistic surplus-profits, so that over-accumulation leads to a 
frantic growth of capital exports. 
Monopoly Surplus Profits : specific forms of surplus-profit originating 
from obstacles to entry into special branches of production. 
Natural Economy: one based on the production for personal needs (use 
value) and the close connection between industry (handicrafts) and 
agriculture (Bradby, 1975:127). 
Organic Composition of Capital: a measure of the relation of constant 
(c) to variable (v) capital in the total composition of capital (q), q = 
c/c+v, a measure of the extent to which labor is furnished with 
materials, instruments, and machinery in the productive process (Sweezy, 
1970:66) . 
Periodization: certain periods or stages can be distinguished in the 
development of the capitalist mode of production (O'Laughlin, 1975:359). 
Rey distinguishes three periods or stages of articulation between the 
precapitalist mode and the capitalist mode of production (Foster-Carter, 
1978:56): (1) an initial link in the sphere of exchange, where 
interaction with capitalism reinforces the precapitalist mode; (2) 
capitalism takes root, subordinating the precapitalist mode; (3) the 
total disappearance of the precapitalist mode, even in agriculture. 
Price (Market Price): the monetary expression of the exchange value of a 
commodity, which oscillates about this value according to the laws of 
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supply and demand. 
Prices of Production: transformation of values of commodities by means 
of competition between capitals, which tends to equalize the rate of 
profit for each capital. The result of this process of equalization is 
that each capital does not appropriate the sum total of the surplus-value 
produced by "its own" workers, but a part of the total social 
surplus-value proportionate to the fraction of total social capital which 
it represents. The sum total of prices of production is equal to the sum 
total of value, because in the process of competition and equalization of 
the rate of profit, no additional surplus-value can be created nor any 
portion of socially produced surplus-value be destroyed. 
Productive Capital ; that part of social capital invested in sectors 
where surplus-value is directly produced. 
Productive Labor : in a capitalist society, only that labor which 
directly produces surplus-value. 
Profit : that part of social surplus-value which is appropriated by each 
particular capital (each capitalist firm). 
Rate of Accumulation: the relationship between the accumulated portion 
of surplus-value and the value of the capital which this surplus-value 
increases. 
Rate of Profit: the ratio of surplus-value (s) to total capital outlay 
(c+v), p = s/c+v, or p = s'(l-q) (Sweezy, 1970:67). 
Rate of Surplus Value : the ratio of surplus-value (s) to variable capital 
(v), s' = s/v (Sweezy, 1970:63-64). 
Real Subsumption of Labor Under Capital : occurs only when a revolution 
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takes place in the development of the social forces of production of 
labor, hence a complete transformation which brings about large-scale 
production and the direct application of science and advanced technology. 
The production of relative surplus-value may be viewed as the real 
subsumption of labor under capital (Chevalier, 1983:173). 
Realization of Surplus-Value; surplus-value, produced by workers in the 
process of production, and therefore contained in the commodities as soon 
as this production is completed, can only be appropriated by capitalists 
in money form - in other words, after the commodities in question have 
been sold. Realization of surplus-value thus involves the sale of 
commodities at such a market price that part or whole of the 
surplus-value which they contain can be appropriated by their owners. 
Relations of Production: a particular arrangement of labor and the 
objects and instruments of labor in terms of the relations of 
appropriation between persons (O'Laughlin, 1975:351). 
Reproduction: the process by which, after production and sale of 
commodités, a new cycle of production is undertaken by a given capital. 
Simple Commodity Production: economic system in which producers sell the 
products of their labor on the market, but remain proprietors of, or have 
direct access to, their own means of production and livelihood 
(essentially small farmers and independent artisans). The general 
purpose of such commodity owners is to sell their own products in order 
to buy goods necessary for their livelihood which they do not produce 
themselves, because of the social division of labor. 
Social Formation: relational systems composed of superstructure and a 
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determinant economic base which may itself be a complex articulation of 
more than a single mode of production (O'Laughlin, 1975:350). 
Specificity of Dominated Forms : surviving noncapitalist structures and 
enterprises are characterized as modes of production reproduced in 
articulation with the dominant mode (Goodman and Reclift, 1981:59). They 
have properties common to all precapitalist economies, - e.g., "natural 
economies" - such that they can be analyzed by a common set of concepts 
(O'Laughlin, 1975:353). 
Surplus-Profits : all profits over and above the socially average rate of 
profit. 
Surplus-Value : the monetary form assumed by the social surplus product 
in a commodity producing society. In a capitalist society, surplus-value 
is produced by wage laborers and appropriated by capitalists: in other 
words, it is the difference between the new value produced by labor in 
the process of production and the cost of reproducing labor power (or the 
value of labor power). In the final analysis, it represents unpaid labor 
appropriated by the capitalist class. 
Technological Rents : those monopoly surplus-profits originating from 
technical advances protected by monopolistic practices. 
Technological Revolution: involves a fundamental restructuring of the 
basic techniques in all areas of capitalist production and distribution 
including transportation and communications. Massive innovation does not 
occur during a long wave with an undertone of stagnation because of low 
profit expectations. Once the average rate of profit begins to increase, 
capital discovers a supply of unused or only slightly applied innovations 
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and has, therefore, the means to undertake a technological revolution. 
Along with the supply of innovations is a supply of unused capital not 
previously invested which is now added to the rapid increase in new and 
accumulated surplus-value to make a healthy increase in productive 
investment possible. A genuine technological revolution results in large 
differences in production costs between those firms using the 
revolutionary technology and those that do not (Mandel, 1980:119-120). 
Technological Treadmill : the aggressive, innovative farmer is on a 
treadmill with regard to the adoption of new and improved technologies on 
his farm. As he rushes to adopt a new and improved technology when it 
first becomes available, he at first reaps a gain. But as others after 
him run to adopt the technology, the treadmill speeds up and grinds out 
an increased supply of the product. The increased supply of the product 
drives the price of the product down to where the early adopter and all 
his fellow adopters are back in a no-profit situation. Farm 
technological advance in a free market situation forces the participants 
to run on a treadmill. Not only did the process of farm technological 
advance force the participants in the process onto a treadmill, but it 
created a condition in which the strong and aggressive farmers gobbled up 
the weak and inefficient. The process of farm technological advance has 
contributed importantly to the redistribution of productive assets in 
American agriculture in which commerical production has been, and 
continues to be, concentrated on the larger farms. The process of farm 
technological advance has resulted in widespread cannibalism in American 
agriculture (Cochrane, 1979:389-390). 
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Terms of Exchange : measure the relations of exchange in an 
interdependent system. The terms are a ratio of the long-run market 
price received per unit of value exported compared to the market price 
paid per unit of value imported (Becker, 1977:138). 
Third Technological Revolution: began in North America in 1940 and in 
other industrial countries in 1945-48 and is characterized by the 
generalized control of machines by means of electronic apparatuses 
(Mandel, 1980:121). 
Turnover Time of Capital: the time during which the value of a capital 
is reconstituted. Normally, one cycle of production and circulation 
(sale of commodities) reconstitutes circulating capital, whereas fixed 
capital is only reconstituted after several cycles of production and 
circulation of commodities. 
Use-Value: utility of a commodity for the fulfillment of a specific need 
of its purchaser. Goods without use value for anyone cannot be exchanged 
or sold. By extension, production of use values pure and simple, as 
opposed to production of commodities, is production of goods for the 
consumption of their direct producers, or collective units of such 
producers. 
Valorization : the process whereby capital increases its own value by the 
production of surplus-value. Marx presents the process of commodity 
production as a unity of two distinct processes - the labor process 
through which labor power produces use values, and the valorization 
process through which labor power produces additional value over and 
above its own value. This surplus-value, although created during the 
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process of production, has first to be realized through the sale of 
commodities before capital can appropriate it and therewith, actually 
increase its own value. 
Value of Labor Power : the sum total of the exchange values of all those 
commodities necessary to reproduce the labor power of the direct producer 
and his family. This contains a purely physiological element, and a 
moral-historical element. The later is a function of those workers' 
needs that are formed by a specific level of civilization and a given 
relationship of forces between social classes, which have become 
acknowledged as integral to a normal standard of living. 
Variable Capital : replaces the value of labor power, does in a sense 
undergo an alteration of value in that it both reproduces the equivalent 
of its own value, and also produces an excess, a surplus-value, which may 
itself vary, maybe more or less according to circumstances (Sweezy, 
1970:62) . 
Vertical Concentration: refers to the coordination, standardization, and 
(greater or lesser) supervision of the production of numerous small 
producers through a central agency whether this represents productive 
capital directly (as in out-grower arrangements), forms of merchant's 
capital which thereby actively intervene in the organization of 
production, or whether the agency is that of a cooperative or other 
state-managed scheme (Bernstein, 1977:70). 
Wage: price of the commodity of labor power, or monetary expression of 
its exchange-value, which oscillates about the value of labor-power via 
the regulation of the reserve army of labor, or volume of unemployment. 
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APPENDIX D: 
MARKOV MODEL 
First-Order, Finite, Discrete Stationary 
Markov Process Model 
Estimated From Micro Data 
The model and its characteristics are defined as follows 
(Hallberg, 1969; 290-291; Lee et al., 1977; 23): 
(1) s^ = the ith outcome or state. There are a finite number 
of outcomes or states s^ (i . . .r), which random variable 
X^ (t=0,l,2, . .T) may take in T discrete equisdistant time 
periods. 
(2) Pr (X^ = s^^, ®it-l' %t-2 ° ^it-2 
^0 " ®io^ ^ = ®it\-l ^  ^ it-l) C' ^hich 
means that it is a first-order process. 
(3) P = = rXr matrix of transition probabilities, where 
represents the probability that outcome will result 
during the tth time period given that outcome s^ occurred 
during the (t-l)th time period. 
(4) X = the initial starting state vector or initial 
configuration of elements in the r states, where X^^ 
represents the number of elements in s^ during time period 
t=0. 
(5) X^ = (X^^) = the configuration vector. 
(5) n^j = the number of elements in s^ during period (t-1) 
which moved to s^ during time period t. 
(7) X^ = X^P, the future time path of the stochastic process. 
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Additionally, two constraints are imposed on the elements of the 
P matrix: 
(8) > 0 for all i, j ,t. 
(9) S P... = 1 for all i and t. j = l 
Anderson and Goodman (1957) suggested that the maximum likelihood 
estimator technique could be used to estimate the transition 
probabilities of elements moving between size categories. The 
calculation of the maximum liklihood estimator is as follows: 
t-l 
To estimate the transition matrix, historical micro-level data 
which indicate the number of elements which move from state i to state 
j during each time period are needed. 
First-Order, Finite, Discrete, Stationary 
Markov Process Model 
Estimated from Aggregate Data 
Because micro data which indicate the movement of farms between 
size categories in successive time periods is not available, aggregate 
data which indicate the number of farms by size categories at 
successive time periods would have to suffice. Lee, Judge and Zellner 
(1977) developed a model which could be used to estimate transition 
probabilities from aggregate proportion data. The model addressed the 
situation where n^j^ sample observations are not available. Instead, 
the model uses aggregate outcome data, n.^ and the total number of 
r ^ 
elements which are being observed, E n.^. This aggregate data can be 
used to determine the proportion of elements in each state in time 
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period t. 
(11) y je 
The first order conditional probability assumption is (Lee et 
al., 1977: 31): 
By applying the generalized law of addition to 12, 13 can be 
generated: 
r 
(13) P/x^-Sj) -
(14) qjç = s (t-l)Pij where and q.^^_ 1) 
represent the unconditional probabilities, P^(x^=Sj) and 
P^=(x^^_^^=s^) respectively. The observed proportions y^^ and Yj ]_) 
may be substituted as estimates for the unconditional probabilities. 
By substituting the observed proportions and by adding an error term, 
14 becomes: 
(15) y.(t) = Z (t-1) p.. + u 
J i=i iJ J'--
Equation 15 can be written in matrix notation as : 
(16) = XjPj + Uj where 
(17) y^ is a (Txl) vector of observed sample proportions. 
' ^ jl 
^j2 
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(18) Xj is a (T X r) matrix of sample proportions. 
X, 10 
X 11 
^20 • • • • \o 
^21 • • • • 
^l(T-l) ^2(T-1) • • \(T-1) 
(19) Pj is a (rXl) vector of unknown transition probabilities to 
be estimated. 
Plj 
P2j 
(20) Uj is a (TXl) vector of error terms. 
The error term vector assumptions are: 
(21) E(u ) = 0 
(22) E(UjUj ) = $, a (TXT) covariance matrix. 
The model can be restated to reflect all s for each of the time 
periods. 
(23) y = Xp + u. 
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Equation 23 can be written in matrix notation as : 
(24) yi ^1 "Pl" 
^2 X2 P2 
+ 
^2 
^r ^r Pr ^r 
Each y is a (rTXl) vector of sample proportions, where each is a 
(TXl) vector as demonstrated in 17. 
(25) y = 
^1 
^2 
The X is a (rTxr ) block diagonal matrix with x^ = x^ = x^, where each 
Xj is a (Txr) matrix of sample proportions as described in 18. 
X- x ^  . . . .  0  
0 Xg . 
0  . . . .  X 
r 
The p is a (r XI) matrix of unknown transition probabilities, where 
each Pj is a (rXl) vector of unknown transition probabilities where 
each vector takes the form developed in 19. 
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(27) P = 
u is a (rTXl) vector of error terms, where each is a (TXl) (10X1) 
vector of error terms as developed in 20. 
(28) u = 
The error term assumptions are: 
(29) E (u) = 0 
(30) E (uu') = f , a (rTXrT) covariance matrix as shown in 31. 
(31) Y 11 Y 12 Ir 
"^21 22 2r 
rl r2 rr 
The elements of the covariance matrix Y are given as : 
(32) variance; t=t' 
i=J 
irj -Sit^jt 
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and where the submatrices 4" ^ are the size (TXT) as expressed in: 
(33) 
11= 
(34) = 
-qi2qj2/N2 for iî^j 
The ordinary least squares technique can be used to estimate the 
transition probabilities by minimizing the sum of squared error terms 
(Miller, 1952). 
(35) min u'u = (y-Xp)'(y-Xp) 
An estimate for p is obtained by setting the sum of the squared error 
terms equal to zero and solving for p. 
(36) p - (X'X)'^X'Y 
When a solution for p is obtained in 34, there is no guarantee 
that all of the estimated p..'s will meet the criteria that p.. > 0 
^ iJ ^1] -
or i p.. = 1. To fullfill the requirement that all p..'s are > 0 and 
j=l r 
to also guarantee that S p . .  = 1 ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a r e  j = l i-J 
placed on 35. 
(37) Gp > 
2 
where G is a (rXr ) matrix (I^, , I^) with each an (rXr) 
identity matrix, and n^ is a (rXl) column vector with all elements 
equal to 1. The purpose of the restriction in 37 is to guarantee that 
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(38) Another restriction, p > 0, is imposed on 35 to guarantee 
that there are no negative p^'s. 
The solution of 28 with the imposed restrictions 37 and 38 shall 
be referred to as estimating restricted stationary transition 
probabilities by ordinary least squares Markov model. In a model 
involving proportions, however, heteroscedasticity is present. The 
unweighted, restricted ordinary least squares estimator does not 
account for heteroscedasticity and is therefore inefficient. Aitken's 
generalized least squares approach (Lee et al., 1977: 63) can be 
applied to deal with the problem. The following unbiased estimator is 
obtained: 
(39) p = (X'Y"^X)"^X'Y'^Y. 
Because Y is a singular (TrXTr) covariance matrix, "i' ^ does not 
exist thus making Aitken's generalized least square technique 
unusable. Lee et al., (1977: 75) noted, however, that since the model 
as developed in 23 is restricted by the requirement that the row sums 
for each y^. must equal 1, there are redundant variables. There are, 
therefore, only r-1 independent observation vectors y^ and r-1 
independent parameter vectors p^. The model can be reduced as 
follows : 
(40) 
^1 
^2 
1 i
-i 
1 
^
 
r-1 r-1 r-1 
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The model can be written in matrix form as follows: 
(41) Y* = X*p* + u* where 
Y* = (T (r-l)X 1) matrix 
X* = (T(r-l)X 1) vector 
p* = (Tr(r-l)Xl)X 1) vector 
u* = (T(r-l)Xl) vector 
The error term vector u* has the following assumptions : 
(42) Eu* = 0 
(43) Eu*u * = Y * where Y * is a nonsingular block matrix 
2 
consisting of (r-1) Y _ submatrices in the form developed 
in 44. 
(44) ij/ * = 
'11 
21 
12 
22 
1 r-1 
2 r-1 
r-1 ^r-1 ' r-1, r-1 
The submatrices dimensions of Y* are (T X T) and the elements of each 
are given by 45 and 46. 
-qiiqil/Ni 
-qj2qj2/^2 
-QIT^JT/^T 
^il^^'^il^/^l 
(45) Y.j = 
i=j 
(46) Y.. = 
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(47) The inverse of 'F* is a ((r-l)T X (r-l)T) matrix with 
(r-l)(r-l) submatrices in the following form: 
^11 *12 
Y 21 ?22 
l.r-1 
2,r-l 
"r-l ^-1 • r-l,r-l 
The size of the submatrices of Y * is (T X T) and the elements of each 
submatrix are specified in the following: 
(48) Y.j Ni/qri 
N2/qr2 
N^/qrT 
(49)  
JJ ^1 + ^ 1 
^rl ^11 
^r2 ^22 
«Tt + 
^rT 
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p* can be estimated by placing 41 in quadratic form, and solving for 
p* which minimizes the sum of the squared error terms. The solution 
for p* is calculated by minimizing the quadratic as developed in 50 
and subject to the following restrictions: 
(50) (y* - X*p*)' 9 *'^(y* - X*p*) 
(51) Rp* < n^ 
(52) p* > 0 
The n^ matrix is a (r X 1) vector of ones, and the R matrix is a 
reduced G matrix of the size (r(r-l) X r) which takes the form 
(I^, ^r 1^ where each I is a (r X r) identity matrix. 
Once p* has been estimated, the deleted parameter p^ can be 
estimated by solving the following equation: 
(53) P]. - - Rp* 
Because the number of estimated parameters cannot be greater than 
the number of observations, the following equation must hold: 
(54) r^ < rT or r < T 
In summary, the model for a first order finite, stationary Markov 
process to estimate transition probabilities from macro data, 
utilizing ordinary least squares, is set forth in the following: 
(55) min (y - Xp)'(y - Xp) subject to the restrictions 
(56) Gp < n^ and p > 0 
and the first order, discrete, stationary Markov process model used to 
estimate transition probabilities from macro data, utilizing 
generalized least squares, is as follows: 
(57) min (y* - X/p*) Y * ^ (y* - y*p*) subject to the restrictions 
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(58) Rp* < 
p* > 0, and 
pr = n^ - Rp* 
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APPENDIX E: 
DATA 
Table E.l Number of farms by farm-size categories 1940-1982 
Farm-Size 1940^ 1945* 1950* 1954* 1959^ 1964^ 1969^ 1974® 1978^ 1982^ 
Categories , 
<10 acres 10428 10664 9585 9138 5469 4324 5637 5051 8343 7910 
10-49 acres 18097 17174 16515 14402 13710 11156 9586 9841 13034 12318 
50-99 acres 32146 28080 25894 22582 18549 18351 13796 12826 12327 10951 
100-139 acres 32854 30323 28720 24923 19586 15113 12563 10306 9268 7992 
140-179 acres 50967 50019 48846 45564 37408 27837 21897 17014 14608 12010 
180-219 acres 20722 21982 22457 22152 20105 16067 12818 10166 8890 7789 
220-259 acres 19302 20335 19896 20657 20699 17873 14582 11597 10012 8794 
260-499 acres 26119 27483 28144 29960 34337 38850 38598 34929 33373 29656 
500-999 acres 2382 2655 2845 3284 4477 6990 9865 12578 14195 14849 
1000+ acres 201 219 253 271 341 592 1012 1708 2406 3100 
Total 213318 208934 203155 192933 174681 157153 140354 126010 126456 115369 
yl954 Census of Agriculture, 
1959 Census of Agriculture, 
^1964 Census of Agriculture, 
1969 Census of Agriculture, 
with more than $2,500 sales). 
®1974 Census of Agriculture, 
with more than $2,500 sales). 
Volume I. Part 16, Iowa. State Table 2. 
Volume I. Part 16, Iowa. Chapter A, table 20. 
Volume I. Part 16, Iowa. State Table 20. 
Volume I. Part 16, Iowa. Chapter 1, Table 26 (Farms 
Volume I, Part 15, Iowa. Chapter 1, Table 30 (Farms 
Volume I, Part 15, Iowa. Chapter 1, Table 33. 
Volume I. Part 15, Iowa. Chapter 1, Table 48. 
Table E.2 Number and percent of acres by farm-size categories 
Year 
Farm Size 1959* 1964^ 1969^ 1974^ 1978® 1982^ 
Categories Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number 
<10 acres 23135 .06 16944 .05 14365 .04 13754 .04 25340 .08 25456 
10-49 acres 368602 1 .1 306477 .9 267618 .8 274951 .8 337969 1 .0 319710 
50-99 acres 1427816 4, .2 1174936 3, .5 1052929 3, .1 973220 2 .9 925799 2, .8 816069 
100-139 acres 2316141 6, .8 1786915 5 .3 1482641 4, ,4 1213123 3 .7 1089176 3, .2 938949 
140-179 acres 5940523 17, .5 4420728 13 ,1 3471079 10, .3 2695163 8 .2 2308921 6, .9 1900552 
180-219 acres 3978935 11. ,7 3176784 9, .4 2534995 7, ,6 2009891 6 , . 1 1758258 5, .2 1539442 
220-259 acres 4920230 14, , 5 4251136 12. .6 3468717 10. , 3 2756204 8 , .3 2380552 7, .1 2090793 
260-499 acres 11600483 34. ,2 13351684 39, ,6 13540385 40. ,3 12412130 37, .6 11969772 35. ,6 10696632 
500-999 acres 2821045 8. 3 4410781 13. ,1 6307752 18. 8 8174543 24, .7 9338622 27. 8 9842173 
1000+ acres 501271 1. 5 861936 2. ,6 1429148 4. 2 2521789 7. ,6 2702446 8. 0 4419778 
Total 33898181 33758321 33569629 33044768 33580851 32589554 
Avg. Farm Size 194 219 239 262 266 282 
^1954 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
1959 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
^1964 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
1969 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
(Farms with more than $2,500 sales). 
1974 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
(Farms with more than $2,500 sales). 
^1978 Census of Agr icul tiire , Volume 
I, Part 16, Iowa. State Table 2. 
I, Part 16. Iowa. Chapter A, table 20 
I, Part 16, Iowa. State Table 20. 
I. Part 16, Iowa. Chapter 1, Table 26 
1. Part 15, Iowa. Chapter 1, Table 30 
I. Part 15, T owa . Cha p te r 1, Tab 1 o. 33 
Table E.3 Value (in thousands) of products sold and percent by farm-size categories 
Year 
Farm Size 
Categories 
1959* 
Number % 
1964^ 
Number % 
1969^ 
Number % 
1974^ 
Number % 
1978® 
Number % 
1982^ 
Numbe; 
<10 acres 15667 , 6 16988 .6 32107 1, .0 50680 1 .2 80106 1 .9 78197 
10-49 acres 38526 1 . 5 36144 1, 4 31351 ,9 55505 1 .3 96754 2 .3 75663 
50-99 acres 104008 4, .0 82988 3. 2 82311 2, .5 111316 2 .6 106000 2 ,5 79579 
100-139 acres 168239 6 , 5 134561 5, .2 129771 3, .9 134942 3 .2 119338 2 .8 85496 
140-179 acres 484881 18. , 6 383974 14. 8 346949 10. 5 338784 7, .9 287094 6 ,8 188918 
180-219 acres 394466 11. 7 260998 10. 0 249332 7, .5 244272 5 .7 216802 5 .2 153293 
220-259 acres 394660 15. , 2 362689 13. ,9 357596 10. ,8 359864 8, .4 298583 7, .1 215119 
260-499 acres 854963 32. , 8 1094146 42. ,0 1309958 39. ,6 1597079 37, .4 1463521 34. 8 1087329 
500-999 acres 195615 7. 5 346484 13. 3 605431 18, 3 1024601 24. ,0 1093794 26, .0 979624 
1000+ acres 42128 1. 6 74908 2. ,9 165603 5. 0 349870 8, .2 438323 10. 4 454910 
Total 2603154 2793881 3310408 4266931 4200316 3398820 
^1954 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
1959 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
^1964 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
1969 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
(Farms with more than $2,500 sales). 
1974 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
(Farms with more than $2,500 sales). 
^1978 Census of Agricul., Volume 
I, Part 16, Iowa. State Table 2. 
I. Part 16, Iowa. Chapter A, table 20 
I. Part 16, Iowa. State Table 20. 
I. Part 16. I owa. Chapter 1, Table 26 
I, Part 15, I owa . Chapter 1. Table 30 
T, Part 1.5, T owa . Chapter 1, Tzible 33 
Table E.4 Number and percent of farms reporting 100 or more days off-farm work by farm-size 
categories 
Year 
Farm Size 1959^ 1964^ 1969° 1974^ 1978® 1982^ 
Categories Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
<10 acres 2575 11, .0 1889 7, .4 1011 4 . 6 1153 5 .9 5003 14 ,2 4697 14 .6 
10-49 acres 6208 26 .5 5532 21 .8 1759 8 .1 2295 11 .7 8696 24, .7 8062 25 .1 
50-99 acres 5037 21, .5 5552 21, .8 4170 19, ,2 4519 23, .0 6381 18, .1 5520 17, .2 
100-139 acres 3120 13, .3 3404 13, .4 3205 14 .8 2872 14 .6 3686 10. 5 3145 9, .8 
140-179 acres 2801 11. ,9 3466 13. ,6 4212 19, .4 3147 16, .0 3823 10, ,9 3367 10. 5 
180-219 acres 1246 5. , 3 1664 6. 5 1911 8, .8 1515 7, .7 1854 5, ,3 1714 5. 3 
220-259 acres 906 3. 9 1252 4. 9 1673 7. , 7 1161 5. ,9 1515 4. 3 1384 4, ,3 
260-499 acres 1270 5. ,4 2211 8. 7 3073 14. ,2 2379 12. ,1 3201 9. 1 3053 9. ,5 
500-999 acres 263 1. 1 383 1. 5 625 2. 9 507 2. ,6 814 2. 3 901 2. 8 
1000+ acres 39 2 61 2 102 5 79 ,4 164 5 1122 3. 5 
Total 23456 25414 21741 19627 35137 32066 
^1954 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
1959 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
^1964 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
1969 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
(Farms with more than $2,500 sales). 
1974 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
(Farms with more than $2,500 sales). 
^ 1 9 7 8  Cen.SLis of Agricul Um e , Volume 
I, Part 16. Iowa. State Table 2. 
I, Part 16, Iowa. Chapter A, table 20 
I, Part 16, I owa. State Table 20. 
I, Part 16, Iowa. Chapter 1, Table 26 
I, Part 15, Iowa . Chapter 1, Table 30 
I. Part 15, T owa , Chapter 1 , Tiible 33 
Talilo E.5 Number and percent of farms employing laborers 150 days or more per year by farm-
size categories 
Year 
Farm Size 
Categories 
1959* 
Number % 
1964^ 
Number ! 
1969^ 
Number % 
1974^ 
Number % 
1978® 
Number ! h
1982^ 
Number % 
<10 acres 138 1 .0 106 ,7 134 1 .5 159 1 .6 216 1 .5 336 2 .3 
10-49 acres 185 1 .4 109 .8 74 .8 118 1 .2 391 2 .7 445 3 .0 
50-99 acres 304 2. 3 261 1. 8 142 1 .6 131 1 .3 366 2, .5 344 2 .3 
100-139 acres 332 2. ,5 391 2. ,7 192 2 .2 187 1 .9 413 2. ,8 405 2, .8 
140-179 acres 1206 9. ,0 1098 7. ,7 485 5 .4 481 4 .8 884 6, .0 815 5, ,6 
180-219 acres 1009 7. ,6 744 5. ,2 401 4 .5 447 4 .4 671 4. 6 691 4. 7 
220-259 acres 1527 1, ,1 1316 ,9 571 6 .4 605 6 .0 782 5. ,3 872 6, .0 
260-499 acres 6260 47. ,0 6519 45. 8 3430 38 .8 3460 34 .4 5033 34. 4 4722 32 .2 
500-999 acres 2097 15. , 7 3261 22, 9 2777 31 .4 3402 33 .8 4448 30. 4 4246 29 .0 
1000+ acres 261 2. 0 444 3. 1 641 7 .2 1063 10 .6 1433 9. 8 1771 12, ,1 
Total 13319 14249 8847 10053 14637 14647 
1959 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 16, Iowa. Chapter A, Table 20 
(Estimates based on samples). 
1964 Census of Agriculture, Volume I. Part 16. Iowa. Chapter 1, Table 20 
(Estimates based on samples). 
*^1969 Census of Agriculture, Volume I. Part 16, Iowa. Chapter 1. Table 26 
(Farms with more than $2,500 sale s) , 
*^1974 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 15, Iowa . Chapter 1, Table 30 
(Farms with more than $2,500 sale s) . 
®1978 Census of Agriculture, Volume I. Part 15, I owa. Chapter 1, Table 33 
^1982 Census of Agriculture, Volume 1 , Part 15, Iowa . Clu'ipte r 1. Table 48 
Table E.6 Number and percent of owners by farm-size categories 
Year 
Farm Size 1959^ 1964^ 1969^ 1974^ 1978® 1982^ 
Categories Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number 
<10 acres 4446 5 .6 3582 7 .4 2198 4 .7 2976 5 ,3 6918 14, .2 6886 13 .0 
10-49 acres 11303 14, .2 9302 13, .3 2742 4, .8 4709 8, ,9 9921 16. ,9 9215 17 .4 
50-99 acres 14063 17, .6 11947 17, .1 7650 13, .4 8524 15, .2 8293 14. 1 7146 13 .5 
100-139 acres 11801 14. ,8 9877 14, .1 7803 13, .7 6823 12. 1 5761 9. . 8  4740 9, .0 
140-179 acres 16668 20 .9 13886 19, .8 12536 21, ,9 10248 18. 2 8158 13. ,9 16521 12 .3 
180-219 acres 6852 8, ,6 6274 9. 0 6099 10. . 7 5365 9. 6 4275 7. 3 3576 6, .8 
220-259 acres 5624 7. ,0 5317 7. ,6 5773 10. , 1 4899 8. ,7 4046 6. 9 3524 6. 7 
260-499 acres 7744 9. ,7 8374 12. ,0 10211 17 . ,9 10045 17. 9 8826 15. 0 8095 15. 3 
500-999 acres 1065 1. ,3 1287 1. ,8 1861 3. ,2 2277 4. 0 2221 3. 8 2642 5. ,0 
1000+ acres 111 1 150 2 229 4 312 6 356 6 562 1, 1 
Total 79677 69981 57102 56178 58775 52907 
^1959 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
1964 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
^^1969 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
(Farms with more than $2,500 sales). 
*^1974 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
(Farms with more than $2,500 sales). 
®1978 Census of Agriculture, Volume 
1982 Census of Agr icu 1 tiwe , VoLuiiio 
I, Part 16, I owa . Chapter A, table 20 
I, Part 16, Iowa. State Table 20. 
I. Part 16, Iowa. Chapter 1, Table 26 
I, Part 15, Iowa . Chapter 1, Table 30 
I, Part 15, Iowa. Chapter 1. Table 33 
I , Part 15, I owa . Chap ter 1, Tal)l (.• 48 
Table E.7 Number and percent of part-owners by farm-size categories 
Year 
Farm Size 
Categories 
1959* 
Number % 
1964^ 
Number è 
1969^ 
Number % 
1974^ 
Number I 
1978® 
Number I 
1982^ 
Number < i 
<10 acres 201 .6 98 . 3 20 . 1 29 .1 104 .3 190 .5 
10-49 acres 1007 2 .8 692 2 .0 189 .6 456 1 .3 1107 2 .8 1202 3 .1 
50-99 acres 1322 3 .7 1028 2, , 9 597 1 . 7 933 2, .6 1388 3 .5 1355 3 .5 
100-139 acres 2332 6 .6 1584 4, .5 1093 3 .2 1108 3, .1 1281 3 ,2 1332 3, .5 
140-179 acres 4654 13 .1 34.32 9. .8 2413 7 .0 2183 6, .1 2319 5 ,9 2141 5 .6 
180-219 acres 4558 12 .8 3842 11, .0 2905 8 .4 2310 6, ,4 2356 6, .0 2240 5, .8 
220-259 acres 5145 14 .5 4889 14, ,0 4052 11 .8 3411 9, .5 3211 8, .1 2944 7, ,7 
260-499 acres 11962 33 .6 15164 43, ,5 16569 48 .2 16071 44. 8 16389 41, ,4 14813 38, 6 
500-999 acres 2207 6 .2 3809 10, ,9 5864 17 .1 8053 22. ,5 9595 24. ,3 9927 25. ,8 
1000+ acres 159 .4 315 9 645 1 .9 1280 3. 6 1782 4. 5 2274 5. 9 
Total 35546 34853 34347 35834 39532 38418 
1959 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 16, Iowa. 
1964 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 16, Iowa. 
'1969 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 16, Iowa. 
; with more than $2,500 sales). 
'l974 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 15, Iowa. 
(Farms with more than $2,500 sales) 
1978 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 15, Iowa. 
^1982 Census of Agr icitl turc, Volume I, Part 15, Towa. 
Chapter A, table 20. 
State Table 20. 
Chapter 1, Table 26 
Chapter 1, Table 30 
Chapter 1, Table 33. 
Chapter 1, Table 48. 
Table E.8 Number and percent of tenants by farm-size categories 
Year 
Farm Size 
Categories 
1959* 
Number % 
1964^ 
Number ? h 
1969^ 
Number % 
1974^ 
Number h 
1978® 
Number % 
1982^ 
Number i 
<10 acres 801 1 .3 623 1 .3 305 1 .0 343 1 .4 1320 4 .7 834 3, .5 
10-49 acres 1357 2 .2 1139 2, ,3 456 1 .4 827 3 .3 1995 7 .1 1901 7 ,9 
50-99 acres 3138 5 .1 2353 4 .8 1540 4 .8 1746 7 .0 2642 9 .4 2450 10 .2 
100-139 acres 5432 8 .9 3630 7, ,4 2096 6 .5 1740 6 .9 2221 7 .9 1920 8, .0 
140-179 acres 16065 26 .3 10485 21, ,5 6026 18 .8 4100 16, .4 4125 14 .7 3348 13, .9 
180-219 acres 8685 14 .2 5932 12. 2 3421 10 .7 2297 9. 2 2255 8 .0 1973 8, .3 
220-259 acres 9889 16 .2 7617 15. 6 4530 14 .1 3118 12, .4 2750 9 .8 2326 9, ,7 
260-499 acres 14512 23 .8 15148 31, 0 11469 35 .8 8509 34. ,0 8136 29 .0 6748 28. ,1 
500-999 acres 1156 1 .9 1812 3. 7 2077 6 .5 2186 8, ,7 2386 8 .5 2280 9. ,5 
1000+ acres 36 .1 84 2 126 .4 257 1. 0 261 .9 264 1. 1 
Total 61071 48823 32046 25063 28073 24044 
j^l959 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 16, Iowa. 
1964 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 16, Iowa. 
1969 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 16, Iowa. 
(Farms with more than $2,500 sales). 
*^1974 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 15, Iowa. 
(Farms with more than $2,500 sales). 
1978 Census of Agriculture, Volume I, Part 15, Iowa. 
f 1982 Census of Agricu Iturc, Volume I, Part 15, I ovja . 
Chapter A, table 20. 
State Table 20. 
Chapter 1, Table 26 
Chapter 1, Table 30 
Chapter 1, Table 33. 
Chapter 1, Table. 4 8. 
